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Civil Society and International 
Governance
Structures and processes occurring within and between states are no longer the 
only – or even the most important – determinants of those political, economic 
and social developments and dynamics that shape the modern world. Many 
issues, including the environment, health, crime, drugs, migration and terrorism, 
can no longer be contained within national boundaries. As a result, it is not 
always possible to identify the loci for authority and legitimacy, and the role of 
governments has been called into question.
 This book critically analyses the increasing impact of nongovernmental 
organizations and civil society on global and regional governance. Written from 
the standpoint of advocates of civil society and addressing the role of civil 
society in relation to the UN, the IMF, the G8 and the WTO, the contributors to 
this volumes assess the role of various non- state actors from three perspectives: 
theoretical aspects, civil society interaction with the European Union and civil 
society and regional governance outside Europe, specifically Africa, East Asia 
and the Middle East. It demonstrates that civil society’s role has been more 
complex than one defined in terms, essentially, of resistance and includes actual 
participation in governance as well as multi- faceted contributions to legitimizing 
and democratizing global and regional governance.
 This book will be of interest to students and scholars of political science, 
international relations, civil society, sociology, European politics and global 
governance.
David Armstrong is Emeritus Professor at the University of Exeter. Valeria 
Bello is Marie Curie Intra- European Research Fellow at the Institut Barcelona 
d’Estudis Internacionals, Spain. Julie Gilson is a senior lecturer in the Depart-
ment of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Birming-
ham. Debora Spini teaches political theory at Syracuse University in Florence 
and Social Philosophy at Florence University.
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Civil society and international governance
David Armstrong and Julie Gilson
International politics have rarely seemed as uncertain since the end of the Second 
World War as they appear today. The Cold War, despite the threats it carried, 
did at least bring a degree of predictability and even stability to world politics: 
the nuclear ‘balance of terror’ imposed increasing degrees of self- discipline and 
restraint on the superpowers, while their competition for influence brought an 
element of stability to numerous potential conflict zones. Until 1970 American 
economic power was also able to underpin the 1944 Bretton Woods global finan-
cial system. Today we face a far less predictable and stable global situation, with 
the world economy lurching from one crisis to another, security fears of a com-
pletely different kind from anything anticipated during the Cold War, the col-
lapse to the point of ungovernability of some African countries and fears of 
catastrophic consequences arising from global warming over the next few 
decades.
 Many would argue that these crises share one further dimension: they are 
crises in governance. They do not simply indicate difficult times, but, crucially, 
point to a failure in the collective management of these problems: a failure in 
‘governance’. This concept itself is not easy to define, and is taken here to denote 
rules, structures and processes providing some measure of regulation over spe-
cific areas of activity and working towards certain given objectives. Rules, struc-
tures and processes may be formal or informal. Governance should be 
distinguished from the term government, which may be defined as authority 
exercised by a recognized agency over a given community backed by extensive 
powers of revenue generation and enforcement.
 Particularly in international affairs, the structures associated with governance 
tend not to be based on coercive enforcement powers, and to retain relatively 
fewer powers to generate revenue. However, as will be illustrated throughout this 
book, many of the elements inherent in the two terms can overlap, and some 
observers would query whether the distinction between governance and govern-
ment is indeed necessary or valid. In their contribution to this volume, for 
example, Godsäter and Söderbaum make use of an understanding of governance 
advanced by James Rosenau in which ‘the exercise of control’ is a key ingredient, 
rather than the preferred (and softer) term employed here: ‘regulation’. Rosenau 
himself, however, is also very clear that ‘governance’ and ‘government’ are 
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 separable phenomena: ‘To presume the presence of governance without govern-
ment is to conceive of functions that have to be performed in any viable human 
system irrespective of whether the system has evolved organizations and institu-
tions explicitly charged with performing them’ (Rosenau 1992: 3). In the two 
decades since Rosenau advanced that formulation the range of global activities 
and dynamics taking place outside a clearly demarcated ‘governmental’ space 
has escalated, notably as a consequence of various processes of ‘globalization’.
 This is a term that has provoked a vast and ever- growing literature in the last 
twenty years in many diverse academic fields and a correspondingly large range 
of definitions and controversies, which we cannot consider here. However, if 
there is a common core to this literature it is the assertion that structures and 
processes occurring within and between states are no longer the only – or even 
the most important – determinants of those political, economic and social devel-
opments and dynamics that shape the modern world. As Armstrong (1998) has 
suggested elsewhere, the term ‘globalization’ has been applied to processes 
(especially the expansion and internationalization of financial markets), interac-
tive networks (such as global corporate management and world- wide epistemic 
and interpretative communities including Islam), structures (e.g. newly emerg-
ing power relationships deriving from changing global investment patterns), and 
discourses (e.g. new social constructions of cognition, identity and meaning built 
upon postmodern global conditions). Bello’s chapter examines the issues of col-
lective and social identity in the context of the EU.
 As we have indicated, it is the many and varied consequences of globalization 
that present some of the most profound challenges to governance. Many issues, 
especially the environment, health, crime, drugs, migration and terrorism, can no 
longer be contained within national boundaries. As a result, it is not always pos-
sible to identify the loci for authority and legitimacy, and the role of govern-
ments per se has been called into question. As we discuss throughout this book, 
many different kinds of non- state actors, ranging from transnational corporations 
to terrorist networks, have emerged alongside such developments. The size, 
speed and power of global financial markets have grown to a point where even 
several governments acting in concert cannot control them. Governments in the 
age of the internet are equally unable to control the flow of information within 
their borders. Similar processes undermine the claim of the state to be the territo-
rial location of the ‘national society’ and the repository of its distinct culture, 
language, values, symbols, rituals, practices and institutions. Finally, post-
modernist readings of globalization argue that an even more profound paradigm 
shift is under way, as globalization undermines the dominant discourse of 
modernity and the Enlightenment as well as the state.
 In the study of international relations the term ‘governance’ is used in three 
broad contexts. First, international governance corresponds to a situation in 
which the principal actors are states and the objectives relate mainly to the regu-
lation of interstate relations. States have been careful to enshrine state sover-
eignty as the fundamental principle underlying any international organizations 
set up by them, including the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund 
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(IMF ) and the World Bank. Second, global governance involves state, intergov-
ernmental and non- state actors and processes. Its objectives are more complex 
than those of international governance since it is concerned with the regulation 
of broad areas of interaction involving this wide range of actors. For example, 
the recent global financial crisis has involved interstate groupings, notably the 
Group of 20, but also more informal networks of advisers and regulators, inter-
national institutions like the IMF and World Bank, the banks themselves and 
other non- state actors, such as financial speculators and numerous individual 
states (sometimes at cross- purposes with each other). Moreover, processes of 
governance in the age of globalization include not just regulatory mechanisms of 
various kinds but the workings of that vast, invisible set of forces known as ‘the 
market’. Third, regional governance may be seen as a subset of global govern-
ance. It involves diverse state, interstate and non- state actors and processes, but 
is applicable to a specific region.
 Governance of any kind tends to be assessed by virtue of its effectiveness and 
legitimacy. Unlike the case for government, the effectiveness of governance 
structures cannot be measured by elections or other measures of popular 
approval. Rather, in the international/global context, effectiveness may be 
defined as the capacity to achieve a set of objectives without undue disruption. 
This, of course, is essentially a bureaucratic or administrative understanding of 
effectiveness as against the more democratic criteria employed in the evaluation 
of national government. While some might see such an understanding as appro-
priate in the context of intergovernmental organizations, it is much harder to 
comprehend legitimacy in any context without bringing in some kind of demo-
cratic input. Legitimacy may be understood in terms of a broad degree of accept-
ance by those directly affected by governance, but this immediately raises the 
question of how such acceptance is expressed and measured in the absence of 
conventional democratic means such as elections. How, in other words, can 
international governance be accountable, to introduce another key element in the 
general understanding of what legitimacy entails? Ebrahim and Weisband 
suggest that the term ‘accountability’ contains within it four facets: transpar-
ency, so that information is made available for public scrutiny; justification, or 
making sure that institutional leaders give clear reasons for their actions; com-
pliance or monitoring and evaluating actions taken; and enforcement, or sanc-
tions in the event that actions are not taken as promised or required (Ebrahim 
and Weisband 2007: 2–4).
 The crisis in global governance is apparent in respect of both effectiveness 
and legitimacy. It can also be seen to span at least three sets of issues: security, 
the environment, and economics and finance. Our concern here is primarily with 
legitimacy (as we will focus on non- state responses), although questions relating 
to effectiveness are also considered. In recent times the most controversial issue 
in which the notion of ‘international legitimacy’ was frequently invoked was the 
American- led invasion of Iraq, where arguments focused on the lack of a Secur-
ity Council resolution authorizing the invasion. In that context the assertion of 
the key policy makers involved was in essence that legitimate international 
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 governance consisted of acting in accordance with the UN Charter, which 
required Security Council approval of the use of force. However, the debate 
about international legitimacy has ranged far beyond this relatively narrow, 
legalistic conception, and has revolved around two interrelated arguments: that 
legitimate international, regional or global governance derives from clear evid-
ence of popular approval and from a broad acceptance of the fairness of any act 
of governance.
 It should be noted that this legitimacy crisis affects the individual state as well 
as global institutions. The state’s claim to sovereign authority over a clearly 
demarcated territorial domain rests in part upon its claim to be able to provide 
various collective goods, notably security against external threats, internal law 
and order and some measure of economic welfare and social justice. Globaliza-
tion has made it ever more difficult for states to live up to this claim, not simply 
in terms of their power to determine economic growth but also in their capacity 
to provide distributive justice when the competition among states for interna-
tional investment obliges them to cut taxes of the wealthy in their endeavour to 
attract investment. Indeed many would argue that one consequence of globaliza-
tion, both within and between states, has been an increase in economic inequal-
ity; bringing into question the argument that a key facet of legitimate governance 
is its perceived ability to provide outcomes generally accepted as fair.
 It is at this point that the next key concept employed in this book comes into 
the picture: civil society. As with all of the terms used here, we are not attempt-
ing to impose any single definition, since all of them refer to phenomena of con-
siderable complexity. That is certainly the case with civil society. The concept 
was first employed in a systematic way by John Locke ([1690] 1953, quoted in 
Armstrong et al. 2004), who referred to an association based on the rule of law 
and formed by men in a state of nature to protect their property, which he saw as 
consisting of life and liberty as well as ‘estate’. Locke envisaged civil society as 
a force standing in opposition to oppressive state power, a usage it has continued 
to have to the present day, notwithstanding Marx’s equation of civil society with 
‘bourgeois society’, or the social relations emanating from capitalism. A fairly 
broad but useful definition is provided by David Held (1993: 6): ‘Civil society 
constitutes those areas of social life – the domestic world, the economic sphere, 
cultural activities and political interaction – which are organized by private or 
voluntary arrangements between individuals and groups outside the direct 
control of the state.’
 In recent times the term ‘civil society’ came to prominence in the struggles of 
the 1970s and 1980s against the repressive state machinery in Eastern Europe. 
At that time civil society was defined primarily as the antithesis of the totalitar-
ian conception of the state as the single institution possessing legitimate author-
ity. In other words, it was defined in terms of what it was not: not central but 
dispersed; not hierarchically or vertically organized, but horizontally structured 
(or indeed completely unstructured); not official but private and voluntary. It was 
not despotic or controlling or part of the power structure. It was rather the 
myriad small – and in some cases not so small – groups, organizations, associ-
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ations, agencies and networks that maintained social order, and which kept 
society working at the grassroots level. As such it was, of course, seen largely as 
a good thing. And as such, like other ‘good words’, it came to be appropriated 
by all sorts of other groups. For example, civil society (normally in the form of 
various social movements) came to be heralded as the antithesis not just of the 
state but of capitalism and of the whole politico- economic order, as in the case 
of the demonstrations against the World Trade Organization (WTO) or the IMF. 
In contrast, proponents of the so- called Third Way, like Tony Blair, Bill Clinton 
and European social democrats, also embraced the idea of civil society. The 
Thatcher–Reagan era had seemed to demonstrate the limits of rule by the 
national government, particularly in an age of globalization, and the advocacy 
by Third Way theorists of a strengthened civil society – sometimes under the 
label of ‘communitarianism’ – seemed to offer a way forward that would pre-
serve social cohesion and domestic order. Thus, some governments as well as 
reformers and radicals had begun to promote the idea of civil society, with the 
inevitable consequence that the term has become increasingly malleable and 
rather fuzzy. Spini’s chapter in this volume considers the historical and philo-
sophical evolution of the term from the eighteenth century, while also problema-
tizing some of the claims made for civil society’s role in the postmodern era. 
Godsäter and Söderbaum distinguish between different roles played by civil 
society in global and regional governance: as partner, legitimator, site of resist-
ance and manipulator.
 One argument that has been made with increasing force in recent years is that 
civil society plays a crucial role in both the legitimacy and the effectiveness of 
global/regional governance (identified earlier as the two criteria by which gov-
ernance tends to be evaluated). Ebrahim and Weisband (2007) suggest that advo-
cacy groups of the kind we are considering here have a crucial role to play in 
global accountability. They expose publicly areas in which transparency is not 
forthcoming, appeal directly to leaders to explain the reasons for their actions, 
publish – now in a wide variety of communication channels – and disseminate 
information regarding areas where compliance has not been achieved. In addi-
tion, although sanctions of the kind employed in national contexts may be una-
vailable, they may exercise some measure of enforcement through such means 
as gaining public support for petitions, boycotts and other forms of popular 
action against decisions taken by the powerful. A central contention here is that 
specific transnational issues such as the environment, trade or finance give rise 
to specific transnational constituencies of affected groups and individuals who 
can no longer be defined in terms of traditional democratic notions of universal 
suffrage within a determinate territory. Democratic legitimacy in such circum-
stances may derive less from having directly elected representatives in each issue 
area than from the more varied activities of the many non- governmental organi-
zations (NGOs), global networks and social movements that constitute ‘global 
civil society’. Furthermore, because such activists are engaged in ongoing 
and sometimes expert, or at least knowledgeable, participation in their input 
into governance, they may be seen as an improvement on traditional, formal 
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democratic methods. For instance, the Commission on Global Governance 
(1995: 257–260) called for the establishment of a Forum of Civil Society, which 
it saw as more likely to meet the need not just for greater public participation in 
governance, but for more genuine participation than the more traditionally 
grounded idea of a world assembly of parliamentarians. Some academic observ-
ers have also seen global civil society’s capacity to mobilize public opinion 
behind specific agendas as offering a more authentic, less hierarchical basis for 
democratic legitimation than frequently discredited governments. Non- state 
actors often enjoy closer and more intimate access to local levels of public 
opinion, while many contemporary issues, which are ‘long- range, open- ended 
and diffuse in their need for attention’, are not always susceptible to resolution 
through traditional, centralized modes of decision making (Ku 1995: 142–143). 
As well as their democratic role, civil society activists also argue that, as indi-
viduals committed to the pursuit of justice in various domains, they also meet 
the second main requirement of legitimate governance: its enhancement of fair-
ness. Moreover, they claim to be able to add to the effectiveness of governance 
by virtue of their ability to make things happen at grassroots levels and their 
capacity to act in more imaginative and flexible and less bureaucratic ways than 
traditional public services. Assertions of this kind have been central in meetings 
of global civil society representatives, as a paper written for a meeting in Manila 
of more than eighty NGO networks demonstrates:
In the long run we have to invent the infrastructure so citizens can particip-
ate effectively in the democratic management of the global system. In the 
next decade, NGOs and their networks are one of the important precursors 
of an accountable global civil society. They are one of the few actors who 
try to articulate the global public interest.
(Callahan 1999)
 One additional complicating factor in discussion of civil society and govern-
ance is that the dominant narratives and conceptualizations tend to reflect a 
Western- centric perspective, normally including a specific Western understand-
ing of democracy and the ways in which democracy may be enhanced. As the 
third part of this volume illustrates, there are active ‘civil societies’ in non- 
Western states, but their premises and objectives may be quite different from 
those seeking democratic change. What this implies is that, however civil society 
is defined, it has to be understood within its own historical trajectory and studied 
within specific socio- cultural and political contexts.
 There are, of course, many objections that may be made to the kinds of 
democracy- enhancing claims advanced by activists. Even where civil society 
associations may genuinely represent some issue of broad international concern, 
they themselves are not always perfect models of democratic control or transpar-
ency. Jan Aart Scholte (1999) has pointed to several potential defects in this 
respect, including limited opportunities for members of an NGO to participate in 
its affairs, and opaque financial and decision- making procedures. Indeed, in 
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many instances NGOs – particularly in their contemporary professionalized 
forms – cannot be said to represent directly the grassroots communities they 
purport to stand for. Where international and regional governance agencies do 
make a point of consulting civil society representatives, this may stem from 
motives other than a desire for greater democracy; they may even stem from a 
more cynical desire to deflect criticism (Parks 2004).
 One further criticism is that some activists may prefer the ‘gesture politics’ of 
holding parallel conferences alongside WTO meetings, for example, rather than 
engaging in the duller task of attempting to influence the wording of some spe-
cific clause in an environmental treaty (Speth 1992). This last, however, is a 
more complicated issue than it may appear at first sight because many NGOs do 
not always gain access to official channels, so many parallel conferences have 
been organized with the deliberate purpose of publicly raising issues that may 
only be on the periphery of the ‘main event’. It is also the case that global insti-
tutions that do admit civil society representatives tend to give access to an NGO 
‘elite’, so that many smaller and less well- connected groups have no choice but 
to lobby independently. Similarly there is a risk that groups that cooperate and 
interact too closely with government officials may end up effectively co- opted 
into quasi- governmental functions. In the most famous example of this, the Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), whose role is officially acknow-
ledged in numerous intergovernmental documents, it could be argued that it is 
only by accepting self- imposed constraints, including refraining in most cases 
from direct criticism of governments, that the ICRC has been able to carry out 
its crucial work during times of conflict. Other NGOs prefer to retain their inde-
pendence and freedom to criticize governments.1 That, of course, does not make 
them immune from criticism. In a recent study of NGOs in international society, 
Volker Heins (2008), while broadly supportive of what these organizations seek 
to do, suggests several reasons for treating some of their more ambitious claims 
with caution, if not scepticism: their ‘managerial liberalism’, moralism and tend-
ency to ignore local causes of Third World problems (which they often see as 
caused by Western imperialism and capitalism) may at times be over- simplistic 
and counter- productive.
 In the chapters that follow, we consider the interaction between various kinds 
of non- state actors and international governance from three key theoretical per-
spectives and also in the context of the EU and in relation to regional govern-
ance outside Europe. Debora Spini opens our theoretical analysis by arguing that 
globalization has led to more profound changes than can be fitted into existing 
conceptual categories – including those most commonly employed with respect 
to civil society. After discussing two contrasting lines of thought in Western 
political philosophy relating to civil society, she suggests that, in a world charac-
terized by a weakening of the capacity of the state to perform some of its tradi-
tional functions, alongside a reconfiguring of existing modes of state governance 
and the emergence of other political actors, orthodox views of civil society, 
which place it in a particular relationship to state power, need to be re- evaluated. 
In the ‘profound transformations’ taking place in the era of globalization and the 
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‘second modernity’, a new global public space is emerging with many actors – 
state and non- state – and this itself may be seen as an evolving form of govern-
ance. This in turn inevitably makes the true place of civil society far more 
ambiguous and elusive than is assumed by traditional analyses that separate it 
from and place it in opposition to those perceived to be the main holders of 
power since power itself has become a much more complex and multi- faceted 
phenomenon. Assumptions revolving around civil society’s essentially demo-
cratic functions may not necessarily prove the most effective analytical tools to 
comprehend the role of civil society in the ‘second modernity’.
 In our second theoretical chapter, Bello’s starting point is also the existence 
of a postmodern globalized world. Regionalism has been a significant response 
by states to the pressures of globalization but in its most developed form – the 
EU – serious problems have surfaced in recent years relating to the failure of EU 
citizens to see the EU as a key part of their collective identity. Bello’s chapter is 
concerned with the possibilities and problems of social identity formation at the 
regional level – indeed whether such a form of identity is possible at all where 
the existence of strong national identities may actually perceive it as a threat. 
Her discussion draws upon the extensive literature relating to socialization and 
also the classic distinction between ‘community’ and ‘society’, where the former 
involves a sense of belonging and a shared understanding of meaning and values 
while the latter involves a more rational perception of common interests. Sociali-
zation processes – the acquisition of social learning of rules, meanings and 
values – are more crucial to any genuine formation of a community identity than 
top- down initiatives like the EU’s promotion of common symbols like the EU 
flag and anthem. Here the role of various kinds of non- state actors may be vital 
in developing a horizontal rather than vertical dynamic of socialization. Bello 
cites the example of the 2008 protest where fishermen from several member 
states perceived a common interest and a shared identity. Bello’s own earlier 
research has included in- depth interviews with Italian members of the EU’s Eco-
nomic and Social Committee, who emphasized the importance of being able to 
demonstrate a widely shared consensus to the more powerful EU Council and 
Parliament in their efforts to influence policy.
 Carlo Ruzza focuses upon a third crucial aspect of civil society, especially in 
the EU context: representation. This has important theoretical and practical 
aspects. In particular, traditional concepts of representation employed by demo-
cratic theorists – for example in the context of national parliaments – need to be 
broadened, especially in relation to supranational institutions like the EU Com-
mission. Here, ‘their remoteness from specific constituencies makes the role of 
civil society as provider of alternative chains of representation particularly useful 
in terms of both top- down and bottom- up dynamics’. This is especially the case 
of groups that otherwise might be relatively disfranchised for various reasons 
but a much broader and more far- reaching set of changes is taking place that, in 
effect, are bringing civil society into an ever- closer role with regard to EU gov-
ernance. Civil society, for example, has become increasingly important as a 
source of information but also in more clearly ‘governmental’ areas, such as 
Introduction  9
service delivery, policy implementation and monitoring and in the emergence of 
the kind of ‘soft law’ steering mechanisms that characterize governance which 
lacks the coercive authority of the state. Here too crucial questions about the 
legitimacy of governance are increasingly apparent.
 Our next section examines some specific aspects of civil society in the EU 
context. Karolina Borońska-Hryniewiecka elaborates a framework for analysing 
the interaction between non- state actors and the EU through the concept of 
‘Europeanization’: the process by which various actors adapt to the reality of the 
EU and the associated emergence of new political dynamics. She suggests three 
possible perspectives on this crucial phenomenon. The neo- institutionalist 
‘rational choice’ approach assumes that any fundamental institutional change 
involves a redistribution of resources among actors and she comprehensively 
evaluates the different factors affecting this process. The sociological perspec-
tive focuses rather on the ways in which the EU changes the logic of interaction 
among its various state and non- state actors, with new institutionalized consen-
suses emerging from the evolving understandings about meaning and values that 
flow from the existence of the EU. Finally, a historically grounded framework 
would stress, instead, that institutional change needs to be seen as a long, incre-
mental process conditioned by different national experiences and cultural 
heritages.
 Erica Panighello’s chapter, drawing upon extensive empirical research, 
including interviews, examines the case of NGOs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
There the EU’s greatest concern has been to aid in reducing the kind of ethno- 
nationalism that brought so much violence in the 1990s and NGOs have come to 
be seen as playing a vital part in that enterprise. She argues that NGOs have 
become a sort of ‘counter- elite’ in Bosnia and Herzegovina, standing for more 
inclusive and non- discriminatory social values than, for example, those preval-
ent in some political parties. Their position in the country has its own unique 
complexities: their financial support from the international community some-
times enables them to offer higher salaries than state agencies, which obviously 
provides other motives for joining them than the more selfless idealism and 
activism that often characterize their counterparts elsewhere. But they are, none-
theless, seen by the EU Commission as ‘ideal partners’ in its aim of conveying 
its message about European values and helping to break down ethnic divisions.
 The potentially ambivalent impact of Europeanization in a troubled border 
region is the concern of Xabier Itçaina’s chapter on the Basque region. In this he 
employs a distinction drawn by O’Dowd and McCall between international rela-
tions, which are border confirming, and transnational relations, which are border 
transcending. In one sense, the increasingly close links between Basque civil 
society organizations on both sides of the border may be seen as border transcend-
ing. On the other hand, such civil society mobilization may sometimes see itself in 
competition with, if not in outright opposition to, cross- border cooperation policies 
that function on an inter- institutional basis. Therefore, these transnational third- 
sector mobilizations possess an instrumental, rather than identity- based, relation-
ship to European integration. Europe is grasped as an opportunity to go further in 
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the institutionalization from below of a cross- border Basque common identity. 
Basque third sector actors are, indeed, developing a cross- border regional civil 
society, but this ‘micro- regionalism’ has to be understood in the light of the pursuit 
of very distinctive interests. As Itçaina’s detailed research indicates, however, 
many special- interest NGOs and social movements such as farmers try to include 
their specific causes in wider transnational mobilizations at the European and inter-
national levels in order to gain international support. This creates an exceptionally 
complex relationship between local issues and international causes, civil society 
actors and multi- level institutional frameworks.
 Our third section concentrates on civil society in four key regions outside 
Europe: East Asia, Eastern and Southern Africa, the Middle East and Latin 
America. As Julie Gilson’s chapter on the first of these regions argues, while 
there is substantial debate within East Asia about the nature of civil society, 
there is little agreement as to what it might actually represent and signify in 
terms of government structures and democratization. Her main focus is on the 
nature and objectives of transnational advocacy networks in the region, includ-
ing their two- way interaction with integration projects. After discussing in 
general terms some of the more important issues relating to such advocacy net-
works, including the challenges they pose to orthodox understandings of the 
state, she examines in detail the origins and organizational capacities of a 
number of East Asian networks, in particular Forum Asia and the Asian NGO 
Coalition for Agrarian Reform and Rural Development (ANGOC). She shows 
how these networks have evolved in the context of broader regional develop-
ments, drawing particular attention to some of the complexities and subtleties 
that make the East Asian experience so distinctive.
 Andréas Godsäter and Fredrik Söderbaum follow Gilson, beginning with 
some general observations about the relative neglect of civil society in the aca-
demic study of regionalism. They also suggest that theories and conceptualiza-
tions of civil society rooted in the Western or European experience risk 
misunderstanding the logic of African civil society and its involvement in 
regional governance. For example, many Africanist scholars consider civil 
society to be conflictual and contradictory, arguing that the Western academic 
community tends to idealize civil society, conceptualizing it as homogenous and 
inherently democratic. They also point out that civil society actors may be 
involved in complex, rather than simple and straightforward, relationships with 
other types of actors, and this may blur the distinctions between civil society 
actors, states and private market actors. At the same time it is evident that exter-
nal actors play an important role in the promotion of civil society in Africa, a 
more powerful role than that observed in Western civil society. In the course of 
an examination of civil society actors in two broad sectors (sustainable develop-
ment and social and economic justice), they develop and apply a typology com-
prising four partly competing types of civil society participation in regional 
governance: partnership, legitimation, resistance and manipulation. Such diver-
gences may lead to tensions between civil society actors but may also strengthen 
their involvement in regional governance.
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 Michael Schulz’s wide- ranging chapter considers the Middle East, a region 
which is simultaneously one of the most critical in contemporary world politics 
and, historically, least susceptible to both regionalism and a vibrant civil society. 
After considering claims that Islam is inherently incompatible with democracy and 
that many regimes in the region suppress civil society, he argues that several coun-
tries have in recent years engaged in different experiments with electoral practices, 
while Islamic and other organizations point to quite a strong democratic popular 
culture. Although these are unevenly distributed throughout the region, NGOs 
dealing with issues that are similar for the entire region have indirectly helped to 
‘regionalize’ such issues. These include issues such as HIV/AIDS and gay rights 
that are taboo in many Arab states. In such cases, as well as region- wide issues 
such as water and climate change, civil society has been the key driving force. 
Like similar organizations in other developing world regions, Middle East NGOs 
frequently have strong links with global civil society: a source of both funds and 
criticisms of being too Western- orientated. Schulz concludes that Islamist and 
other social movements may help to create a new dynamic in the Middle East, 
helping to promote a more participatory and regionalist politics.
 Finally, Marcelo Saguier asks whether shifting patterns of power associated 
with multiple levels of decision making and governance of trade are changing 
the dynamics of mobilization of the labour movement in Latin America. His 
starting point is that regionalization and globalization have posed various kinds 
of threat to the bargaining power of the labour movement. This is particularly 
the case of the unfolding process of the Free Trade Area of the Americas 
(FTAA), which he sees as creating a multi- faceted challenge to the labour move-
ment to articulate alternative transnational strategies to ‘the institutional, mater-
ial and ideational power structures of neoliberal globalization’. This involves, 
among other requirements, mobilizing new multi- sectoral and transborder net-
works to confront regional governance institutions and influence the trade agree-
ment’s agenda, for example by broadening it to incorporate gender and human 
rights issues. In the course of this strategy, the labour movement has built coali-
tions with a wide range of other organizations. This in turn has not only helped 
to renew the labour movement itself but has led to the creation of alternative 
democratic spaces that have enlarged the regional agenda to include issues like 
indigenous and gender rights and environmental sustainability.
Note
1 For further discussion of this, see David Armstrong (1985).
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Part I
Theory

1 Civil society and the 
democratisation of global public 
space
Debora Spini
Introduction
Globalisation processes have made it necessary to conduct a general reassess-
ment of the political vocabulary typical of Western modernity, and to reconsider 
categories such as those of state, borders, and territory. Among the conceptual 
tools of Western modernity, that of civil society has enjoyed renewed attention 
in recent decades, especially since the momentous events of 1989. At present, 
civil society is widely recognised as a key actor in global governance, and a key 
factor for democratisation in both domestic politics and the still developing 
global public space (Armstrong et al. 2004; see Introduction in this volume).
 This chapter focuses on the question of whether a stronger role for civil 
society in global governance would automatically translate into the democratisa-
tion of a post- national public space. Moving on from an analysis of the different 
models of civil society, the chapter will criticise some current assumptions about 
its role and function in a globalising world. It will then proceed to question the 
prevalent definition of global civil society as the whole of public interest groups 
or, in a narrower sense, all organisations sharing core values such as justice, a 
respect for difference, and human rights. This chapter argues that identifying 
civil society simply with the voice of the voiceless, or as the point of origin of 
communicative power, does not help to understand the profound transformations 
occurring in this second modernity. The chapter aims to defend the claim that 
civil society must be analysed not only as a space that needs to be protected from 
political power, but also as a space where new forms of power – not purely com-
municative – are developed and exercised, within the overall framework of post- 
national governance. For this reason, the chapter includes a short section on the 
specific functioning of civil society within the EU, as the European polity illus-
trates the processes of transforming democracy. It addresses the question of how 
civil society interacts with the new forms of political and social power that are 
typical of the second modernity, and whether it may be conducive to a sort of 
post- democratic governance rather than to a genuine democratisation of post- 
national spaces.
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Models in Western political thought
An immense literature has developed on the theme of global civil society. In 
most cases, such a literature identifies global civil society as a galaxy of groups 
and networks involved in struggles for global justice, sustainability, the empow-
erment of women, respect for human rights, and so on – in short, the same kind 
of movements that take part in global fora (Falk 1995). Contemporary scholarly 
literature – and to a certain extent political communication as well – privileges a 
definition inspired by Habermas or Cohen and Arato, whereby civil society is 
the space were questions of public interest are discussed by individuals or groups 
organised on a voluntary basis; often, civil society is considered to equate to 
NGOs or non- state actors (Cohen and Arato 1992; Falk 1995; Habermas 1991, 
1996). One remarkable exception is represented by the concept developed by EU 
official documents, which focus on civil society as the totality of interest groups 
because they reflect the unique experience of European governance.
 These prevailing definitions can be challenged in terms of both their capacity 
to describe what is actually happening and their normative value. They do not 
help us to understand in all its complexity the transformation of a globalising 
political space, as they take into consideration only a part of the picture. The so- 
called global public space is inhabited by a great variety of different actors, 
many of whom are far from sharing those values of justice, toleration, and 
respect for difference. Therefore, it would be much more appropriate to use 
terms other than a generic reference to ‘civil society’ in order to define the 
galaxy of progressive, justice- oriented organisations: one example is the term 
‘alter- globalism’ (Marchetti 2008). Moreover, the genealogy of civil society in 
Western modernity is extremely rich both in theoretical models and in concrete 
historical practices. Such richness should not be ignored, and some of its high-
lights may prove helpful for capturing many of the current transformations.
 In the history of modern political thought, civil society has traditionally rep-
resented the middle ground between private life and an exclusively political 
space, more specifically the level of the ‘state’ and of ‘government’. The very 
existence of a separate sphere between that of family and intimacy on the one 
hand, and that of government and state power on the other, can indeed be con-
sidered a marked feature of Western modernity itself. Nonetheless, the separa-
tion between society and politics did not surface instantaneously. At the dawn of 
modern political thought, ‘civil society’ coincided completely with political 
society, as in Hobbes, who does not see any space of ‘society’ before or outside 
the space made peaceful by the action of the Sovereign. One of the earlier 
notions of a ‘society’ as a separate sphere of social interaction, and existing apart 
from and before the covenant establishing a political society in its proper sense, 
appears in Locke. The Second Treatise on Government suggests that even before 
the existence of a properly political society, men were involved in commercial 
and economic relations, which were in themselves constitutive of social bonds. 
The Letter concerning Toleration also demonstrated how men join together to 
pursue a great variety of activities, such as providing for the salvation of their 
Civil society and democratisation  17
souls by performing different forms of worship. From this perspective, the polit-
ical covenant establishing ‘government’ exists in order to protect such a sphere, 
but does not create it, thus marking a major difference with the Hobbesian 
model. Furthermore, moral and political philosophers of the eighteenth century, 
such as Smith and Ferguson, also gave shape to a specific sphere of interactions 
which are not ‘political’ per se and yet which may be considered as the founda-
tion of social, and consequently also of political, bonds. In contrast, throughout 
late eighteenth- and nineteenth- century political thought, the need to protect and 
preserve an autonomous space for society, as opposed to the potentially oppres-
sive power of the state, became one of the key themes of classical liberalism, 
which would serve to formulate the relationship between state and civil society 
in terms of zero- sum opposition towards each other.
 This survey of theoretical models is brief, but two main genealogical lines 
may be understood. The first, focused on the line that unites the Scottish Enlight-
enment to the Hegelian–Marxian perspective, assigns a primary role to the inter-
play of passion and interests as well as to the social genesis of needs. 
Consequently, this genealogy highlights the essentially conflictual character of 
the relationships defining civil society and ends by connecting it to the sphere of 
the economy. The second model stretches from the experience of the Enlighten-
ment to include fully fledged liberal theories: it privileges, instead, the role of 
civil society as the source of democratic legitimacy, and gives a minor role, if 
any at all, to the sphere of economic activity.
 Hegel represents a pivotal step in the first genealogical line. His conceptuali-
sation of civil society in Philosophie des Rechts deserves special attention not 
solely for historical reconstruction, but also for the new light it may cast on the 
present context. Civil society is the second term of Hegel’s political trilogy, 
besides family and the state; it represents the ‘system of needs’, the space where 
needs are first created through social interactions and then satisfied through the 
medium of work and of economic activity. It is not superfluous to underline that 
Hegel’s civil society is bürgerliche, not zivil; individuals take part in it as private 
actors, moved by their often selfish needs and interests. It is a space where indi-
viduals establish social bodies for the pursuit of particular interests. Such groups 
are collective – yet not universal – and are likely to be in competition, even in 
open conflict, with one another. Hegel’s Bürgerlichegesellschaft, although essen-
tially conflictual, is something more than the mere battlefield of selfish drives. In 
civil society, men1 join together to form corporations (Stände): these are social 
groupings primarily defined by their position in the chain of economic activity, 
focused on the defence of specific interests and, therefore, always potentially in 
conflict with their peers. Nonetheless, these associations are more than the sum 
of individual egos; they are the space where individuals can – and must – learn 
to think and behave as a body. Moreover, Hegel highlights how corporations 
cannot avoid meeting their own peers in the open arena of civil society, thus 
being forced to overcome their self- centred perspectives. This encounter among 
corporations, although necessarily marked by conflict and competition, repre-
sents an essential step, because every corporation – and the individual members 
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within it – needs to be reconciled with the whole body of the state through the 
medium of Law (Recht). Mediating potential and especially actual conflicts, and 
leading opposed interests to a general aim, is the function of Recht. Civil society 
is necessarily marked by conflict, and therefore it needs the state to outgrow its 
original nature. Only the state, as the source of normativity, may transform 
bűrgern into proper citizens, capable of thinking and acting in universal terms.
 Marx’s conception placed even greater emphasis on the conflictual nature of 
civil society, defined as the whole of material relationships among individuals, 
and, consequently, as a space overlapping to a good degree with that of the 
market. Marx’s critique was directed at the Hegelian dichotomy between mem-
bership of civil society and citizenship. He defined this dichotomy as a schizo-
phrenia typical of the bourgeois state, which revolves around the artificial 
juxtaposition of homme, defined by interests and needs, and citoyen, supposedly 
open to the dimension of universality. Marx’s Bürgerlichegesellschaft, therefore, 
basically coincides with the market, and is to be interpreted strictly according to 
the instruments of dialectic materialism. But whereas in Marx it is entirely 
defined by political economy, in the Gramscian perspective civil society is 
endowed with a higher degree of autonomy, as it provides the arena for a strug-
gle over cultural influence and hegemony that goes beyond a strict opposition 
between structure and superstructure.
 Gramsci’s thought has recently been rediscovered and reapplied in analyses 
of globalisation, and also applied to the specific condition of civil society within 
that framework (Cox 2002; Baker and Chandler 2005). This attention to civil 
society as a transmission mechanism for dominant mental frameworks was pre-
viously developed, although in a different light, by Foucault. He highlighted the 
ways in which civil society as a category responds to a compelling need for 
liberal gouvernementalité. From this perspective, civil society makes it possible 
to rule as a sovereign over a space populated by homines oeconomici. It is there-
fore an integral part of the governmental technology of the liberal state, or, in 
strictly Foucauldian language, is a figure de transaction, creating an interface 
between rulers and ruled. Civil society somehow escapes – or rather, it seems to 
escape – the governmental scope of control; yet it reinforces its capacity for 
domination, as it represents a specific governmental rationality based upon eco-
nomic rationality. In this way, it is reminiscent of the specific role of folly 
(Foucault 2008).
 The second genealogical line can be reconstructed around the focus of legiti-
macy and popular sovereignty. This itinerary stems from the République des 
Lettres of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries and develops 
throughout Western modernity to embrace contemporary theories of democratic 
legitimacy. This model finds its turning point in Kant’s concept of Publizität, 
and emphasises the exercise of reason by a public of ‘reasonable’ men 
(mostly!2); private individuals who, while not sharing any direct involvement 
with government, have nonetheless learned to think about and judge public 
affairs, and therefore develop a self- understanding as ‘public opinion’. Civil 
society thus becomes the space where matters of common relevance may be 
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debated and evaluated through the public use of reason; all deliberations formu-
lated within a public discourse are thus determined by the strength of the most 
convincing arguments, rather than by the enforcement of sheer might. Con-
sequently, public opinion becomes the ultimate tribunal for the validity of norms, 
and the ultimate source of political legitimacy. The classic liberal view is articu-
lated by a long tradition of thought, from the Enlightenment to John Stuart Mill. 
Nonetheless, it is important to remark how civil society, if considered as the 
source of democratic legitimacy, needs to transform itself into something else; 
namely, to crystallise into systems of norms, or constitutional structures. Even 
more drastically, it may end up becoming the state itself. As indicated by Arendt 
in On Revolution, (1973) popular sovereignty, in order to guarantee freedom, has 
to abide by the self- imposed limits of a constitutional order.
 Habermas can be considered as the culmination of this thinking, even though 
his reinterpretation of zivilgesellschaft as the cradle of legitimacy includes more 
distinctively republican elements than is the case with mainstream liberalism. In 
his Structural Transformations of the Public Sphere and even more in Between 
Facts and Norms (Habermas 1991, 1996), he describes civil society as the breed-
ing ground where new issues and demands are formed, received and re- elaborated 
by the public sphere, and finally translated into policies and law- making norms, 
or in other terms into ‘rights’, by the political system, thus ensuring a substratum 
for that legitimate exercise of power which in Weberian terms could be defined as 
Herrschaft, as opposed to Macht. Moreover, from the perspective of deliberative 
democracy, civil society is the space where different subjects may also engage in 
communicative processes conducive to a level of agreement much higher than the 
strictly Rawlsian conception of overlapping consensus.
 Although they can and must be separated as theoretical models, the two faces 
of civil society were, in their historical phenomenology, closely connected. First 
of all, the two genealogies crossed paths in those historical processes that 
brought the working class into the sphere of citizenship. In the practice of 
Western or, at the very least, European modernity, civil society – protected by 
first- generation rights typical of the Rechstaat – has provided the arena where 
the working class could voice its demands. Thanks to a series of long- lasting 
struggles for both recognition and redistribution,3 workers obtained not only 
political rights but also those third- generation rights – social rights – that permit-
ted their full integration into the structures of liberal- democratic states. Indeed, 
one of the distinguishing features of democratic national- territorial states, espe-
cially in the European context, has been their capacity to function as mediators 
between labour and capital, by means of the redistribution mechanisms enacted 
by the welfare state. The ‘social contract’ thus produced lay at the heart of 
Western democratic polities, and represented a pivotal legitimising element.
 Moreover, both models sketched above share one important feature: civil 
society is defined in a dialectic relationship with the state. Of course, such rela-
tionships may materialise through a very diverse morphology. If understood, in 
Hegel’s wake, as the System der Bedürfnisse, civil society needed the state to act 
as a mediator and arbiter or, more specifically, as the source of those norms 
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which would prevent its implosion under the pressure of conflicting interests. On 
the other hand, an important tradition within liberalism emphasises the need to 
draw a sharp dividing line between society and the state, minimising the latter’s 
presence. Civil society, meant as the space both for not yet political social inter-
action and for economic activity, constantly needs to defend itself from the 
power of the state. Hence the importance of all those barriers – the so- called 
negative liberties – erected to protect society from the interference of political 
power. Tom Paine could be considered the forerunner of this trend; mutatis 
mutandis, opposition movements in the former Eastern bloc at the time of the 
great 1989 transformations often echoed this kind of anti- political language, and 
emphasised the distance between ‘politics’, seen to be heavily compromised 
with power, and an ideal of civil society as a space entirely immune from any 
temptation to exercise power and completely devoted to giving, ‘voice to the 
voiceless’, in the words of Vaclav Havel, leader of the 1989 Velvet Revolution. 
An important contradiction within the liberal framework is evident here: civil 
society can be seen as the antagonist of the state but, at the same time, it has to 
become the source of its legitimacy.
 This overview has been necessarily skeletal. Nonetheless, for our present 
analysis, it is important to recall one key aspect, as it, more than any other, faces 
major challenges in the present political and social circumstances. Civil society, 
considered both as ‘market’ and as ‘public space’, has been conceptualised 
mostly, if not exclusively, in relation to individual polities, traditionally defined 
by the borders of the national- territorial state.
A post- national space in transition
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to establish whether the present context can 
still be considered ‘modern’, or whether we are already living in a post- modern, 
hyper- modern or deutero- modern world.4 Undoubtedly, many distinguishing fea-
tures of Western modernity have changed so profoundly as to justify the use of 
the category of ‘second modernity’. This transformation may to a certain extent 
be summarised with reference to what has been defined as the paradigm shift 
from the ‘vertical’ framework of government towards a multi- tiered or multi- 
level model of governance. Obviously, the supposed crisis of national- territorial 
states is the main factor in such a transition. Nonetheless, the very expression 
‘crisis of the nation state’ is in itself a matter for considerable debate, a debate 
that cannot be fully rehearsed in these pages. Globalisation does indeed impact 
on the traditional model of the state typical of Western modernity, but all the 
processes it entails cannot simply be deemed to cause a ‘withering away’ of the 
state. Their consequences are far richer in nuance and complexity, and it would 
be far too simple to describe the situation in terms of a straightforward ‘decline’ 
and loss of relevance of states. On the one hand, national- territorial states are 
indisputably experiencing growing difficulty in exercising effective control over 
their territory – a dynamic often described as a ‘crisis’ or even a ‘loss of sover-
eignty’. On the other, states have to take up a new modus operandi, or, as in Sas-
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sen’s words, have to participate in a new set of normative, territorial, economic 
and political ‘assemblages’, which may represent not solely an undermining but 
a transformation of their political agency. States are being ‘denationalised’ – or, 
with a different and perhaps more appropriate lexicon, ‘deterritorialised’ – and 
reconfigured in such a way as to become a major vessel for the fostering and 
shaping of processes taking place at the global level (Sassen 2006).
 The role of civil society undergoes a dramatic transformation in the context 
of the post- national constellation. First of all, both models emphasise the protec-
tion of national- territorial state boundaries of national- territorial states. More 
significantly, civil society could be represented as the ‘pulp’ of individual states 
protected by the ‘skin’ or ‘shell’ of their territorially defined sovereignty. It is 
now evident that civil society is no longer a hortus conclusus, defended by the 
walls of individual polities, nor can its activity be conceived as being strictly 
limited to the ‘domestic’ sphere. Civil society organisations are actors in what 
used to be the space of international politics, a space that is now better repre-
sented by the image of a multi- level and multi- tiered Mobius knot of governance 
functions than by the traditional Westphalian vertical architecture. State and 
non- state actors interact at various levels of governance, and civil society organi-
sations do not need to go through the filter of state institutions, but can exercise 
autonomously a protagonist role in many fields that used to be the exclusive 
province of states (Armstrong et al. 2004; chapters by Panighello, Godsäter and 
Söderbaum, and Borońska-Hryniewiecka in this volume).
 Two main lines of reflection emerge from the matching of genealogical 
research and analysis of the present. Insofar as civil society is considered a 
source of democratic legitimacy, the challenge is how to rethink its role in the 
shaping of post- national public spaces that could still be defined as democratic. 
As far as the first line of reflection is concerned, a clear response is provided by 
those who, roughly speaking, recognise themselves within the ideal of ‘cosmo-
politan democracy’. This vision boasts a very noble genealogy, beginning with 
Kant, and is definitely worth careful debate and consideration. Within the 
broadly understood ‘cosmopolitan’ school many different views on the nature 
and role of territorially based polities coexist, from more to less radical. The 
broader consensus is that individual polities should gradually yield to super- 
national – and obviously democratic – political spaces. In spite of objections, 
cosmopolitan democracy has every right to respect and attention, as it grounds 
itself in the principle of ‘all affected’: in a globally interdependent world, territo-
rial membership could hardly be considered a ‘just’ criterion for participating in 
decision making (Pogge 2002; Marchetti 2008). These theoretical and political 
perspectives basically identify the galaxy of transnational movements and NGOs 
as the embryo, or even better the avant- garde, of a vibrant post- national public 
sphere, capable of giving birth to genuine global public opinion, and thus to rep-
licating on a post- national scale the process of the creation of public will, as 
described by theorists such as Habermas or Cohen and Arato.
 Such a role is to take place in a context completely different from the devel-
opment of modern democratic polities. At present it would be unrealistic to 
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expect the development, on the super- national level, of permanent structures for 
the creation of a public will which could perfectly coincide with those typical of 
democratic representation organised within national- territorial states. On the 
other hand, there remains the problem of the quasi- absence of a political- 
institutional framework at the super- national level (once again, with the remark-
able exception of the EU, soon to be briefly discussed). This problem remains 
important, insofar as civil society is considered to be the result of acquisitive 
passions and of the interplay between economic and political actors. Within the 
context of a globalising world where the dividing line between political and eco-
nomic power is becoming increasingly blurred, it would be too easy to simply 
discard this darker face of civil society. This model, if left unbridled, could very 
well result in a sort of Hobbesian bellum omnium contra omnes or, less dramati-
cally, in a kind of invisible hand situation. Surely neo- liberal trust in the self- 
regulating power of society is not solid enough to shape a democratic 
post- national space (Keane 2003). The most sensitive and alert voices of the 
cosmopolitan school nonetheless recognise the need for a two- way exchange 
between global civil society organisations and new forms of global democratic 
institutions, and are aware of the danger represented by the most radical, or even 
‘populistic’ approach to civil society (Fraser 2008).
 The increasing role of global civil society has been debated not solely in the 
framework of normative philosophy. It has also been analysed in various disci-
plinary fields, from international relations to political science and sociology. 
Thus, global ‘civil society’, however defined, is already at work in a variety of 
contexts. However, descriptive analyses of the concrete functions of global civil 
society have often adopted a distinctly normative stance. Such is the case for 
those authors who regarded the weakening of state structures as opening up new 
spaces for political agency and, consequently, as holding the potential for a 
renewal of democracy (Albrow 1996; Beck 2005). In the extreme, the crisis of 
the traditional form of state would facilitate the emergence of a lively civil 
society on a post- national level, and this would translate into a more ‘demo-
cratic’, less authoritarian political space. From this perspective, civil society and 
its components have unprecedented potential. Authors such as Albrow, Rosenau 
and Beck, coming from different theoretical and disciplinary approaches, still 
share, although with different emphases, the conviction that the paradigm shift 
from government to governance may result in new opportunities for political 
agency and for the expression of social energies, as they are intrinsically inclined 
to work by consensus rather than coercion. The shift towards governance sup-
posedly undermines vertical relationships and highlights ‘horizontal’ relation-
ships, as civil society is often called to participate directly in the function of 
governance (Rosenau 2003).
 Moreover, Rosenau holds that global governance relies on a set of tools that 
are different from those of traditional modern political actors. Rather than func-
tioning along the vertical relationships typical of the modern state – largely 
resting on the threat of coercion – governance happens along the continuum 
compliance–defiance, less immediately relying on the capacity to exercise viol-
Civil society and democratisation  23
ence. Rosenau also highlights the changing nature and utility of power, and the 
decreasing effectiveness of the traditional ‘vertical’ conception of power. For 
global governance to be effective, the most important resource is voluntary com-
pliance rather than coercive capacity. Last but not least, Rosenau’s theory rests 
on many important assumptions concerning a new capacity for political agency, 
since he points to the increasing ‘skills’ possessed by citizens of the contempor-
ary world.
 Ulrich Beck’s work is especially relevant, as it places the issue of power at 
the very centre of his reflections. In short, Beck holds that civil society is the 
third actor, on an equal footing with political institutions and economic actors, in 
what he defines as the meta- power game of global governance (Beck 2005). In 
this complicated game of checks and balances, civil society may count on a spe-
cific set of tools. The first tool is moral authority: civil society organisations may 
expose to public contempt political institutions and major economic actors such 
as transnational corporations, thus eroding their consensus. Moreover, Beck also 
points to the power to manipulate consumption as a new possibility for non- 
governmental organisations. The global market opens up new avenues for polit-
ical participation, and the very act of buying becomes a crucial form of political 
action. In fact, Beck goes as far as to define global consumption as an initial 
form of global citizenship. It is almost superfluous to comment on how far, from 
this perspective, civil society has come from the Habermasian model. To a 
certain extent, it still provides the space where new political themes and issues 
are first brought to public attention. But it no longer focuses its action on becom-
ing a breeding ground for government legitimacy. Rather, civil society is one 
actor among others in the ‘metapower game’, and, although moved by aims 
which may be different from those of all other actors, it still plays by the same 
rules and in the same style, resorting to media exposure, spectacular impact and 
a tough lobbying style.
 In fact, these views – and in particular Beck’s position – are grounded in a 
solid analysis of the actual morphology of global governance. This chapter does 
not deny the appropriateness of these diagnoses, nor does it claim to conduct 
sociological research into the emerging global civil society. Many excellent 
research projects are indeed mapping this galaxy – see the outstanding work of 
the Centre for the Study of Global Governance of the LSE (Anheier et al. 2002, 
2003, 2004, 2005, 2008) – and what is left to do is rather to conduct a critical 
reflection on these sociological findings. Undoubtedly, the number of groups and 
networks active on public interest issues around the globe is still growing stead-
ily after its explosion in the early 1990s. In addition, there is the presence of a 
number of actors that are atypical and hard to encase in a simple definition. 
Many questions still remain open, as pointed out in the Introduction to this 
present volume. First of all, civil society organisations do not always have crys-
talline accountability records, nor are they completely immune from the accusa-
tion of being centred in the ‘first world’, most notably in Europe, or of being 
somehow carriers of ‘cultural normalisation’ (Anheier et al. 2002, 2003, 2004, 
2005, 2008; see chapters by Gilson and Godsäter and by Söderbaum in this 
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volume). But the ambiguity of a post- national civil society is rooted at a much 
deeper level, that of the progressive loss of relevance of an autonomous role of 
‘politics’. In fact politics – political actors and, even more, political agency – 
seems to be less and less capable of providing a meaningful perspective to col-
lective actions, which are slowly but constantly sliding towards what used to be 
defined as ‘social’.
 Roles are shifting, and the real nature of ‘civil society’ in its post- national 
version is much more ambiguous and elusive than it may appear in all those defi-
nitions that identify it with the galaxy of the ‘willing’. There is no justification for 
representing civil society as a space immune from the exercise of power. Public, 
domestic and post- national spaces all see a profound transformation in the number 
and nature of their actors, as well as in the nature and formulation of the issues 
that are considered to be worthy of public discussion. It is clear that those specifi-
cally political subjects whose role was to channel and transform into proper polit-
ical issues the claims surfacing in civil society are experiencing a deep crisis. 
Public spaces are being increasingly colonised by issues that a few decades ago 
would hardly have qualified as political – such as themes concerning ethics, life-
styles, and ultimate values. Symmetrically, public spaces are becoming increas-
ingly populated by actors who cannot be defined as specifically political, but who 
are, in fact, typically social. Many so- called third- sector organisations are trans-
forming themselves into institutional actors – or into good, sound businesses – 
while big enterprises and companies often take up campaigns for justice and 
human rights, replacing to a large extent the space of action that used to belong to 
national- territorial states (see chapter below by Itçaina). In many cases, both 
third- sector organisations and economic actors find themselves cooperating to fill 
the vacuum left by states, which find it increasingly hard to intervene in issues of 
redistribution and social inequality, and to reinforce that specific ‘social contract’ 
between capital and work that was at the very root of liberal democracies. The 
dominant modus operandi seems to be oriented more towards bargaining and 
exercising pressure on the already existing power structures rather than on 
opening spaces of public debate conducive to the shaping of a real ‘public will’.
 The changing role of civil society in the post- national world cannot be sepa-
rated from the transformation of politics, of its actors and modes of action. This 
chapter does not intend to launch into an in- depth analysis of ‘what is politics?’ 
Of course it is imperative to clarify what is meant by the opposition between the 
social and political – this question is of such magnitude as to require much more 
space and time, not to mention theoretical strength, than can be offered here. 
More modestly, it limits itself to recalling basic references, focusing on the spe-
cific question of political power. Civil society in modernity emerged and grew in 
a dialectic relationship with political power, in most cases concentrated within 
the specific locus of the ‘state’. This dialectic can be read according to the 
Foucauldian model – civil society as an instrument of domination – but it can 
also be conceived as highlighting the role of civil society in the creation of 
democratic legitimacy. Even in this second model, however, the problem of 
power cannot be avoided and must be confronted. The mechanism of democratic 
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representation, structures of accountability and, more than anything else, the 
possibility of public debates conducive to the formation of a public will, made it 
possible for political institutions to become something more than mere instru-
ments of domination, even though they maintained their capacity for coercion. 
The political and constitutional structures that have historically been the product 
of the national- territorial (modern) model of state have made it possible for indi-
viduals to think of themselves as actors capable of autonomy, thus discovering 
an answer to the compelling dilemma of finding a legitimising narrative to justify 
the very existence of political power. In all the genealogy that sees it as the point 
of origin of legitimacy, civil society is essentially connected to the legal- rational 
determination of political power and, more specifically, to popular consensus as 
a source of legitimacy – and therefore, ultimately, as a source of personal moral 
and political autonomy. Seen from another point of view, civil society, by the 
very fact of constituting the tribunal of public reason, and consequently the foun-
dation of legitimate power, necessarily aims to transform itself into that same 
institutional structure it used to oppose – the normative power of the state.
 The conquest of the state was the focus of modern political agency, as it was 
typically affirmed in Politik als Beruf (Weber in Owen and Strong 2004). 
According to Weber, an action may be defined as political if it aims to conquer 
the state, because the state is the one body that has the monopoly on the legiti-
mate use of force. This reference helps to throw light on one of the main lines of 
transformation from the first to the second modernity. It is almost redundant to 
stress how hard or, rather, impossible the contemporary context would make it to 
apply this same mechanism to post- national civil society. It is evident that the 
conquest of the state is far, very far, from being the essential goal of political 
struggle. If the state is no longer the political actor par excellence, it is not sur-
prising that the control of the specific loci of political power is no longer the 
supreme aim of social struggles: the goal is to influence, rather than control, spe-
cific political institutions. In other words, what is at stake is the possibility of 
influencing the bodies that hold the keys of power, rather than conquering them 
and replacing the original occupants. As Manuel Castells (1998: 352) said once, 
there is no Winter Palace to seize. In a situation where the state is no longer the 
central actor, but one actor among many, the goal of the struggle is to influence 
those in power. With Bauman (1999), one could say that politics in the age of 
globalisation can be represented as an airplane with an empty cockpit – empty 
because no one is really interested in holding the control column. Hence, the 
growing relevance of those resources which are typical of civil society, such as 
knowledge, or moral authority, or that particular kind of power that Beck defines 
as the power of shame, for exercising skilfully targeted ‘blackmail’.
 The often invoked crisis of the state, as has been observed above, is not the 
only possible key to understanding these transformations. Globalisation pro-
cesses – or, to use less popular vocabulary, new forms of post- industrial capital-
ism – make it easier for civil society to organise and exercise agency on a 
super- national level, but this process does not automatically lead to a post- 
national democracy. Rather, the changing role of civil society in a post- national 
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space has to be read as part of the overall fresco of the transformation of demo-
cratic polities into some sort of a post- democracy; namely, a situation where 
civil society groups mobilise in a variety of ways, participate in governance 
functions and compete for influence, but where the decision- making power is to 
a large extent immune from popular control and accountability.5
The European case
No reflection on civil society could be considered complete without a reference 
to the European context. Notwithstanding all its evident shortcomings, the Euro-
pean Union is, at the present moment, the most developed post- national polity 
(some would even call it post- sovereign and post- modern), as well as a particu-
larly sophisticated example of multi- level governance. In EU governance the 
role of civil society is nothing short of pivotal. However, the dominant under-
standing does not focus on its nature as the breeding ground of public opinion or 
as a source of legitimacy. On the contrary, civil society is conceived primarily as 
the whole of organised interests. EU official language, therefore, presents a 
vision closer to the Hegelian than to the Habermasian model, as is quite clearly 
visible in the White Paper on European Governance by the Prodi Commission 
(European Commission 2001). Actors from the world of economics, such as cor-
porations, industries and trade unions, have a long- standing tradition of powerful 
lobbying in Brussels. Organised interests cooperate in EU policy making through 
formal channels (such as the Social and Economic Committee) and also through 
very effective informal channels – channels that have been made even more 
effective by the trend towards ‘open’ methods of coordination in governance 
(see chapters by Bello and Ruzza in this volume). In recent years, traditional 
lobbyists representing corporate interests have been joined by the so- called PIGs 
(public interest groups) – NGOs with agendas ranging from racism, to the envir-
onment, to consumers’ rights, which have flocked to Brussels in growing 
numbers. More and more PIGs and NGOs have found ways to influence EU 
policy making, breaking the monopoly of the great financial lobbies, and learn-
ing their enemies’ skills and techniques for influencing EU legislation in matters 
of public concern, such as racial equality, the preservation of the environment, 
gender rights, and justice (Ruzza 2006; Greenwood 2007).
 These transformations mirror the internal evolution of the EU and its quest 
for legitimacy that is not exclusively based on output. Insofar as it needed to 
reassess its nature as a fully fledged polity, the official bodies of the EU have 
reaffirmed the role of civil society, especially as a remedy for the much- lamented 
democratic deficit. However, the effective impact of civil society organisations 
on EU legitimacy can be felt predominantly in terms of performance- based, ex- 
post legitimacy, rather than in terms of procedure- based, input legitimacy 
(Scharpf 1999; Cerutti 2008).6 In other words, civil society, meant as both PIGs 
and interest groups, strengthens performance- based ‘output’ legitimacy, as it 
contributes to the good governance of the European Union. Both lobbies and 
PIGs in fact play a crucial role, providing policy makers with information and 
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feedback. Moreover, civil society organisations and NGOs in general exercise an 
increasingly essential role in the specifically European approach to security, as is 
evident in the European Neighbourhood Policy (Panighello in this volume). This 
continuous exchange reinforces ex- post legitimacy, as it ensures better govern-
ance and lessens the possibility of social conflict arising within specific policies: 
the question remains as to whether it opens up more space for democratic partic-
ipation. Civil society does not – or not yet – contribute to input- based legitimacy, 
as it is still far from being the breeding ground for a European public opinion 
capable of converting itself into a fully fledged political actor. And it could 
hardly be otherwise, as the very structure of the European Union does not 
encourage the birth of actors characterised by a broad and specifically political 
agenda. On the contrary, it facilitates the presence of very specialised and issue- 
oriented organisations. At the present moment, it looks as though the relation-
ship between the EU and PIGs is being shaped in the same way as the 
relationship between the EU and private interest lobbies. Civil society organisa-
tions therefore exercise their specific form of power – naming and shaming – 
and trade their specific resources, such as moral authority, expertise, and field 
knowledge. Not only is this model of governance far removed from any deliber-
ative model, as it has often been lamented, it is still very far removed from some 
of the elements that were considered essential for a genuine democratic life, 
characterised by the establishment of public fora of discussion and supported by 
open and public structures of accountability. The absence of institutional struc-
tures that may claim to be representative of a real European public encourages a 
governance ‘European style’, which tends to minimise conflicts and to privilege 
bargaining, consultations, and negotiations. Political institutions and actors are 
either irrelevant or beyond reach, and therefore do not represent an appetising 
prey. Therefore, the European Union remains governance for the people – such 
is the essence of its output legitimacy – and to an ever- growing extent with the 
people, as is demonstrated by the many instances where civil society organisa-
tions, lobbies, and public interest groups cooperate in the function of European 
governance. Nonetheless, the EU still cannot be defined as governance by the 
people (I am borrowing ‘for, with and by’ from Schmidt 2006) or as a technoc-
racie ouverte, to use the very perceptive definition by Paul Magnette (2003). 
Whatever the definition, the participation of civil society in European govern-
ance confirms, or even emphasises, a trend that could be defined as post- 
democratic. The EU can therefore be considered a workshop where the dynamic 
focus remains on individual polities, rather than on influencing the emerging 
global public space.
Concluding remarks
The brief references made above to Foucault may now come in handy. Of course 
they are not meant to herald a mechanical neo- Marxist analysis or a Foucauldian 
orthodoxy, and even less should they result in undermining all the effective lib-
erating and empowering potential shown by civil society organisation in our 
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contemporary world. Nonetheless, they both point to two important lines of anal-
ysis. On the one hand, the Lectures au Collège de France may help us to grasp 
some of the most elusive features of the relationship between civil society and 
power, in all its different forms: political, economic, social. Commenting on a 
quote by Ferguson, Foucault reminds us that power comes into being simultan-
eously with the establishment of social bonds (Foucault 2008: 291). This lesson 
should not be forgotten when analysing all the ambiguities and contradictions 
marking our contemporary context.
 This does not mean, of course, that only territorial states carry political auton-
omy. It means that unpleasant questions deserve to be considered most seriously. 
The challenge is to understand whether the expansion of an increasingly un- 
political politics is truly and exclusively good news for the future of democracy, 
and if the presence of a strong and vital civil society per se is sufficient to ensure 
the democratisation of the post- national public space. Attempting to apply the 
theoretical and historical models of the first modernity to a context that is so pro-
foundly changed is evidently pointless; on the other hand, it is also important to 
keep a critical eye on the transformations. Civil society is not only the voice of 
the voiceless – it is a form of public space where power cannot be ignored or 
exorcised. If power is not channelled into post- national political and constitu-
tional forms, civil society risks becoming the breeding ground for post- 
democratic public spaces rather than for post- national democracies.
Notes
1 The use of the term ‘men’ is intentional. In fact, in mainstream Political Theory only 
men can participate in the establishment of the political covenant, while in Hegel’s 
political theory women remain confined in the private sphere of the oikos.
2 The gender dimension in the birth of bourgeois civil society deserves a separate, in- 
depth analysis. Suffice it to say, for this chapter, that the bourgeois public sphere at its 
inception somehow tolerated the presence of women insofar as it developed in a sort of 
‘grey area’ between an exquisitely ‘public’ space and a ‘private’ one. The French 
Revolution then pushed women back into a dimension of privacy by reinforcing the 
dividing line between public and private (see Landes 1988; Benhabib 1993; Fraser 
1993).
3 The reference is obviously to the dialogue in Fraser and Honneth (2003).
4 On this debate, see at least Albrow (1996), Beck (1998), and Giddens (1990).
5 It is well known that this term has been brought to the wide attention of the public by 
Colin Crouch (2004). In my analysis I use this term in a slightly different sense.
6 I have also discussed this point in Spini (2008).
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2 Collective and social identity
A theoretical analysis of the role of 
civil society in the construction of 
supra- national societies1
Valeria Bello
Introduction
In the last century after the end of the bipolar system, the international arena wit-
nessed important advances in regional integration projects. As Farrell’s book 
shows, regionalism is a response to globalization ‘as both a defensive and as an 
offensive strategy’ (Farrell et al. 2005: 2). Members of regional integration pro-
cesses try to sort out common problems and to strengthen their role in the world 
through collaborative action. In addition, while from the middle of the twentieth 
century until the end of the Cold War the development of international institu-
tions was only a state affair, nowadays all events in the international arena are 
also a society affair. This is due to several factors, including an increasing com-
mitment to civil society at the global level and greater citizen awareness of their 
role in public life, and their consequent involvement in politics. However, even 
though citizen participation in the EU governance system has no parallel in other 
similar regional integration processes, and is indirectly guaranteed through the 
European Parliament and an institutional commitment to consultation with civil 
society, a large proportion of Europe’s citizens are not interested in having a 
voice in the EU’s political system. This is clear from the low participation of 
voters in the 2009 European Parliament elections. Consultation with civil society 
was intended to improve linkages between the EU and its citizens (EU Commis-
sion 2001), after the European Commission acknowledged that citizens’ sense of 
belonging to the EU was weak, mainly because the EU was considered to exist 
at a distant institutional level.
 The interesting point is that, even at the national level, states often encounter 
problems due to the fact that some of the citizens living in territories that are part 
of the country do not identify with the central state. In fact, some European 
states are currently witnessing protests and requests for independence by separa-
tist movements. People’s discontent due to economic or social problems can be 
easily channelled – sometimes by exploiting populist feelings – into complaints 
about the very fact of being included in a state which they do not identify with 
because they cannot see any commonalities with the other members of the state. 
Such populist appeals reveal a lack of solidarity between different districts of a 
country, which can consequently create fractures at a national level. Examples of 
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these protests are in Northern Italy, the Basque Country in Spain, and formerly 
in the Czech Republic, which in consequence succeeded in separating from Slo-
vakia on 1 January 1993. Therefore it should be clear that the lack – or even the 
loss – of a ‘commonness’ is something that, if exploited by separatist move-
ments, could threaten not only the legitimacy of a democratic system (as asserted 
by important scholars, notably Scharpf 1999) but the very existence of a country 
or other territorial form of government, including regional integration processes. 
That is why, during the conquest of a territory, a new power tries to construct a 
new collective identity in addition to new governmental structures (Anderson 
1983) and, more generally, dominant groups always struggle to achieve a ‘cul-
tural compromise’ which will then be imposed on the territory through social 
‘closure’ towards others (Wimmer 2002).
 The two most classic perspectives on the formation of states locate it in 
ethnos (Smith 1986) or in demos (Gellner 1983; Deutsch 1954). At the European 
level, the debate can be summarized by the two well- known positions taken by 
Dieter Grimm and Jürgen Habermas when discussing the existence (or ‘the pos-
sibility of a formation’) or absence of a European demos (Grimm 1995; Haber-
mas 1995). Habermas raised the idea of constitutional patriotism, which we can 
now consider the theoretical starting point of the EU constitutionalization 
process (Habermas 1995, 1998). It is no surprise then that the failure of the 
European Constitution has been considered as initiating a period of crisis for the 
EU. Indeed, as the regional integration project is currently ‘in process’ (under 
construction), scholars have the opportunity to witness its development and 
examine for themselves the possible paths this process might take, while giving 
shape to its constituency.
 Then, identity issues can also strongly impact on regional integration. This is 
not a new idea, if we consider that some of the oldest and most famous integra-
tion theorists, despite their differences, all considered common norms, common 
interests and common values essential for the further advancement of regional 
integration processes (Scartezzini 2004). Such theories included Amitai Etzio-
ni’s political unification (1965); Ernst Haas’s neofunctionalist theory (1958, 
1960, 1964); and Karl Deutsch’s ‘security community’ (1954, 1957). Now this 
chapter intends to highlight that, particularly at the regional (‘supra- national’) 
level, other forms of solidarity and the construction of ‘group sense’ are pos-
sible, rather than what Wimmer (2002) identified as ‘the cultural compromise’ at 
national level.
 Among members of an international community, such as the EU and other 
regional institutional actors, a common identity cannot be represented by strict 
cultural or ethnic criteria. The formation of ethnic and cultural identities – even 
if, of course, constructed and imagined (Anderson 1983) – can occur in small 
communities and are still possible in a national context. It can be encouraged 
through the construction of myths, collective memories, rituals and behaviour. 
However, most of the literature suggests that this is unlikely to happen at a 
macro- regional level, because of the diversity of interests, cultures, histories, 
and not least because of the lack of a common language (Grimm 1995; Miller 
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1995). Some authors consider it possible to build a regional identity with the 
help of the same mechanisms of identity construction as are used in the process 
of nation- building, such as common educational programmes, common themes 
and myths, or the common construction of news and demands (Castells 2002; 
Eder and Spohn 2005). And this is indeed what the EU intended to do with the 
construction of symbols (the flag, the euro, the European anthem), the use of 
the European classical myth (the rape of Europa by Zeus in the form of a white 
bull), or through education and mobility programmes (such as the Erasmus 
Mobility Programme or the Jean Monnet Action and, in general, all those 
actions that the EU implements in order to diffuse knowledge and information 
about the EU itself ). In sum, while the possibility of a common identity at 
regional level is denied on the one hand because a ‘shared past’ is missing, on 
the other hand it is affirmed on the basis of ‘sharing a future’. In any case, the 
evidence of ‘cultural’ commonalities (already existing or to be constructed) is 
considered necessary.
 But is that really true? Is it true that too many interests, too many histories, 
and different languages are elements that impede the forging of a common iden-
tity? And were these elements to exist, should we consequently think that a 
regional identity could develop? In Latin America, even though states share a 
language, a religion, a history and interests, there is no regional identity, while in 
Africa, divided into thousands of fratrie,2 groups, communities – even in war in 
some cases – with plenty of languages and several religions, a certain regional 
identity has formed and regional integration processes have made giant steps in 
recent years. How is it possible to explain these facts? The first question this 
chapter aims to explain pertains to the mechanisms for identity construction. The 
second question concerns why it is possible to construct a regional identity and 
examines the kinds of identity that can be found at regional level.
 One of the best works on collective identity and the sense of belonging, 
Imagined Communities (Anderson 1983), outlined the role of institutions in the 
construction of collective memories, myths and other elements which were used 
in the last century to construct national communities. Therefore these mechan-
isms form collective identities through vertical (top- down) dynamics, from the 
state and its institutions to the people. However, as illustrated by important 
scholars (Blumer 1963, 1969; Berger and Luckmann 1966; Castells 1997; 
Giddens 1991; Simmel 1890; Tajfel and Turner 1986; Turner 1982), there are 
also other mechanisms of identity construction, which operate through horizon-
tal dynamics. They take place through the action of individuals and groups of 
citizens who interact and shape what is known by sociologists as social iden-
tity.3 Currently, at the regional level, individuals and citizens’ groups have acted 
together in the formation of civil society, thus contributing to the construction 
of a regional identity through horizontal dynamics. This chapter intends to 
introduce into the debate on macro- regional identity a concept that has hitherto 
been neglected by both international relations (IR) scholars and political scien-
tists, and to examine the role that civil society plays in this particular process of 
identity construction.
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Collective identity vs social identity
A definition of identity
The Introduction has already answered the question of why IR scholars should 
be interested in identity, and a plentiful literature about its importance can also 
be found within constructivism. The latter differs from other IR approaches 
because of the role it gives to identities and values (Checkel 1998, 2007; Katzen-
stein 1996; Wendt 1999). But what is identity? Different disciplines use the term 
in different ways and the concept brings with it different meanings. As a result, 
it also sometimes implies certain ambiguities, as argued by Brubaker and Cooper 
(2000), who suggest the need to avoid the term and to use other less ambiguous 
concepts. As the aims of this chapter are already broad, I refer to Jenkins (2008) 
for a reply to this argument made by the two authors, and in particular I agree 
that:
What’s more, even when we stop talking about ‘identity’, we would still 
need a way of talking about the fundamental human process that I have been 
discussing in this chapter. We would still require abstract, shorthand terms 
that allow us to think about ‘knowing who’s who’ and the fact that people 
are, in their own eyes and in the eyes of others, identified as this, that or the 
other.
(Jenkins 2008: 14)
Identity explains who’s who and this explanation can be achieved by investigat-
ing in different directions. It is possible to research identification, attitudes and 
the sense of belonging. Part of the literature concerning the EU actually dis-
cusses these issues (Diez Medrano 2003; Eder and Spohn 2005; Ruiz Jimenez et 
al. 2004). However, when referring to a collective actor such as a regional inte-
gration process like the EU, we might also refer to political identity (or better to 
self- representation); that is to say norms, principles, beliefs, values and ideas 
that, in the eyes of this actor, represent what he is and what he consequently 
intends to apply politically through his actions (Haller 2000; Olsen 2007; Sedel-
meier 2003; Cerutti and Lucarelli 2008). Other scholars have published works 
on the external image that a political system or regional integration process can 
have, thus talking of international identity (Bello 2010; Davidshofer 2005; 
Lucarelli 2007; Manners and Whitman 2003; Smith 2008; Whitman 1997).
 In Luhmann’s theory, identity is considered as what allows the system to 
control its own operations through those actions which the different environ-
ments composing the system itself have in common – the system’s identity 
(Luhmann and De Giorgi 1991). Following this reasoning, it is possible to apply 
this definition to any type of identity: personal identity,4 role identity, group 
identity. Considering collective actors as regional integration projects, this 
chapter focuses on how it is possible to construct a common identity, at regional 
level, through the formation of common interests and common attitudes, rather 
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than on the basis of common cultural elements. In other words, this chapter anal-
yses whether there is a different way to keep together the different parts of a 
political system, for example in a regional integration, without appealing to 
common ‘cultural’ aspects. Is it still possible to do it in a ‘societal’ manner, to 
recall a Weberian concept (Weber 1922)?
 As argued in my previous work (Bello 2010), identity can be considered a 
system of reference for action and of meaning for communication to explain 
who’s who. This is a general definition of identity which focuses on the function 
rather than on the contents of identity. Thus, it can also be used, like Luhmann’s 
definition, as an analytical tool to refer to whatever type of identity (personal, 
role, collective and social). It can explain to those members who share it the 
socially meaningful borders of their actions and how they can express these vis- 
à-vis others. This is simply a different way of explaining who’s who. Taking 
into account a different definition of identity, such as that of Wenger (1999), it is 
clear that the essential function is still the same, even if not emphasized by the 
author. Wenger in fact argues:
Engagement in practice gives us certain experiences of participation, and 
what our communities pay attention to reifies us as participants. . . . As an 
identity, this translates into a perspective. It does not mean that all members 
of a community look at the world in the same way. Nonetheless, an identity 
in this sense manifests as a tendency to come up with certain interpretations, 
to engage in certain actions, to make certain choices, to value certain experi-
ences – all by virtue of participating in certain enterprises.
(Wenger 1999: 150–153)
I share this perspective. Even if Wenger focuses on practice while this chapter 
focuses on interaction, and thus the processes of identity construction considered 
are different, the function played by identity is the same in both definitions. 
Identity serves to guide (or indicate borders for) action and, it is worth adding, to 
make communication intelligible. It serves to guide action, because when a 
person is in a particular and known context, he/she distinguishes how to make 
others understand who he/she is through his/her own actions, by sharing the 
behavioural code of that context. Similarly, others can recognize the rules of that 
context, its norms; and can predict reactions to actions because the accepted 
behavioural code within that context is known and shared. The forming and 
sharing of this information are the processes of identity construction and self- 
understanding respectively.
 Identity also makes communication intelligible – so people can communicate 
with each other – because they know the meanings given to things in their 
context. This can depend on the existence of a common language or on the pres-
ence of a vehicular language – as in the African continent where classical Arabic 
and French make communication possible between people who speak different 
mother tongues. The important fact here is that people who share an identity 
know what is meant by any given sentence. It is of course clear that the better a 
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language is understood, the easier communication becomes. However, without a 
shared identity, a common language alone does not imply the sharing of mean-
ings. When a person does not know a context and its identity, he/she cannot 
interact in a meaningful way with its members.
Vertical and horizontal dynamics of identity construction
This chapter focuses on the different ways of constructing these shared meanings 
and information at group level. I have called identity the system which allows 
meanings and ‘information on norms and values’ (the behavioural code) to be 
shared. All the groups have this system. This is true for collective actors, such as 
parties, associations, NGOs or, at a wider level, a regional actor such as the EU.5 
Indeed, these all have collective self- understandings, which can be considered as 
the frame of their actions. But what are the actual mechanisms that allow the 
construction of an identity? In other words, how does the process of identity 
construction work? Until now, scholars of the constructivist approach have ana-
lysed this issue by considering vertical – hierarchical – dynamics (the role of 
dominant groups, institutions and so on) particularly at national level (Calhoun 
1997; Anderson 1983; Wimmer 2002). Horizontal dynamics (the role of indi-
viduals’ and groups’ interactions) have been taken into account by some inter-
esting works mainly at regional level (Checkel 2007; Garcia Faroldi 2008). I 
thus consider it to be worth distinguishing two different types of identity forma-
tion, by theoretically separating the hierarchical from the horizontal dynamics.
 Therefore, when a collective actor emphasizes the vertical (top- down) dynam-
ics of identity construction, I use the concept of collective identity. However, 
horizontal processes of identity construction also exist, and in this case the social 
identity concept will be used to refer to the results of individual actions in the 
framing of possible socially meaningful borders for action (Jenkins 2008; among 
the classics see Blumer 1963, 1969; Berger and Luckmann 1966; Simmel 1890; 
Tajfel and Turner 1986; Turner 1982). Through social interaction people learn 
the rules, meanings and values of a group and may then contribute to changing 
them. Thus, this process shapes a form of social identity that individuals assume 
and contribute to daily through contacts and interaction. In this way, the horizon-
tal dynamics of identity construction takes place through the creation and diffu-
sion of attitudes, norms, values and meanings. In contrast, collective identity is a 
term which suggests vertical, top- down processes of identity construction set up 
by a collective actor or dominant groups, which people can then choose to 
identify with.
Consciousness vs rationality: a useful distinction
Social identity, being constructed horizontally by individuals or groups through 
interaction, is not the result of given representations of commonality, but it is the 
result of a spontaneous6 process that is part of daily contacts and interaction. 
Therefore, it is an open and inclusive process that adapts to changes. Collective 
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identity is formed by a fixed image, which has precise borders and defines itself 
by confronting what is outside. This is an exclusive and ascribed process of iden-
tity construction. The resulting form of identity implies the development of a 
sense of belonging (a consciousness) because one feels a member of a given 
community. And that is in fact the final aim of the collective actor that has 
created that identity. An example is the collective identity of a political party: if 
a person is left- wing, he/she is known to be a left- wing-oriented voter; he/she 
will adopt specific behavioural norms, or even a particular idiom. This is the 
result of a process of identity construction directed from the top. Instead, social 
identity, derived by interaction, depends on long- term daily interaction in a 
context and does not issue from a joint desire to share a collective identity. A 
very clear example is the case of migrants: an African person who lives in 
Naples will speak Italian with a different accent from his/her countrymen living 
in Milan. However, this is something which is not the result of a conscious will 
aimed at constructing an image of a particular identity; it is just the consequence 
of social interaction in a context where a person hears a particular accent daily.
 Nowadays, this social interaction happens in a context that is also influenced 
by the regional and the global level and not only by the national one. For 
example, ‘globalized’ people, even if living in different parts of the world, give 
the same importance and social meanings to the same objects, such as the 
iPhone, and Facebook. However, they usually do not know that this is the result 
of their daily interaction in a global context, but would be likely to consider 
those objects as symbols of social status. They do not have a sense of belonging 
to a global identity, while they will certainly say ‘I am Italian’, ‘I am French’ or 
‘I am English’. However, this daily interaction in a ‘global’ context will influ-
ence their life and actions in the same way that their national ‘social location’ 
does. The straightforward distinction between social and collective identities 
given above maintains that the second is constructed from the top. Institution-
ally, politically or even culturally, this depends on the means and contents used 
by those who construct it. Moreover, individuals feel, know and sometimes 
decide that they belong to a group (a political party, national or subnational com-
munity, and so on). Therefore, collective identity always entails a sense of 
belonging, because it is recognized (through a process which develops con-
sciousness) as an element of distinction towards ‘others’ and of identification 
with people belonging to the same community. While social identity does not 
create feelings of belonging, it can imply some form of membership. In any case, 
it is always constructed through social interaction and horizontal dynamics, and 
it does not depend on ‘ethnicity’.
 It is worth emphasizing that consciousness, used until now to understand dif-
ferences between social and collective forms of identity, is something com-
pletely different from the rationality existing (or not) behind the identification 
with a group. Rationality is an element that first Weber and then many others 
used to distinguish between communitarian socialization and societal socializa-
tion (Weber 1922; see also Delanty and Rumford 2005; Dubar 1998). Indeed, 
consciousness of a collective identity depends on a sense of belonging: on the 
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fact that a person knows perfectly what he is expected to be by the group he 
feels he belongs to – a left- wing party member, or a Nazi group member, or part 
of the Italian nation. This consciousness is different from the rationality or lack 
of it of an identity- building process. It can also be irrational. Let us take the 
example of the Nazi identity shared by soldiers of the German army during the 
Second World War: it was a collective form of identity with a very strong sense 
of belonging; conformity to the rules was absolutely ‘conscious’. However, it 
was not built on rational interests, but on elements that appealed to emotions and 
other irrational feelings (xenophobia, racism, sense of primacy).
 Therefore, this chapter focuses on consciousness as ‘other’ compared to the 
emotional or rational contents of identities. Here consciousness represents a way 
of distinguishing between vertical dynamics of identity construction, which are 
downwardly constructed by a collective actor (for instance the state and its insti-
tutions) or by dominant groups, and horizontal dynamics of identity construc-
tion, which take place through interaction and contacts and which create a 
so- called social identity.
 Examples of social identity are difficult to recall, as they do not involve feel-
ings of belonging. However, it is possible to consider the outcomes of social 
identity in broad areas such as civilizations. In fact, no collective actor constructs 
civilizations, but they are the result of long- run processes derived from philo-
sophical thought, literature and history. They are open processes, which adapt to 
changes and thus have shifting borders. They do not always entail strong feel-
ings of belonging, but can create forms of membership. Another example of 
social identity is cosmopolitan identity, which is open, inclusive and not verti-
cally constructed. However, as will be mentioned below, social and collective 
identities are ideal types constructed to help analysis; the reality is far more 
complex as both processes are involved, to a different extent, in the construction 
of any one identity.
 It is worth distinguishing between these concepts for two main reasons. First, 
it will help to highlight that ethnic identities are not a form of social identity. In 
fact, they always entail a sense of belonging (and not membership); so they are 
not social, spontaneous identities created by interaction among individuals, but 
are supposed to have natural origins. ‘Ethnic’ identities are fixed images of a 
group, stable in time and with hard borders, so they are mainly forms of collect-
ive identity.7 Second, and theoretically more important, social identity, being 
formed by a spontaneous and inclusive process of identity construction, is more 
likely to shape rational types of identity, such as those described by Weber 
through societal socialization.
Communitarian and societal socializations: ideal types of 
identity construction
Weber’s distinction between communitarian and societal socialization is based on 
the existence (or lack of it) of rationality in the process of identity construction. 
He illustrates that the first (the communitarian) is based on expectations resulting 
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from customs and shared values; it implies a community of belonging (Verband) 
and a common language; it is an emotional rather than a rational process. In con-
trast, societal socialization is the expression of different interests, based on rules 
established through rational scope- oriented behaviour (Zweckrationalität). There-
fore, the voluntary conformity of individuals to these rules is based on a rational 
agreement on common but limited interests (Weber 1922). In the EU we could 
refer, for example, to the concept of civilian power, to the culture of individual 
freedoms and to the European Social Model (see Bello 2008, 2010). This is also 
what Delanty referred to as societal identity (see Delanty and Rumford 2005). It 
is constituted by those elements derived from the arts, philosophy, literature and 
historical events, which formed a European culture in a broad sense, intended as a 
form of ‘civilization’ (in Huntington’s terms, 1996). Societal identity is therefore 
the result of interaction on the continental territory considered from a historical 
viewpoint. Therefore, a civilization can be considered a consequence of long- run 
social interaction and the outcome of social identity. This argument is made 
clearer if we consider it through a systemic approach: the interaction of indi-
viduals contributes to the formation of social identities; these create – in the long 
run and at the widest level reached by the system – common elements of a civili-
zation. In turn, the latter, once formed, influence individual and social identity. In 
other words, we have a circular process, made of upward and downward dynam-
ics of identity construction processes (see Figure 2.1).
 Societal socialization does not represent a passive conditioning designed to 
make individuals belong to a certain grouping, entry to which is established by 
sharing a past, a language, blood and other ‘natural’ linkages, as happens in 
communitarian socialization. Rather, societal socialization is rational and 
entrance to the society is open; it is in fact based on the acceptance of norms and 
rules which determine the rational and non- hostile interaction of individuals who 
could have different interests and values, but who also understand the possibility 
of maximizing reciprocal interests. What is claimed here is that horizontal proc-
esses of identity construction (resulting in so- called social identity) are more 
likely to shape societal forms of grouping, while vertical, top- down dynamics of 
identity construction are likely to shape communitarian forms of grouping. This 
is due to the fact that a community based on self- hood and sameness, because of 
its own nature, constructs its identity in an exclusive way, creating its image 
through confrontation with others.
 However, as Weber outlined, these are only ideal types, and in real life soci-
etal socialization can give rise to aspects of communitarian socialization and 
vice versa (Weber 1922, 1980, vol. 1: 39). Each national society presents aspects 
of societal socialization and features derived from a sense of community. The 
problem is not the reality, but those theoretical approaches which refer to the 
identity of a society only in terms of a community of belonging, entry to which 
is necessarily considered strictly closed and where rules of admission are based 
on natural elements. In the EU, the debate over its rules of admission currently 
seems to be inclined towards a communitarian model (for example, the discus-
sions on Turkey and its possible entry into the club).
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 This theoretical distinction therefore can be useful when analysing which one 
of the two identity construction processes is predominant in a territory. This dis-
tinction becomes operational through an analysis of different aspects, such as: 
the dynamics of identity construction (top- down or horizontal; emotional and 
structure- oriented, or rational and scope- oriented); entry requirements (natural 
elements or respect for internal rules); the degree of openness or closure of the 
group; the definition of borders (hard/closed or shifting borders); and the volun-
tary or involuntary motion of individuals towards conformity. A simple cross- tab 
can distinguish analytically between the two (see Table 2.1).
What kind of identity construction is there at macro- regional 
level?
In order to understand what kind of identity construction is possible at macro- 
regional level, it is worth considering the European case, by recalling empirical 
Civilization
(in the long run and the widest level)
Social identity
(in the short run and at individual and group level)
Interaction
Group A
Group B
Group C
Figure 2.1  Dynamics of the process of identity construction (source: © Valeria Bello 
2009).
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investigations and the results presented in the Asian, African and Latin Ameri-
can case studies in the relevant chapters of this volume. Regarding Europe, as is 
well known, most of the investigations that have been carried out on European 
identity show that a feeling of belonging to the EU is expressed only by a group 
of well- educated individuals who have lived in different European countries 
(Carey 2002; Diez Medrano 2003; Garcia Faroldi 2008; Ruiz Jimenez et al. 
2004). However, all these research projects concerned people’s identification 
with the EU, and considered whether people felt ‘European’ and supported the 
EU. These of course clearly involve collective forms of identity which are con-
sciously maintained, and emotionally driven and structure- driven. Other studies, 
such as that of Hooghe and Marks (2004), clearly show that the development of 
a European identity is difficult where there is a strong sense of national com-
munity, because the EU is perceived as a possible threat. This confirms the belief 
that a strong national identity – based on communitarian socialization, emotion-
ally driven and structure- oriented – is characterized by hard borders and is a 
closed system; therefore, connections with other systems, and the development 
of forms of solidarity with, or loyalty to, diverse groupings, are not possible. In 
fact, in this case the sharing of interests and values is considered to depend on 
feelings of brotherhood; it is emotional and not rational. Thus, I consider sponta-
neous dynamics of interactions to be more adequate identity construction mech-
anisms for a regional integration process than hierarchical attempts to shape a 
fixed image of commonality for people to identify with. The latter could actually 
come into confrontation with national collective identities, which are currently 
stronger. Thus, a regional identity can entail a social identity and not a collective 
one. Indeed, at such a level, with a vast territory and a large number of member 
states, it is difficult to imagine the possibility of common habits and shared 
values, while it is very simple to understand it as a society where there are 
common but limited interests, which can emerge through interaction and be 
maximized through cooperation. This is indeed the objective of regional integra-
tion processes.
 Unfortunately, today people seem to give too much importance to a commun-
ity of belonging, with the result that horizontal dynamics of identity construction 
are obscured and consequently underestimated. However, they have always 
taken (and still take) place, and in our age this phenomenon also concerns 
regional dimensions. At the European level, for example, we can refer to con-
tacts through work, to increased mobility or to mixed families – couples with 
different nationalities (Bettin Lattes and Bontempi 2008; Garcia Faroldi 2008; 
Recchi 2005; Recchi and Nebe 2003). But, apart from interaction and contacts 
among individuals, is there any kind of actor that can contribute to this horizon-
tal process of identity building? Each kind of institutional socializing agent 
should be excluded because of being involved in top- down dynamics of sociali-
zation. On the other hand, families can be socializing agents but only in a long- 
term perspective, after they have been socialized or have had interaction and 
contacts in the regional context. Other socializing agents that can effect horizon-
tal processes of identity construction are: the media (mainly the free press) 
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through socialization; and civil society through interaction. Therefore, the role of 
the public sphere is essential, as recognized by several scholars (Beyeler and 
Kriesi 2005; Eriksen 2005; Koopmans and Erbe 2004; Machill et al. 2006; Trenz 
and Eder 2004). However, civil society plays a more important role than the 
media in the construction of social identity: the media can be important only for 
the diffusion, but not for the construction, of social identity. Indeed, if we con-
sider that social identity is created by the presence of limited common interests 
among members of a society, it is clear that the only collective actors likely to 
contribute to this process without putting into effect top- down dynamics are civil 
society associations and movements, as they are formed by groups of citizens. 
Therefore they can be relevant actors in the construction of a common interest in 
a broad territorial context. For example, in the EU they can contribute to policy 
making through the European Economic and Social Committee’s activities or 
influence the decision- making process through the social and the civil dialogues. 
On these occasions, civil society associations, NGOs, advocacy coalitions and 
other lobby groups from all over Europe meet and discuss together what should 
be pursued at a European level. However, even outside the institutional frame-
work, civil society’s contribution is visible. In this light, the June 2008 protests 
by fishermen in Brussels can be considered very important, because people 
belonging to different member states banded together to reach a common inter-
est. This event was anticipated in March 2005 by the ‘Euro- demonstration’, 
when 75,000 people from all over Europe marched in Brussels to defend 
employment and social rights in opposition to the Bolkestein directive. But the 
relevance of the fishermen’s protest of June 2008 is that it was at first national 
(demonstrations started in May in France, Portugal, Spain and Italy as national 
protests) and then took on a supra- national dimension when the fishermen’s 
associations, by realizing that they had a common transnational interest, decided 
to protest together.8 Thus, this was not the result of an initiative by an institu-
tional actor, such as the European Trade Union Confederation (the organizer of 
the 2005 protests), but a spontaneous movement. Participants considered that 
together they were stronger and more effective than they would be if they pro-
tested alone in their national context and they understood that the relevant gov-
erning level was Brussels. Two important elements follow. First, there are 
categories of people who have started to feel the need to protest together against 
the European government. Not only do they recognize common interests even if 
they belong to different national contexts, but they also have shared aims. More-
over, they may have influenced other parts of the world, and may thus be con-
sidered a model for action. Second, these individuals have had contact with one 
another and have established a network that organized the protest. They have 
communicated and expressed the same interests, feelings and ideas transversally 
to other nations. However, the most important aspect is that they have conceived 
and performed a common action.
 Now, even if the EU seems to be in question, what is really happening is that 
it has finally entered into society. Certainly, this has a consequence: once people 
become involved, they want to have a voice. If the EU finally reaches society, it 
44  V. Bello
is clear that, as in every democratic system, people may contest it and may 
dislike some of its policies. However, this does not mean that there is no identity 
in Europe; on the contrary, it may be just the beginning of a common identity. 
Identity does not mean blind trust in institutions when it is not intended as a pre-
packaged collective identity to be instilled down to the citizens.
 In addition, when considering some other elements illustrated by the regional 
case studies included in this volume, it is worth highlighting the following 
points concerning the role that civil society plays in the process of identity con-
struction in regional contexts. First, as far as the Asian case is concerned, as 
Gilson notes in this volume, the idea of a region ‘serves as a useful geographi-
cal frame for these groups, but it may also be applied to justify certain values 
and a mythical- historical reference to a community of shared values’. This con-
firms the possibility of shared interests and values intended as the result of an 
interaction process at the regional level created through civil society activities. 
Second, regarding Africa, Godsäter and Söderbaum in this volume show that it 
is possible to see that, despite the different strategies adopted by civil society 
associations working at the regional level, those which engage within an inter-
state framework do so mainly to solve common problems, thus recognizing 
common interests despite internal conflicts. Thus at a regional level different 
actors can still recognize limited shared interests, even when conflict and 
internal rivalries exist at a more general mass level. Third, Saguier’s case study 
below on Latin America shows that the only viable construction of shared inter-
ests is anchored in a common political ideology, which has indeed been the 
most unifying element in this region. Understood as collective identity forma-
tion, it is difficult for it – according to my reasoning – to create solidarities 
large enough to give rise to common identification in a supra- national institu-
tion at a regional level. This perhaps explains why in the only region where 
(most of the) countries share a language, construction of a regional identity 
seems unlikely. Indeed, Latin American regional integration, once considered 
to be among the most advanced, today seems weak compared with the other 
regional integration processes.
Conclusion
Civil society associations and movements try to advocate particular interests, 
which may be those of a specific category of people, such as fishermen or 
women. By coming together, groups of different nationalities can find common 
interests and can interact in such a way as to create the tools for constructing a 
social identity. Of course this regional social identity is limited and holds a par-
ticular meaning for each individual and each group (even national groups). For 
example, representatives of the European Economic and Social Committee 
(EESC) find that their initiatives are taken more seriously by the Council and the 
European Parliament when support for an agreement is very broad (Bello 2008). 
In this way, it is possible to see and create a real European interest. Even groups 
whose particular interests are contrary not only to those of other countries but 
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within country groups themselves, still are able to perceive a common European 
interest. This shows that the borders of a European identity constructed through 
horizontal dynamics are inclusive, and makes it possible to obtain a broad con-
sensus even between very different categories of individuals with very divergent 
interests.
 As a final consideration, interaction within a regional context represents a 
horizontal process of identity construction; so it is likely to create an inclusive 
form of identity. Thus, regional integration processes based on inclusive identity 
types can take the form of open societies; therefore, they will not threaten the 
existence of national identities. In contrast, the existence of different national or 
local identities may depend on the survival of regional identity. Just as without 
the EU framework none of the European nationals could match America, China 
or India in a globalized world, other regional groupings such as South East Asia 
or Africa cannot hope to succeed in the face of competition by the great powers. 
Through the proposed perspective on the process of identity construction, civil 
society can play a very significant role.
Notes
1 I would like to thank the other editors of this volume and Juan Diez Medrano for their 
useful comments which enormously helped the development of this work. In addition I 
have benefited greatly from discussions with Livia Garcia Faroldi, whose friendship 
has been invaluable for my academic growth during these years. Naturally, none of 
these persons should be considered responsible for this work’s deficiencies, which are 
only and wholly mine.
2 A sort of enlarged family group which can even cross the borders of groups, tribes, 
communities or countries.
3 For a general discussion on the concept of social identity see Jenkins (2008), while for 
a distinction between social identity and other notions see particularly the Handbook of 
Symbolic Interactionism (Reynolds and Herman- Kinney 2003).
4 Indeed, even the individual, if considered as a system (in Luhmann’s reasoning), tries 
to give coherence to his/her actions and uses his/her own identity to control different 
roles in private and public life.
5 But this is not the case for a sense of belonging, which is a feeling and not a system of 
reference, and which can be a consequence of a collective identity but is not the iden-
tity itself.
6 By ‘spontaneous’ I mean what is not induced or created from above by dominant 
groups, political leaders or institutions.
7 I do not like to use concepts like ethnos, because I do not share the idea that there are 
natural elements composing identity; I also consider ethnos a reifying concept. So I 
prefer to use the one of ‘imagined communities’ proposed by Anderson (1983). Here, 
the concept ethnos is intended to refer to its ‘common use’ as a category of practice.
8 After this event, the protest spread to other places, such as Canada (10 June 2008) and 
Japan (18 June 2008).
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3 Organised civil society and 
political representation in the EU 
arena
Carlo Ruzza
Introduction
As has often been noted, the European Commission is a bureaucracy with unique 
traits. It can be conceptualised and studied as a bureaucracy, and as such it shares 
many of the distinctive traits of other bureaucracies in terms of its problems, ide-
ologies, constraints, strategies, and relations with its political masters. Thus, con-
siderations of budget maximising and bureau shaping are as relevant for the EU 
Commission as for other bureaucracies. It is, however, a very distinctive civil 
service as several of its functions are unique, and so is its supranational institu-
tional environment. Thus, heightened concerns for political legitimacy are dis-
tinctive. As in other civil services, reliance on and inclusion of civil society 
groups can address some of its problems, but in a distinctive way. This chapter 
will focus on the relations between civil society and the Commission and 
examine to what extent they are coloured by the distinctive characteristics of this 
institution, and to what extent the changing features and roles of civil society 
formations reflect the growing general importance that civil society is acquiring 
in the EU institutional environment. However, to the extent that the EU Com-
mission reflects broader dynamics taking place in the European public sector, we 
will strive to generalise beyond the specific test case of the EU.
 The European Commission, like other public bodies, is involved with civil 
society groups in various capacities: among the functions frequently cited in the 
literature, civil society representatives are consulted as providers of technical and 
scientific expertise, channels for collecting information on the preferences of spe-
cific groups or causes, and recipients of funds for service delivery. However, we 
will argue that the full set of roles that civil society can play is broader. The spe-
cific reasons, and the specific motivational factors underlying the relations 
between civil services and civil society groups, are likely to change over time and 
in different places. With specific reference to the European Commission, we 
would like to emphasise the distinctive roles played by issues of representation. 
After a brief review of the main functions of civil society groups in policy arenas, 
and consideration of their specificity at EU level, we will focus on representation. 
We argue that a set of recent changes in the structure of civil society organisa-
tions has facilitated these functions and made them more politically salient.
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The policy role of civil society and the EU level
Interviews with policy makers in a variety of different administrative contexts 
suggest that the most important reason for including all civil society groups in 
policy- making contexts is to acquire information (Walker 1991). Good policies 
are based on appropriate technical, social and political information. Information 
is costly and it can become scarce and biased in an under- resourced state. Funds 
to acquire information through scientific research are limited, and powerful eco-
nomic actors can often provide relevant, but not unbiased, information. Civil 
society groups, through their scientists and through their grassroots bases, can 
often provide information that counterbalances that information provided by lob-
byists and can complement the often limited understanding of social and territo-
rial issues in specific contexts that would be difficult and expensive to study. In a 
constantly changing political and social environment, public sector activities are 
aimed at improving the social conditions of a population with frequently chang-
ing needs. Empirical research shows that civil society formations are valued pri-
marily for the quality of the information they can provide. For instance, an EU 
document on civil society notes: ‘NGOs have a duty to demonstrate that they 
have the expertise, management systems and internal quality control systems 
appropriate to the work they are undertaking on behalf of the Commission’ 
(European Commission 2000: 7).
 This fact has induced several organisations to develop specific policy, techni-
cal, sociological and administrative skills. For instance, at both local and supra-
national level, institutionalised environmental groups are often highly specialised 
and possess specific knowledge about complex sectors such as transport, agricul-
ture or energy (Rootes 2007, 2008). At the EU level, information is particularly 
valued because of two main factors. One is the relatively limited size of the EU 
civil service and its limited funds and powers to acquire original and pertinent 
information to aid decision making. The second is that the ideological and 
administrative fragmentation of the European Commission makes scientific and 
technical expertise traditionally highly controversial (Michelmann 1978). It is 
then not infrequent that different directorates general (DG) will prefer to use 
civil society expertise that they can trust as being sympathetic to their values and 
policy orientations.
 A related factor is that the participation of civil society groups can foster 
processes of policy learning which are useful for the entire public sector 
(Jachtenfuchs 1996). Policy learning can be facilitated by the existence of a thick 
associational inter- organisational field able to produce debating spaces in which 
deliberative forms of political participation can take place. These spaces do not 
necessarily need to be consensual and always result in shared decisions. State 
actors often argue that their ultimate decision- making power does not diminish 
the information- providing, preference- aggregating and preference- redefining 
benefits of involvement in debating fora. Thus the informational contribution of 
civil society organisations includes a better provision of information on which to 
base policies, and it can stimulate better decision making. Nonetheless, at the 
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EU level, policy learning becomes feasible when there is ideological congruity 
between scientific and technical experts involved in consultations and the ethos 
of particular DGs. For this reason it is more likely that environmental experts 
consulted by DG Environment will hold environmentalist values, or that experts 
on issues of racial discrimination consulted by the anti- discrimination unit of DG 
Social Affairs will equally hold strong anti- racist values.
 The joint need to acquire information and process it correctly is particularly 
pressing in some areas, such those of services to ethnic constituencies, poverty 
reduction, and local community self- help groups, because such social informa-
tion is frequently changing and not sufficiently known in policy- making circles 
(Rosenbaum 2006: 46). Because it is in these areas that NGOs often concentrate, 
their contribution is essential. Likewise, advocacy contribution and service deliv-
ery skills in areas related to gender issues are important when the process 
involves different levels of governance which have institutionalised anti- 
discriminatory practices selectively. Rosenbaum points, for instance, to the case 
of international donor organisations which use civil society groups for that 
purpose (Rosenbaum 2006: 47). Similar considerations apply to supranational 
entities such as the EU in relation to some member states (Ruzza 2004).
 The inclusion of civil society and its contributions to policy making acquire a 
special role at EU level because of its distinctive governance- based institutional 
architecture. This has a relatively weak centre within which member states 
attempt to effect policy change in European institutions characterised by limited 
decision- making power, a constantly changing institutional architecture, limited 
political legitimacy, and often poor coordination capacity (Ruzza 2004). In this 
situation, all interest groups – including public ones – have an important role in 
supplementing a weak policy process and making up for limited implementation 
effectiveness. But it also becomes imperative to overcome the obviously pre-
dominant role of economic interests above all others. For this reason, all Euro-
pean institutions have for many years emphasised and supported the aggregation, 
professionalisation, institutionalisation and inclusion of civil society groups 
(Mazey and Richardson 1994; Greenwood and Aspinwall 1998).
 Civil society organisations also interact with the public sphere – either in 
terms of media campaigns or occasionally in terms of demonstrative action – 
and they can reshape the policy needs and requests of salient groups in the 
population. Civil society organisations then articulate the connections between 
politics and society, making sure that socially relevant issues are translated into 
issues in the political arena. They have in this sense an innovative role often 
connected with the work of social movement organisations. This role may 
benefit public services by helping them to reach out to public opinion and artic-
ulate some of its policy choices, possibly those coordinated with civil society 
actors. This is a distinctive preoccupation of the EU institutional framework, 
and the Commission in particular (Schmitter 2000). All civil services have 
an increasing awareness of the necessity to be positively evaluated by 
public opinion, particularly in times of anti- political reactions to a generalised 
perception of bureaucratic inefficiency, organisational lack of accountability, 
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institutional fragmentation of the public sector and resulting low quality of 
public services. However, these perceptions are even stronger in the European 
Commission, whose employees at all levels of the hierarchy are painfully aware 
of the negative image they elicit in several member states (Cini 1996; Hooghe 
and Robert Schuman 1998).
 Civil society organisations can also facilitate the interaction between the 
public sector and its users. Much behaviour considered problematic, which the 
public sector is asked to address, is rooted in incorrect information or otherwise 
problematic lifestyles. A few examples should suffice. Environmental com-
pliance with standards of recycling is, dependent on the willingness of citizens 
to comply with municipal environmental regulations. Public sector policies that 
enlist the support of environmental associations are more likely to be effective, 
because a fund of energy and activism becomes available. Furthermore, as previ-
ously noted, additional political legitimacy is acquired. The same consideration 
– the importance of enlisting civil society support in projects for lifestyle change 
– applies to anti- discrimination or health policies, where the resource base and 
persuasion ability of groups is often essential. A vibrant political- associational 
space can provide non- conventional agonistic spaces for channelling scientific or 
technical expertise in the public sphere. Associated with this approach are mech-
anisms that facilitate the transposition of practices from the associational to the 
political sector.
 Associations can provide alternative chains of representation up and down the 
ladder of different levels of governance. This constitutes a new and important 
form of political participation. Public sector administrations are able to use civil 
society to connect to different levels of governance: for instance, to coordinate 
choices with regions with similar characteristics in the context of EU- level fora, 
or to represent their anti- discrimination or environmental concerns to EU institu-
tions with the help of EU- level public interest groups. Much of the work on 
political participation has been done with an implicit or explicit reference to a 
model of a self- contained nation- state. This takes the political boundaries of a 
state as the main if not the only reference for defining political strategies, and it 
uses the nation- state as the society of reference. This is no longer tenable in a 
multi- level governance structure such as the EU.
 In an integrated Europe, mechanisms for the transmission of citizens’ prefer-
ences across levels of governance are increasingly essential, as the debate on the 
limits of democracy in the European Union indicates. New forms of consultation 
can integrate the governance role of multi- level associations, providing an altern-
ative chain of representation able more effectively to represent the preferences 
of weaker groups in the population – for instance, disfranchised clandestine 
migrants, or minorities which are scattered territorially and therefore not fully 
represented by democratic institutions. Related to this important coordinating 
role that civil society groups can perform to benefit the public sector are trans-
national forms (that is, not only supranational) of political representation on 
issues decided at higher levels of governance but which have a direct impact on 
specific sectors of the population (Keck and Sikkink 1998).
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 Through civil society associations, and often with the involvement of admin-
istrators at local levels of governance, marginalised constituencies can engage in 
processes of venue shopping – processes otherwise reserved for powerful busi-
ness actors. Both civil society groups and interest groups interacting with the 
political environment face a multiplicity of venues, and they increasingly engage 
in venue shopping. This opportunity does not go unnoticed by members of civil 
society with the same political ideologies who act in a coordinated manner 
across different institutional realms and are often perceived as a distinctive con-
stituency. In this context references have sometimes been made to ‘femocrats’ or 
‘envirocrats’, which indicate, respectively, feminist or environmentalist activists 
in institutional positions, regardless of their specific institutional affiliation. 
These concepts are certainly not irrelevant to pockets of institutional activists 
within the European Commission or within the European Parliament with whom 
transversal advocacy coalitions have emerged over the years which combine the 
EU institutional framework and civil society groups (Judge 1992).
 The increasingly frequent steering mechanisms based on soft -laws partially 
developed outside the compelling authority of states often need to rely on 
consensus- seeking coordination, which may take place in multi- level delibera-
tive fora. In these contexts, sectors of the civil service and civil society can work 
in tandem to pursue shared goals – this is not unusual at EU level where reliance 
on soft laws is in part mandated by a weak institutional framework (Smismans 
2004).
 Grassroots civil society associations not only have better social and factual 
information because they are closer to their base, they can also provide better 
services because they have advantages of access; they are relatively freer from 
the imperatives of profit that mark commercial organisations; and they have a 
stock of additional social resources that they can channel to their bases through 
their (not uncommon) roots in affluent conscience constituencies – for instance, 
volunteers who help migrants obtain social services to which they are entitled 
but which would otherwise not be used because of limitations in social capital. 
At the EU level this is relevant, for instance, with reference to the Raxen 
network in the context of information on issues of discrimination in member 
states. This is important in contexts in which the public sector simply cannot 
afford to support weaker groups in the population. One thinks of the educational 
initiatives that civil society organises for underprivileged youth, some of which 
are supported by EU programmes. Civil society organisations and related experts 
and advocates also engage in the monitoring of policy- making processes and of 
implementation compliance. This is particularly important in areas where the 
consequences of defective implementation affect socially weak groups – for 
instance, in regard to issues of racism, environmental justice or gender 
mainstreaming.
 One of the key functions of representative institutions is the aggregation of 
preferences, which is related to how the representational process is constructed. 
However, processes of preference aggregation are often not satisfactory in con-
temporary society. Civil society produces an additional and alternative process 
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of aggregation of preferences within citizens’ associations – a process often 
based more on deliberative aggregation and which can compensate for some of 
the shortcomings of the electorally based aggregations. Finally, a related process 
of triangulation between national and supranational institutions can provide the 
public sector with information and political opportunities that would otherwise 
be difficult to obtain. In this context relations between civil society groups in 
member states and at the EU level provide an additional channel for monitoring 
and improving governance arrangements. To the extent that a transition to an 
increasing use of governance structure is taking place, the role of civil society, 
and particularly organised civil society, is increasing.
 To summarise, it has been argued that the public sector increasingly needs 
civil society because it provides benefits that would otherwise scarcely be avail-
able. These include public sphere communication, information acquisition and 
diffusion, aggregation of preferences, policy improvement through deliberative 
policy learning, involvement in governance structures and the ability to represent 
public sector users at various territorial levels, transnational advocacy and venue 
shopping for better policies and resources. All these benefits are available to the 
extent that different types of civil society organisations can be involved and suc-
cessfully integrated in collaborative projects with each other and in relation to 
the European and national public sectors. This depends upon successful proc-
esses of institutionalisation of civil society which currently characterise the 
sector, and which will be discussed below. First, however, some clarification of 
the issue of representation is needed.
Representation, the public sector and the European 
Commission
Political representation, as the activity of (re)presenting opinions and interests to 
the policy- making process, can be carried out by representatives holding elected 
office or by others. Representation can take place in several arenas. While demo-
cratic theorists often focus on the activities of office holders in democratic 
arenas, representation activities by interest groups of different kinds are increas-
ingly the focus of analysis. Their activities are examined in a broad set of arenas 
– including EU institutions. They present some of the same organisational and 
political dynamics studied by theorists of democratic representation. The literat-
ure on representation in such varied contexts has grown in recent years and has 
often focused on the representative activities of associations, social movements 
and other informal groups. These social formations experience the same tensions 
that occur in elected institutions, such as the tensions between acting as dele-
gates or as trustees. The multiple meanings of the concept of representation and 
the related internal tensions apply to all of the various arenas and agencies 
engaged in representative activities.
 However, as Pitkin (1967) and others have pointed out, the contexts in which 
the concept of representation is deployed colour which dimensions are more 
salient. Prevalent political practices make different usages of the concept of 
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 representation more or less relevant and specify its analytical and normative 
context. In this sense, processes such as the growing relevance of supranational 
integration and the prevalence of governance structures have broadened what is 
topical in relation to issues of representation. It is therefore necessary to identify 
and discuss issues connected to representation, particularly issues of transpar-
ency, openness, accountability and representativeness, and their implications at 
EU level. They have an impact on issues of cooptation by public authorities – 
including the EU Commission. In addition, in recent years the literature has 
emphasised that there is an associational form of representation in the public 
sphere – conceptualised as an increasingly important arena of policy shaping – 
that complements forms of political representation in policy arenas. The specific 
public sphere role of civil society formations also needs to be examined.
 In both cases, a broader concept of representation needs to be employed. 
Briefly, the contention here is that civil society behaves in the public sphere and 
in policy circles as a representative of sectors of the population that would other-
wise be disfranchised, either because of their limited access to voting entitle-
ment, as in the case of clandestine migrants, or because of educational or 
resource limitations on their capacity for social citizenship (Bonnett 1993; Plotke 
1997; Young 1997; Warren and Castiglione 2004; Rehfeld 2005; Urbinati and 
Warren 2008). However, a reverse process is also taking place. When civil 
society is recruited to publicise specific constitutionalised values and practices, 
for instance anti- discriminatory behaviour or environmental norms, and thereby 
to affect lifestyles, it acts as a representative of the public sector towards specific 
constituencies (Ruzza 2008a).
 Following Rehfeld (2005: 6), representation activities can be characterised in 
terms of the identity of representatives (who have to be members of a qualified 
recruitment pool); a selection agent; the functions required from the representa-
tive; and the decision rules utilised to select a particular representative. In the 
case of advocacy associations, the selection agents – often civil servants – select 
whom to consult and therefore endow with a type of representativeness. They 
may select business lobbies and NGOs as members of distinct but differently 
relevant communities of representatives. They may select among civil society 
networks of advocacy organisations according to a set of decision rules which 
could ideally include codified values such as ‘internal democracy, openness, 
transparency, accountability, representativeness of the NGOs’ constituency’ 
(European Commission 1995). They also select representatives on the basis of 
their perceived ability to perform a set of functions. Among the various func-
tions that public and private interest groups could perform, Urbinati emphasises 
the functions that the representative performs as an advocate. As Urbinati points 
out, conceiving the representative as an advocate ‘helps to highlight the two 
main political functions of representation, as a means both for expressing polit-
ical opinions and choices and therefore exercising self- government, and for 
resisting exclusion and therefore achieving security’ (Urbinati 2000: 761).
 Policy- making institutions such as those governments which have established 
a ‘compact’ with the civil society sector, or such as the European Commission, 
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have issued several key documents which implicitly and explicitly articulate the 
view that the activities of public interest groups serve to redress the imbalance 
present in a system of consultation that excludes or limits diffused interests from 
proper representation. And they have similarly stressed the importance of non- 
state actors in providing information useful to the policy- making process. In this 
sense, the inclusion of advocates from civil society has a complex purpose. 
Organised civil society performs functions of legal advocacy, and more broadly 
policy pressure. In order to do so, it is often able to employ already qualified 
personnel, such as legally trained experts who, as they focus on specific cases, 
and therefore provide general information, also furnish representation for a class 
of individuals. As noted, this complex function is particularly valuable when it is 
performed on behalf of groups that are weak in the electoral arena. An aware-
ness of this weakness has permeated several EU documents on civil society 
(European Commission 2000; Ruzza 2006). Awareness of the importance of 
civil society in the public sphere has equally permeated the Commission, which 
now has a growing understanding of the need for the European project to be 
better organised in that context (European Commission 2006). For instance, a 
Commission document notes
the role of NGOs in representing the views to the European Institutions of 
specific groups of citizens (such as people with disabilities, ethnic minori-
ties) or on specific issues (such as the environment, animal welfare, world 
trade). In particular, many NGOs have an ability to reach the poorest and 
most disadvantaged and to provide a voice for those not sufficiently heard 
through other channels.
(European Commission 2000)
This view of civil society’s role as providing a voice for the excluded and 
information for better policies is the standard that recurs in interviews with civil 
society. It is implicitly held by public opinion and it is echoed in scholarly work.
 The informational contribution of civil society is connected to the broader 
form of representation we have described not only because the policy process 
needs information that the representative process in the legislature might not 
provide adequately; it is even more important when there are no other elements 
elsewhere in the policy process to supplement and round out civil society’s con-
tribution. One such element would be to conceptualise the civil service as a 
potential channel of representation. The role of civil society would become 
particularly important when the deficient representation of socially excluded 
groups in the legislature is not compensated by their presence and prominence in 
the public sector. This is what Stevens (2009) argues with reference to gender 
representation in the EU Commission. Poor representation of ethnicity and 
gender within EU institutions is well documented (Woodward 2008). In view of 
this factor, while Stevens argues that bureaucrats should make up for the defi-
ciencies of representation in the legislature (Stevens 2009: 121), an equally rele-
vant strategy would be better inclusion of civil society.
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 If the inclusion of civil society can provide the informational, aggregative and 
representational benefits that have been described – benefits that can be integrat-
ive but also additional to other forms of public sector organisational model – still 
to be addressed is the issue of whether, despite the limitations of civil society 
organisations, which EU Commission documents do not fail to identify and 
emphasise (see for instance European Commission 1993), one can be optimistic 
as to their capacity to deliver. Also required is an examination of what mix of 
forms of involvement and types of organisations involved can best maximise the 
contribution of civil society. Discussion will then turn to the main types of 
organisations in the sector, what developments have marked their performance, 
and how they can interact and integrate their functions. We will argue that their 
role is differentiated across the different types of formations that make up civil 
society, and that although often in internal conflict, as a field of interacting 
organisations they complement each other (Warren and Castiglione 2004). Civil 
society conceptualised as an organisational environment can then be seen to be 
able to address the issues of transparency, accountability, internal democracy, 
informational effectiveness and policy delivery efficacy advocated by several 
civil services, including the Commission (European Commission 1995).
Changes in the structure of civil society and relations with 
the public sector
We wish to argue that a process of isomorphism is taking place whereby civil 
society organisations come to share some of the same views, develop policy 
competences and acquire both representational and service delivery skills. 
However, at the same time enough variety persists in the sector to mean that a 
range of civil society formations are needed to fulfil the functions that policy 
makers emphasise and that have previously been listed. Representational activ-
ities are typically performed by institutionalised social movements such as advo-
cacy groups, citizens’ advice bureaux or public pressure group representatives. 
Service delivery functions are typically performed by third sector organisations. 
Discussion of the relations between these two areas will illustrate the benefits of 
a unified concept of civil society in relation to the public sector.
 Representational civil society addresses the public sphere. This is a relatively 
recent and topical concern which gives a new meaning to the concept of civil 
society (Seligman 1992). It moralises and politicises certain issues of importance 
to particular populations. It exercises policy pressure through a variety of means 
ranging from threats of disruption or negative campaigns by social movement 
groups to providing information to policy makers, and so on. Focusing on these 
functions contextually in relation to a broader concept of civil society can add 
new insights into how the political system as a whole interacts with non- state 
actors.
 In contrast, service delivery activities are increasingly staffed by volunteers 
sensitive to the same social movements that are currently prominent in advocacy 
activities. In Italy, for instance, after the collapse of mass protest by the ‘new 
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social movements’ of the 1980s, ex- activists assumed important positions in the 
voluntary sector, bringing an understanding of the importance and techniques of 
political communication and more generally of politics. The sector split between 
a secular and a religious wing, both shaped by the entry of disillusioned activists 
but also by their interest in influencing political change (Ranci 2006: 29–35). It 
addressed its historical constituencies such as women, gays and minorities by 
catering to their welfare demands, but no longer only in terms of enhancing their 
social and political identities and voicing political demands. This significantly 
altered the social movement sector, further reinforcing its institutionalisation 
through the impact of a flow of public resources and increased social acceptance 
of its service delivery role.
 The social movement background of many volunteers also means that they 
are relatively comfortable with, and knowledgeable about, the workings of polit-
ical communication and advocacy tactics, which they deploy by engaging in 
broad- mix civil society coalitions to advance demands for funds, recognition and 
public policy change. Similar changes have been observed in several EU coun-
tries and in the US, where the political role of the sector has increased while the 
number and scope of other types of civic groups have decreased (Skocpol 2003). 
Thus advocacy and service delivery activities are interrelated, and a broad 
concept of civil society gives better purchase on the full range of activities of 
civil society formations. Nonetheless, for analytical purposes, I now discuss the 
advocacy sector of civil society and the service delivery sector in relation to their 
contribution to the public sector. I briefly review he contributions of social 
movements, citizen groups and coalitions, arguing that while their distinctive-
ness is obvious, they should be studied under the common umbrella of their 
capacity to represent and serve their constituencies. Then discussed are third 
sector associations, with an emphasis on their contribution to the limited 
resources of the public sector. It is posited that these roles are often complement-
ary and at times overlap; and that, in the context of public sector dynamics, 
forms of consultation and inclusion in policy making are often interrelated with 
service delivery activities. These are all part of civil society’s various contribu-
tions – in particular to disadvantaged social groups. Furthermore, this integration 
limits and compensates some of the shortcomings of civil society, as noted by 
the European Commission in its evaluations of the sector.
 I argue that the Commission’s concerns about the quality of information are 
addressed by the growing expertise of many public interest groups, if not by 
social movement organisations. Concerns about the internal democracy and rep-
resentativeness of civil society are potentially addressed by large platforms of 
social NGOs with standardised leadership election procedures, if not by charis-
matic social movements. On the other hand, social movement organisations 
provide a grassroots base and connections to movement groups at various levels 
of governance. They provide a way to reach specific sectors of the population, 
impact their knowledge and lifestyles, and achieve consensus. The NGOs’ 
service delivery sector provides a way to address specific service delivery needs 
that other state institutions find difficult to address. Thus while not all civil 
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society groups satisfy all the Commission’s criteria for effective and normatively 
approved inclusion, the overall institutional environment of civil society can 
provide a positive and much- needed contribution to political representation in a 
governance context. I now review the two main branches of civil society: advo-
cacy and service delivery, in terms of their contribution to the Commission’s 
values of openness, internal democracy, transparency, and efficacy.
The advocacy domain and the public sector
The advocacy domain comprises a set of organisational formations that relate to 
the public sector. As mentioned, these include institutionalised social movement 
groups, but also less formal groups such as ad hoc grassroots coalitions, citizens’ 
groups and broader multi- purpose umbrella groups or advocacy coalitions. To 
discuss this sector, it is useful to start with some reflections on the concept of a 
social movement. The advocacy sector is staffed by personnel who make a dona-
tion of energy, time and often personal resources in the name of idealistic causes. 
At any point in time the range of social causes for which this donation is availa-
ble is limited and they are often connected to concerted attempts at social, polit-
ical and cultural change – attempts embedded in networks of personal and 
organisational relations that are often classified as social movements.
 Nonetheless, it is necessary to note the ambiguity of the concepts of social 
movement and the transformation of the related organisations, which form some 
of the main components of advocacy- oriented civil society. The concept of the 
social movement has received substantial scholarly attention. If in earlier 
decades the distinctive trait of social movements was their contentious repertoire 
of actions, this is no longer necessarily the case – at least not exclusively, and 
particularly not at the EU level. I wish to argue that processes of transformation 
of social movements are changing the profile of civil society and making it more 
readily integrated into the EU environment.
 Social movements are to a large extent the historically shaped outcomes of 
processes of nation building and state building (Tilly 1978, 1984). Processes of 
internationalised governance are therefore likely to affect the form assumed by a 
social movement. While the political category of social movement is typically 
defined in terms of political protest at the national level, it takes on a different 
role once transferred to the international and supranational arena; and this, as 
Marks and McAdam (1996) argue, may require the revision of its conceptual 
definition when studied in a different political environment outside the confines 
of the nation- state. However, revision is useful even within the boundaries of 
states, because movements increasingly interact in multi- level governance struc-
tures with supranational aggregations, of which the EU is probably the most suc-
cessful example.
 In a political system based on shared sovereignty, consensual policy making 
made necessary by weak decision- making powers, and horizontal and vertical 
dispersion of authority, the social movement form lacks the clear target offered 
by the Westphalian state in all its articulations. This is the case even if the state’s 
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authority is considered not as weakened but as merely redefined as an economy- 
steering role (Weiss 1998). These changes then require a redefinition and a 
broadening of the environment in which calculations of political opportunity are 
made. Such broadening makes calculations of the cost- effectiveness of protest 
actions more difficult, and the identification of targets more variable. To be 
expected in such a context is extensive venue shopping, and the targeting of 
action forms on the specific features of different venues.
 Second, besides aiming at policy change, social movements attempt to 
promote social change through strategies of cultural diffusion to which elected 
representatives are expected to respond. However, if the confines of movements’ 
cultural efforts are broadened, this will have an impact on predicting the direct 
policy consequences of their action, and it will also create expanded cultural 
opportunities (McAdam and Rucht 1993). This has implications for calculations 
of focusing on convergent frames across national boundaries but also across 
types of political formations. Broader convergences may become possible and 
necessary in a broader political environment. In a situation of weak decision 
making and negotiated governance with non- state actors, frame convergence 
with potential allies such as other civil society organisations becomes essential. 
This applies to a variety of organisations able to develop convergent frames, but 
it applies in particular to organisations with substantial and growing political 
importance such as public interest groups and third sector organisations.
 A convergence of political frames and a consequent willingness to collaborate 
with other political actors have resulted not only from governance- induced 
factors but also from changes related to the institutionalisation of movements. 
This extensive institutionalisation in the West has, on the one hand, facilitated 
movements’ collaboration with other types of political formations while, on the 
other, it has provided legitimacy and resources to the social movement sector, 
altering its features in a relevant fashion. In several countries, the social move-
ments of the 1970s and 1980s have undergone a process of institutionalisation 
exemplified by their inclusion in a variety of policy- making deliberative fora and 
their rising popularity in public opinion (Ruzza 2004). This has for instance 
resulted in the creation and successful entrenchment in the machinery of the state 
of movement parties, such as green parties or some ethnic parties which have 
strong roots in, and continuing ties with, the social movement sector (Dalton and 
Kuechler 1990: 189–90; Müller-Rommel 1990). But these parties are also con-
nected to the mainstream political system and to processes that in several EU 
countries are progressively institutionalising parties in the machinery of the 
state.
 Much of the action repertoire that used to characterise social movements in 
recent decades has been adopted by a variety of political organisations. It is not 
unusual to see coalitions of opposition parties, and sometimes even governing 
parties and their leaders, organise or take part in protest marches or public events 
that borrow much of the action repertoire previously only utilised by social 
movements. The end result is a much more fragmented and institutionalised 
social movement sector which, together with social movement groups still 
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strongly oriented to disruptive forms of action, also includes a mix of organisa-
tions that express a wider action repertoire. Hence the same movements may use 
different tactics to address different components of the political system within a 
state, and also simultaneously focus on the public sphere, and on policy making 
at different levels of governance. In this context, social movements are increas-
ingly merging with other components of civil society to provide representation, 
advocacy, services and public communication to their constituencies, which are 
often the weaker sectors of the population that the public sector should address: 
for instance, the poor, ethnic minorities and women. Thus social movements are 
already part of broad coalitions, and are likely in the future to become increas-
ingly so; for instance, anti- racist coalitions which bring together sections of 
leftist parties, third sector organisations, but also public interest groups such as 
civil rights groups and also service delivery organisations such as development 
NGOs, religious organisations, migrants’ associations and some professional 
organisations.
 Coalition behaviour does not necessarily alter the main identity of move-
ments. However, coalition behaviour is in itself an important source of policy 
change which should be studied in relation to developments in other types of 
political formations, such as public interest groups and third sector organisations. 
Before discussing coalitions as self- standing political formations, it is necessary 
to consider how each of the forms of contentious political participation is chang-
ing in relation to changes in the role, structure and power of the state.
Citizens’ groups
At any point in time there is often a wide array of campaigns which are sup-
ported by various groups. These can be labelled as civil society advocacy or as 
civic collective action events. They are coordinated by public interest groups 
with different degrees of formalisation and territorial bases of differing extents. 
For instance, on examining public demands over a thirty- year period and distin-
guishing between these events and social movement protest events, Sampson et 
al. (2005) have shown that in the Chicago area civic engagement is durable, and 
that as ‘sixties- style’ protest declines, so hybrid- repertoire events increase. 
Cooperation among citizen grassroots groups is frequent and is facilitated by 
action coordination via the internet, where information, practical manuals and 
exchanges with other groups are easily accessible. For instance, one can find 
online manuals that detail how to contact government officials in different con-
texts, and how to address the media and the public (Dobson 2003). Thus, while 
citizens’ groups often interact with social movement organisations, they have 
different features. They are often relatively short- lived local- level campaigns 
which re- form on related issues through the advocacy of key individuals and 
establish broad local- level coalitions: this is the case, for instance, with many 
groups protesting against localised environmental threats; they may comprise 
broad sets of actors ranging from landowners to environmental protesters. These 
groups, just like social movement organisations, learn even more effectively 
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how to approach the complex decision- making structure of multi- level govern-
ance. For instance, at the EU level they find support in obtaining funds, legal 
advice and policy impact for local- level campaigns. Such information is often 
available in support manuals and via decentralised umbrella organisations that 
connect with levels of government (ECAS 2002). Hence the environment of cit-
izens’ groups has been redefined in terms not dissimilar to those of social 
movements.
Public interest groups
Also important in civil society advocacy coalitions are policy- oriented public 
interest groups. These are sometimes inspired by social movements and recruit 
social movement activists. They can be defined as ‘lobbies who seek the attain-
ment of a collective good the achievement of which will not selectively benefit 
the membership or activists of the organization’ (Imig and Berry 1996). Clearly, 
this definition is compatible with what many social movement organisations do, 
but also with organisations that are not generally engaged in protest actions, 
which do not claim a social movement identity, or which express an ‘out of the 
system’ character. Public interest groups can be differentiated from citizens’ 
groups by the fact that they may be think- tanks of professionals approaching the 
policy- making environment and not necessarily reflecting a broader constitu-
ency. They are often related to grassroots organisations which they claim to rep-
resent, and they not infrequently express an ideological connection to social 
movements. This means that they consider themselves the ‘legal arm’ of move-
ments’ organisations to which members may subscribe.
 Again, it appears that a rigid differentiation between social movements and 
interest groups on the basis of the activities performed is unfeasible. Their orien-
tation is often practical. In the context of EU environmental policy, for instance, 
even groups whose members declare an environmentalist identity frame their 
action in terms of extending the boundaries of the policy change possible in the 
given context of an EU institution. As a consequence, they cannot be defined in 
terms of any ‘out of the system’ orientation. In this context, therefore, the ideo-
logical connection with the social movement sector is important. It differentiates 
social movements from public interest groups with no social movement of refer-
ence, such as the anti- poverty lobby or the consumer movement, which, despite 
its name, has little mobilisation potential.
 The ideological reference points of a movement mean that lobbying activities, 
information- providing activities, participation in decision making and in agenda 
shaping take place with implicit potential recourse to the public sphere – in terms 
of either media campaigns or disruptive action. One may accordingly define a 
social movement- inspired coalition in organisational identity terms and consider 
public interest groups to be an integral part of such a coalition. A movement- 
inspired coalition is then able to triangulate with other political formations which 
also claim allegiance with social movements from different institutional bases, 
certain third sector organisations for instance.
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The service delivery sector
As several observers have pointed out, the third sector has acquired prominence 
as an important component of the decision- making system of several European 
societies. This development corresponds to both the numerical growth of the 
third sector’s organisations and affiliates, and to processes of institutionalisation 
that have seen its role redefined and increased. In many European member states 
there are now important areas of public policy that increasingly rely on the 
expertise, and contributions of resources and personnel, that the sector provides. 
However, the role of the third sector as an interface between the state and the 
public sector has come under scrutiny. Issues of transparency in the selection of 
associations, their accountability and effectiveness have been raised. Some of 
the reasons for the third sector’s increased importance concern economic and 
political processes relating to the changing functions of hollowed- out states 
increasingly unable and unwilling to cope with contemporary welfare demands. 
But equally important are generalised changes in the political discourse, which 
from both left and right have reflected a more central role of the third sector. 
However, the role of the sector changes in different polities and is shaped by the 
ultimate control of regulatory and distributive resources available to political 
actors.
 What political actors say about the role of the third sector is important 
because, as the sector becomes increasingly organised and institutionalised, the 
political system increasingly determines its modalities and margins of operation. 
Notably it determines the political architectures within which the third sector 
operates, the types and quantity of functions available to its organisations, tax 
regimes, normative frameworks for relationships with other social institutions 
such as churches and businesses, and incentives and disincentives in different 
areas of public policy. Of course, given the social relevance of the third sector, 
the internal views on it and perceptions of its role and functions are also highly 
consequential. Also important are the dominant expectations of the state and 
other social institutions, and inter- organisational relations within the sector. The 
concrete outcomes of the third sector in terms of quality and type of service 
delivery are then oriented both by dominant ideologies within the sector and by 
the political ideologies that frame its role in society.
 In recent years, the third sector has received sustained attention from academ-
ics researching the impact of changing forms of service delivery. Participation in 
the sector has also been studied in terms of attitudinal implications regarded as 
essential for good institutional performance. Since Putnam posited a link 
between levels of associationism and institutional performance, close attention 
has been paid to the issue (Putnam et al. 1993). Analyses of the roots of social 
solidarity and its relations with third sector activities have been highly contro-
versial, but generally accepted. This has attracted much attention from political 
actors and promoted public policies favourable to its expanded role.
 The third sector has grown substantially throughout Europe, a factor which 
encourages its closer relationships with other sector- specific organisations – both 
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political and service- oriented. Like the social movement sector, the third sector is 
in many contexts increasingly institutionalised within the state. In several coun-
tries the sector has acquired major political and also social and economic impor-
tance. Analysts have pointed to the specifically modernising function of the third 
sector in several member states, where it is replacing fading communal solidarity 
and offering new universalist social identities. This is typically the case in north-
ern Europe, but it is also increasingly apparent throughout southern Europe, 
where the sector’s importance has been enhanced by specific phenomena.
 However, unlike in some northern European democracies, where the develop-
ment of the welfare state partially eroded the importance of the third sector, in 
southern Europe the sector’s role is still significant, given the late advent and 
modest extent of public welfare. But even the limited importance of the decom-
modified welfare state has decreased in the wake of neo- liberal policies and eco-
nomic globalisation. This has occurred at a time of progressive erosion of the 
potential for political activism by the social movement sector, which, as men-
tioned, has become progressively institutionalised, less ideologically driven and 
more concrete, and has assumed some of the features of the voluntary sector, 
creating space for new synergies. Nonetheless, the social movement background 
of some of the new cadres has proved significant in several contexts. As the size, 
scope and composition of the sector grows, its contribution to delivering a range 
of public services becomes increasingly welcome to the population and political 
formations; and it is often essential, given the historical deficiencies of the public 
sector in several contexts, and the new challenges raised by economic globalisa-
tion. Over time, this has produced a voluntary sector which is highly institution-
alised, particularly in relation to local authorities in several EU member states.
 However, because a large flow of public money goes to the third sector, polit-
ical discussion has ensued on how best to use it. The sector is thematically very 
diverse, it is internally formed by competing organisations, and it plays a variety 
of roles wider than mere support for specific constituencies. For these reasons, 
the potential channels and policy sectors for utilising public money in the sector 
are very broad, and therefore politically controversial. Political forces have 
reacted to this situation by reflecting on potential interactions between the state 
and the sector in their political communication. And the sector has reacted by 
increasing its proactive engagement in the policy environment, which has 
brought it into closer linkage with social movements. It is now possible to con-
sider mixed representational and service delivery coalitions that unite different 
types of civil society groups.
Civil society coalitions
Coalitions can be mechanisms of collaboration among different types of political 
formations: for instance, the ‘New Deal Coalition’ included the Democratic 
Party, labour unions, religious groups and racial minority groups. The principal 
concern of these actors was a presidential election, but they had other policy- 
shaping goals as well. Likewise, civil society coalitions can also be formed by a 
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mix of rather different formations – for instance, political and civil society 
actors, and possibly business organisations involved in the social economy. 
Indeed, civil society coalitions are now the normal form of interaction between 
the public sector and organised non- state actors. Clearly, different types of coali-
tions will have different characteristics. As noted, social movement organisa-
tions may be part of coalitions, and when they are, the coalition has at its 
disposal the weapon of disruptive action and established mechanisms of struc-
tured relations with the media. Other coalitions may focus on interacting with 
the conventional political system and ensuring contracts for their service- 
delivering activities. On the basis of broader concepts such as the civil society 
coalition, some general considerations are now possible. A great deal of work 
has been produced on the relations between associations and policy making in 
recent years. In different ways, much of this work also touches upon the various 
attitudinal, cultural and regulatory issues that qualify this relation.
 The contiguity between the associational field and the political field is defined 
by ideological boundaries and, as has been argued, this contiguity is increasing 
with the transposition from government to governance because any sharp divide 
between the associational and the state sector is eroding for a number of reasons 
– particularly to the extent that associations come to represent local communities 
in international governance settings. Relations between associations and political 
formations are therefore increasingly ideologically driven, and the selection has 
significant consequences for democracy. For instance, at the municipal level, 
changes in the colour of the local government may result in a complex process 
whereby one coalition replaces another in the full range of service delivery and 
advocacy functions (Ruzza 2008b).
Discussion: a contextual view of civil society and the public 
sector
It emerges from the foregoing analysis of the distinguishing traits of civil society 
organisations that their functions, action repertoires and identities are often 
closely interlinked. In the public sector, organised civil society performs func-
tions of advocacy, policy pressure, information provision, minority representa-
tion, monitoring of policy- making and implementation, and political–societal 
interaction on issues of political communication. From this perspective, classical 
analyses of the concept of representation in governance structures need to be 
reconsidered in light of a more articulated interaction between state and non- 
state political actors and a more articulated role of associations (Pitkin 1967; 
Warren 2001). Thus, civil society activities can broaden and redefine the polit-
ical space and act on behalf of specific social constituencies. Associations con-
tribute to the welfare of these constituencies by engaging in a variety of 
interactions with the public sector.
 They may choose to engage in these interactions either while seeking auton-
omy from the state and its territorial articulations or by seeking involvement. 
Different civil society formations assess the advantages and disadvantages of 
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institutionalisation in different ways. Organisations closer to the uninstitutional-
ised social movement sector may reject involvement with the public sector, or 
accept only some forms of involvement. For instance, the environmentalist 
organisation Greenpeace refuses to receive EU funds, but still engages in advo-
cacy processes at EU level and collaborates with other environmentalist organi-
sations which receive the majority of their funds from the European Commission. 
Some organisations have described participation activities as ‘a tyranny’ which, 
in exchange for resources and influence, engenders compliance and limits the 
possibility of criticism. Clearly, different types of civil society organisations will 
exhibit different institutionalisation trajectories, different types of inclusion, and 
a different mix of functions in institutional, non- institutional and public sphere 
settings – the empirical dimensions of this mix of roles would be an important 
subject for further research. In any event, their task is increasingly facilitated by 
a very positive emphasis on civil society; and a set of consultation practices 
between policy makers and civil society actors has emerged on a global scale, 
constituting a new paradigm in policy formation and service delivery at all levels 
of governance.
 This new paradigm has, however, acquired particular salience at EU level 
because of the greater needs for political legitimacy that institutionalised civil 
society can provide to a set of supranational institutions. Their remoteness from 
specific constituencies makes the role of civil society as provider of alternative 
chains of representation particularly useful, in terms of both top- down and bot-
tom- up dynamics. Second, we pointed out that the institutionalisation dynamics 
that civil society formations have generally undergone are more pronounced at 
the EU level. Among the reasons previously identified, we emphasised the selec-
tive dynamics of inclusion in policy- making activities, and the selective barriers 
to access to EU institutions that filter out uninstitutionalised formations more 
rigorously than in member states. We have also emphasised the greater necessity 
of external inputs at EU level and the related reliance on deliberative and con-
sensual policy making given the limited size of the European Commission, its 
limited ability to reach and implement authoritative decisions, and representa-
tional and informational limitations.
Conclusions
With specific reference to the EU level, but also drawing broader theoretical 
implications, this chapter examined the implications of the concept of political 
representation when applied to the advocacy activities of non- state actors. It is 
argued that the interaction between civil society and EU institutions, and more 
generally the public sector, is becoming stronger and more useful because of 
three main factors, which acquire particular relevance at EU level. First, the 
public sector is increasingly turning to civil society because of a need to redress 
the overarching influence of business pressure groups. This extends more gener-
ally to a disenchantment with some aspects of New Public Management and its 
ethos (Dunleavy et al. 2006). At EU level, this is a particularly salient factor as 
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the resource- based political- capital filters that selectively empower the represen-
tation of private groups over public interest groups are particularly strong. 
Second, the public sector is in need of additional resources, particularly informa-
tion, the ability to represent specific social groups, and donations of activists’ 
time and energy that only civil society can offer. Again, the process of EU repre-
sentation, which emphasises governments over parliaments and unequally repre-
sents populations, makes the role of civil society representation particularly 
important. Third, resource needs are redefined by changes in the structure and 
functions of civil society organisations and their modes of operation. In this 
context, we demonstrated the integration of purposes, modes of representation 
and general attributes of efficacy transparency and democracy that different 
types of civil society formations can achieve if they work together as part of an 
associational ecology of organisations. While these dynamics are applicable to 
the entire European public sector, we have argued that they have special salience 
at the EU level.
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Part II
The European Union

4 Europeanization of non- state 
actors
Towards a framework for analysis
Karolina Borońska-Hryniewiecka
Introduction
After a long period of academic interest in the origins and nature of European 
integration there has been a shift in focus away from the ontological questions of 
whether the EU is supranational or intergovernmental, and towards more post- 
definitional issues connected with how it affects the agency and structure of dif-
ferent actors; in other words, how Europeanization matters. Like many scholars 
who deal with the general aspects of political institutions, researchers of Europe-
anization are usually less concerned with whether European institutions matter, 
than to what extent, in what respects, through what processes, under what con-
ditions, and why institutions make a difference (Weaver and Rockman 1993). 
The subject of their interest is to study how Europe, or the system of European 
governance, affects other actors: states and national institutions (Olsen 2002; 
Börzel 2002); sub- national entities, such as regions and territorial politics 
(Malloy 1997; Keating 2004a, 2004b; Dobre 2005); representation structures, 
such as political parties and movements (Ladrech 2001; Roller 2004); interest 
groups (Sroka 2004; Eising 2008); and different segments of civil society (War-
leigh 2001; Ruzza 2004, 2006). This chapter focuses on non- state actors (hereaf-
ter NSAs) and their responses to Europeanization.
 The involvement of NSAs in European and global politics can hardly be char-
acterized as novel, but intensifying economic and social exchange and the emer-
gence of new modes of governance have given them much greater visibility and 
made them the subject of deeper comparative studies. The reason for this is the 
fact that the impact of the EU and its institutional system has caused significant 
changes to non- governmental interest representation. New vectors of power and 
forms of participation have arisen in this sphere, which influences the image of 
the European public space.1 The Europeanization of NSAs requires special atten-
tion because it concerns civil society’s participation in European governance. It 
is one of the weakest points of the EU today and is at the heart of the challenge 
to overcome the European democratic deficit.
 The multiple NSA activities within the EU are reflected both in the variety of 
interests represented by the different NSAs and in the multiplicity of organiza-
tional beings working in the name of promoting vital interests and undertaking 
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strategies aimed at their realization. This diversity, on the one hand, creates 
possibilities for a wide interpretation of the phenomenon of Europeanization of 
NSAs; on the other, however, it causes problems for making generalizations 
about the different modes of adaptation to Europe by particular actors. Yet such 
ambiguity may still yield interesting results.
 This chapter does not intend to give an exhaustive account of research on the 
development of European civil society2 or interest intermediation at different 
levels of the EU, but seeks to highlight the different ways of conceptualizing the 
phenomenon of Europeanization of NSAs that could be used in comparative 
studies on Europeanization. By reviewing the contribution of neo- institutionalism 
and policy networks analysis within European studies, this chapter distinguishes 
between the different actor- oriented approaches that explore the impact of and 
adaptation to the process of Europeanization. The first approach, based on 
rational choice theory, takes as its central notion the problem of resource depend-
ency of interest groups and their strategies. The second approach focuses on the 
sociological aspects of institutional adaptation, stressing the importance of col-
lectively shared values, understandings and logic of behaviour. The third one 
stresses the importance of history and its inefficiencies in analysing institutional 
change. Are NSAs mainly the objects or agents of Europeanization? Can they 
fulfil the two functions simultaneously? A number of examples will illustrate the 
different arguments.
NSAs on the European scene: definitional problems
NSAs are the principal structures of organized society beyond governments 
and public administration. For the purposes of this chapter, they may be 
defined as a wide range of non- governmental agents whose participation in the 
political, economic and social life of the European Union, as well as in the 
global sphere, is formally recognized. NSAs include different kinds of interest 
groups: non- governmental organizations (NGOs); social movements; advocacy 
and promotional groups in all their diversity; functional interest groups3 as 
social partners (such as trade unions and employers’ organizations); and secto-
ral organizations (such as enterpreneurs and consumers’ associations). NSAs 
may also include universities, research institutes and epistemic communities 
organized to promote and achieve certain educational goals. In practice, it 
means that participation is open to all kinds of community- based actors whose 
interests, objectives, strategies, ideology, level of organization, support base, 
legitimacy and degree of international recognition vary greatly.4 This chapter 
will use the terms NSAs and interest groups interchangeably, since they share 
the same basic characteristics, yet their structure and agency vary depending 
on their character and status.
 The involvement of NSAs in European policy making has increased gradually 
over the last 30 years: notably in the establishment of the European Social and 
Economic Committee in 1957; and in the signing of the Single European Act of 
1987, which created the single market within the EU, and introduced the consul-
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tation procedure and extended qualified majority voting to new areas. These 
steps resulted in many NGOs actively participating in the creation of common 
European standards and led different interest groups to lobby at the European 
level rather than in their national ‘playgrounds’. The Leaken Conference of 2001 
established a qualitative milestone for the recognition of the participation of 
NGOs in European governance and included for the first time the representation 
of NSAs in the Convention working on the Constitutional Treaty. The most 
recent, yet still not institutionalized, development in the Europeanization of 
NSAs is the Lisbon Treaty – with its Charter of Fundamental Rights, which 
further enhances the European Social Dialogue and institutionalizes citizens’ ini-
tiatives. All of these stages constitute a continuous process of Europeanization of 
NSAs. But what exactly is Europeanization?
Making sense of Europeanization
Europeanization is sometimes interpreted as a globalization process in the Euro-
pean realm (Matei 2004). Indeed, as in globalization, one aspect of Europeaniza-
tion is the transformation of national or regional phenomena into supranational 
(European) ones through a combination of economic, sociocultural and political 
forces. Europeanization is a contiguous but secondary process to European inte-
gration. The integration of Europe has become the grammar in use for national 
governments, NSAs and societies. The range of understandings of Europeaniza-
tion varies from: ‘transnational process of dissemination of the European norms 
and practices’ (Matei and Matei 2007), through ‘institutional adjustment to the 
EU’ (Börzel 2004), to ‘a specific strategy of solving conflicts around the world’ 
(Featherstone 2003). In spite of existing conceptual contestation, the majority of 
researchers speak of Europeanization when some part of the domestic political 
system is affected by something European (Vink 2002). This definition could be 
rendered more precise as the ‘institutional change in which domestic policy areas 
become increasingly subject to European policy- making’ (Börzel 1999: 574). 
This chapter will use the broad definition of Europeanization proposed by 
Claudio Radaelli.5 For him, it is a process consisting of different sub- processes: 
construction; diffusion; and the institutionalization of formal and informal pro-
cedures, rules and ways of doing things, shared beliefs and norms, which are 
first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated 
into the logic of domestic discourses, identities, political structures and public 
policies (Radaelli 2003: 30). However encompassing it may seem, such a way of 
looking at Europeanization leaves space for a broader interpretation of the dif-
ferent adaptational patterns of NSAs and their modes of interest representation. 
Moreover, it underlines the importance of ‘change’, not only as the changing 
agency of political actors and policy outputs, but also in terms of the underlying 
structures of meanings and identities. Since this chapter aims to draw an analyti-
cal framework of the impact of Europeanization upon the public sphere and the 
relations between the EU administration and NSAs, Europeanization will be 
treated here as: a process (of diffusion, learning, adjusting, and the reorientation 
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of politics); effect (of engagement with Europe); cause (of further integration); 
and relation (between the EU and other actors). Before moving on to analyse 
NSA responses to the EU, it is useful to examine an important general approach 
to Europeanization.
 One of the earliest conceptualizations of Europeanization, by Ladrech, defines 
Europeanization as ‘an incremental process of re- orienting the direction and 
shape of politics to the extent that EC political and economic dynamics become 
part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy making’ (1994: 
69). This emphasizes the ‘top- down approach’ to Europeanization where 
‘change’ emanates from the impact of the EU on national policy and relies on an 
analysis of the implementation of the European policies. It might be represented 
by the following schema:
‘Europeanizing’
↓
input (EU policies) → output (implementation)
Approaching the Europeanization of NSAs exclusively from this top- down 
perspective may fail to recognize the complexity and two- directional character 
of this process (Risse et al. 2001: 1). It is important to acknowledge that 
domestic actors are never just passive recipients and implementers of Euro-
pean norms; after all, European policies do not ‘come out of the blue’, but are 
the result of political action, lobbying and negotiations by the same domestic 
actors who shift domestic issues and delegate their will to the European level 
(Putnam 1988). This is where the ‘bottom- up’ approach becomes helpful. The 
‘bottom- up’ approach, which will be applied in this chapter, has a different 
research design and focuses on domestic actors, their resources, preferences, 
values and relations, checking how and to what extent they respond and adapt 
to the challenges of Europeanization. Here, Europeanization occurs when 
domestic actors begin to affect the policy of the EU in a given area. The fol-
lowing scheme explains it:
domestic actors and interactions → intervening variables (EU and other pressures)
change at the actors level ← change at the European level ↵
The bottom- up process is seen as the emergence of new institutions, practices, 
frameworks and symbols at the domestic level in response to the EU. These 
are then transferred, in the form of a particular strategy or action, onto the 
European level and become a common operational logic in the EU system of 
governance. Europeanization is a dependent variable, an explanandum and a 
problem to be studied. Moreover, it covers both the vertical and horizontal 
dynamics of the relations between the EU and NSAs, whose patterns of beha-
viour are shaped by both newly generated European values and knowledge and 
their domestic logics.
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How does Europeanization affect NSA? Neo- institutionalism 
revisited
According to institutional theory, every institutional change has a broader quali-
tative dimension and presumes an evolution of the character of the relations 
between different political and social actors.6 The impact of Europe may vary 
depending on many factors connected with the nature of NSAs and the contexts 
in which they are rooted, but it requires at a minimum that NSAs redefine them-
selves in a broader perspective within a framework of multi- layered interests. 
The majority of existing NSAs were created in particular member states and 
possess certain national peculiarities reflected in their agency and structure. 
Many of them are used to operating within their domestic realm, following well- 
known patterns of interest intermediation, responding to only a few stakeholders 
and anticipated policy outcomes. Europeanization made the EU a new decisive 
factor in the pursuit of policies traditionally considered domestic, such as 
employment, immigration or asylum. Now, as NSAs have entered the EU supra-
national networks of cooperation, they have had to learn how to collaborate, 
exchange resources and use each other’s experiences. Networking and coopera-
tion among Eurogroups are essential, since they have to respond to the same EU 
institutions and overcome common problems connected with by- passing certain 
gatekeepers who often block access to European decision making. Europeaniza-
tion has affected many areas of NSA activity: organizational structure; patterns 
of behaviour; lobbying strategies; and relations between NSAs and member 
states.
 Operating at the European level has generated changes that were the result of 
both formal requirements and processes of learning and rational calculation. The 
institutional interaction of policy actors at the various levels of the European 
governance system has led to the redefinition of national and regional identities 
within the European context, where the exchange of resources takes place within 
differentiated and interconnected networks. Explanations for varying degrees of 
influence and power of different interest groups were attributed to their ability to 
generate and operationalize these resources. The multi- level structure of NSAs’ 
participation in the EU requires multi- level agency and generates multi- level 
responses to their actions. Therefore to build a constructive and reliable frame-
work of analysis it is indispensable to take a broad and multi- level approach, 
which will identify the changes in the micro- institutional structures of NSAs, 
linking the domains of policy, politics and polity at the different levels of the 
EU. Because EU–NSA relations are shaped by both institutional structures and 
their impacts, as well as by normative aspects and preferences, a neo- institutional 
perspective might offer a useful means of analysing the Europeanization phe-
nomenon. Indeed, much of the Europeanization literature is institutionalist by 
nature and there is a broad agreement that an awareness of the new institutional-
ism is indispensable for understanding how Europeanization is conceptualized 
(Bulmer 2007; Börzel 2002, 2005; Featherstone and Radaelli 2003). Neo- 
institutionalism comes in many flavours that might serve as complementary 
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ways of analysing and understanding the institutional changes connected with 
Europeanization. For any researcher dealing with NSAs, it is useful to distin-
guish between the three main theoretical ways of conceptualizing the adapta-
tional processes in response to Europeanization.7
Resource dependency in Europeanization study
The Resource- Dependency Approach (RDA) to Europeanization originates from 
rational choice institutionalism, which assumes that any change in the institutional 
structure means a redistribution of resources among political actors.8 As Ramon i 
Sumoy notes: ‘Regardless of the origin of the change (exogenous or endogenous), 
it empowers some actors over others’ (2005: 119). In the case of Europeanization, 
the institutional change is European integration, which causes a redistribution of 
power resources at the domestic level resulting from EU membership. RDA 
assumes that actors are rational, purposeful and goal- oriented. They have a fixed 
set of preferences and act quite instrumentally, striving to maximize profits by 
deploying the resources at their disposal. Because any individual or collective is 
dependent on others to achieve its goals, actors tend to exchange resources among 
themselves. This exchange is based on a set of power relations consisting of a joint 
assessment of strategies and interests. Radaelli notes that it is better for actors to 
reformulate their expectations before the process of bargaining is concluded, in 
order to gain some credit at home, or to limit the negative consequences of future 
decisions (Radaelli 2004: 12). So why have some NSAs, such as environmental 
NGOs and trade unions, been able to penetrate EU institutions while others have 
not? The answer might lie in an analysis of the resources of NSAs. The survival, 
expansion and effectiveness of a particular group depends on the control of 
resources. In policy networks literature the control of these resources is seen to lie 
in the hands of the organizational elite (Sroka 2001: 39).9
Access to political decisions
Access to EU decision making prejudges the success of the Europeanization of 
NSAs. Some NSAs are regarded as legitimate interlocutors, so- called ‘insider 
groups’ (such as trade unions in the social dialogue), while others are blocked 
from the negotiating table. In the EU, certain gatekeepers (notably member 
states, but also lobbyists or well- established NGOs) can facilitate or block 
contact with decision makers. Moreover, attempts to build high firewalls around 
policies in a given sector, so that they cannot be altered, are not rare (Peterson 
2003). With regard to NSA participation in EU governance, Schmitter introduces 
the notion of ‘holders’: organizations that possess some quality or resource that 
entitles them to participate in the decision- making process (2002: 62). There 
must then be a demand for them on the part of other stakeholders who have the 
power of letting NSAs into that process.
 The European Commission (EC) plays a significant role in the process of 
including NSAs into European decision- making. In an ideal scenario, NSAs 
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undergo a twofold process of Europeanization: they put knowledge into the 
European legislative process, and they influence implementation processes and 
the democratic legitimacy of the EU. However, some NSAs are more powerful 
than others and many representatives of civil society are still excluded from 
European governance. For example, the ability of NGOs to influence EU policy 
output is generally less than that of corporate lobbyists. Warleigh stresses that 
NGOs are still too weak to play a significant role in Union policy, because they 
lack more regular access to EU decision makers (2001: 623). This factor is con-
nected to a second: lobbying strategies.
Knowledge and expertise
With its own system of law and the capacity to impose its will on a polity of 
over 470 million citizens, the EU may seem very powerful, yet in fact it is com-
paratively weak in terms of resources. Since the EU’s policy is highly technical, 
it relies heavily on informational assets and expertise. These resources can 
become an exclusionary device, especially for NSAs, at the supranational level, 
because representative institutions are very often inefficient at providing special-
ist knowledge. The EC, as initiator of legislation and policies, benefits from the 
expertise of thousands of expert groups, lobbyists and interest groups. Certain 
policy fields such as environment, agriculture and nuclear or waste policy require 
a broad, Europeanized approach, taking into account all possible repercussions 
of the proposed solutions for the different stakeholders. Although member states 
still control access to political decisions at the European Council level, NSA 
experts who share specialized knowledge in particular policy fields are of great 
value for Commission projects. These NSA experts tend to identify and ‘bond’ 
with each other in order to shift the European policy agenda in the direction of a 
policy change, which quite often goes against the interests of the member states. 
This happened during the EU Energy Summit and the European Climate Pact, 
where environmental NGOs lobbied for a decrease in emissions of greenhouse 
gases. Not only did they demonstrate, they also contributed to effective problem 
solving in the form of professional information and expertise. On the other hand, 
NSAs may seek to influence the European agenda by politicizing certain issues 
and making broader European agreements. Alliances within epistemic com-
munities of researchers created within the EU Framework Programme (FP) for 
funding collaborative research illustrate this case. The main objective of the FP 
is to develop and strengthen the European knowledge- based society. Among the 
strategies of the FP are the ‘networks of excellence’, consisting of specialists 
from different disciplines collaborating on different scientific projects. FPs have 
expanded to become one of the largest items of expenditure in the Community’s 
budget,10 not least because much decision making about precisely who gets what 
from the programme has been delegated to communities of researchers and sci-
entists. In this case the EU sponsors Europeanization initiatives in the process of 
knowledge and expertise exchange.
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Mobilization and symbolic resources
Unlike epistemic communities, politicized environmental or social develop-
ment NGOs are highly dependent on their ability to mobilize their bases and to 
influence policy debates over issues such as auto emissions, euthanasia or 
social exclusion. Their activities can often be viewed as battles between com-
peting interests, such as those NGOs advocating environmental protection 
against the industrial interests of the member states. Therefore, their strategies, 
being either confrontational (demonstrations, blockades) or moderate lobby-
ing, require a high degree of mobilization of their elites and members. The 
degree and forms of social mobilization in the public discourse and collective 
action concerning European issues depend principally on the type of group 
identity. Dunleavy’s distinction between exogenous and endogenous groups is 
instructive here (1991: 60–70). Exogenous groups possess predetermined iden-
tity sets such as origins, societal cleavages or professions, while the identity of 
endogenous groups is determined in a goal- oriented and rational way, mostly 
formed by the particular issues at stake (such as protecting the environment or 
supporting euthanasia). This distinction helps to illustrate the differences in 
collective action and the capacity to adapt in particular institutional and polit-
ical contexts, in this case the EU. The first type of group, whose identity is 
based on belonging, acts according to strong normative and emotional factors, 
while the second type is determined by more rational and goal- oriented 
premises resulting from participation (such as the Basque nationalist move-
ment against Greenpeace). Without going deeper into a sociological analysis 
of the different types of collective identities (see Bello’s chapter in this 
volume), it is important to note that in spite of existing differences the two 
types of identities are not exclusive and should be treated as a theoretical 
model with possible variations in a particular situational context. Sometimes 
the strong sense of belonging to a particular interest group can facilitate the 
process of Europeanization, as can be seen in the Catalan and Basque national-
ist parties’ pro- European strategies, designed to circumvent the central govern-
ment in the policy fields connected with the EU (Roller 2004).
 Thus, mobilization is crucial in the Europeanization process as a bridge 
between belonging and active participation. The latter requires voluntary action 
and an understanding of the functioning of the EU and comes from the socializa-
tion process, which occurs through formal education, experience and participa-
tion in European affairs. In this case, NSAs are seen both as subjects and agents 
of Europeanization. As Warleigh points out, NGOs must not only increase their 
supporters’ awareness of problems to be addressed at the EU level, but also 
provide mechanisms by which they can do so (2001: 236). This cognitive 
impact, however, presupposes the mobilization of interest in the EU by citizens. 
This in turn might occur through the politicization of EU issues – ‘bringing the 
EU closer to the people’. It is unfortunately a difficult process due to the persist-
ing complexity of EU governance structures. The result is a lack of social trust 
in European institutions.
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 Moreover, the mobilization factor is closely connected with the symbolic 
resources of an interest group, which comprise both its external image and public 
relations, as well as its organizational culture and internal perception by its 
members and supporters. The symbolic resources are closely connected with 
group identity; they can help to reproduce a group’s bonds and generate trust 
between members and those elites who play a crucial role in the process of the 
Europeanization of NSAs.11
Affiliation and coalition potential
Europeanization influences the mobilization potential of NSAs by letting them 
enter into EU- supported networks of collective action and supranational plat-
forms of cooperation. This often results in a reorientation of their mobilization 
strategies towards norms and patterns of behaviour classified as ‘European’. The 
coalition and affiliation potential is therefore an important resource in the Euro-
pean dynamic where dominant actors vary significantly between policy sectors. 
Europeanization through coalition building can be a successful way of pursuing 
particular interests which otherwise would remain unpoliticized and would not 
be addressed. According to rational choice theory, in interest- driven coalitions 
calculating and goal- oriented actors exchange resources while trying to remain 
as independent of others as possible (Börzel 2002: 19). Yet, in the EU independ-
ence is a scarce good. Very often it is not possible to gain access to a decision- 
making body without previous involvement in a so- called ‘network of friends’, 
which may house those gatekeepers mentioned above. Therefore, it is difficult 
for NSAs to generate trust as they interact in a turbulent environment of compet-
ing interests. One consequence is that EU policy networks of NSAs tend to be 
discrete, distinct and largely disconnected from one another, even when they 
preside over policies that are clearly connected, such as agriculture and environ-
mental protection. Most have diverse memberships, extending from public to 
private, from European to global and sub- national, and lack clear hierarchies and 
visible leaderships. Coalitions are often ad hoc issue networks (Rhodes 1997; 
Peterson 1995), and therefore they are not durable or elastic. However differ-
ently rooted, interests become Europeanized in policentric networks when a 
common understanding of aims and strategies is developed. Therefore the 
agency of NSAs in the process of Europeanization depends on voluntary and 
interest- oriented coalitions, whose members accept a common frame of refer-
ence and rules set by the EU. In advocacy coalitions various undertakings are 
successful when common interests are supplemented by common values.
 NSAs also form affiliations with EU institutions, especially the European 
Commission and the European Economic and Social Committee, in order to seek 
solutions to European problems. These affiliations are based on information 
exchange, expertise and policy projects. Sroka notices that in cooperation 
between NSAs and public administration there is a readiness of interest groups 
to take responsibility for any unsuccessful political and administrative decisions 
in which they were involved. Thus, interest groups are not simply rational actors 
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maximizing their gains, but they are also stabilizing agents who take part in 
redefining and restructuring political space (Sroka 2004: 16). Charles Lindblom 
calls this ‘the intelligence of democracy’, which reconciles the political system’s 
effectiveness and citizen participation (Lindblom and Woodhouse 1993).
Europeanizing through socialization
There is a clear contrast between rationalist (resource- dependent) and sociological 
strands in debates on Europeanization. Sociological institutionalism does not deny 
that actors are rational and goal- oriented, but it does state that actions are not 
entirely guided by strategic and calculating behaviour. Rather, actions depend on 
collectively shared values and understandings, rules of appropriateness and social 
expectations. ‘Doing the right thing’ is the guiding notion of institutional change. 
Institutions are seen not only as formal and informal rules and procedures, but also 
as systems of symbols and moral templates – reflecting a general understanding of 
collective human action, not of individual purpose. Institutional change is there-
fore conceived as a process of institutional adaptation through which new rules, 
norms and practices are internalized and substituted for old ones (Olsen 1997).
 The success or failure of the European socialization process depends heavily 
on group identity, its mobilization and symbolic resources, as mentioned above. 
Warleigh stresses the important role of NSA elites in ‘transmitting Europe’ to 
their grassroots. This process is not only about increasing awareness of ‘what the 
EU is all about’, but also about operationalizing this capital – making people use 
their knowledge, EU funds, programmes, job opportunities, and so on. This is 
what Radaelli calls the European ‘grammar in use’, ‘the ways of doing things’ 
that change the logic of interaction, where NSAs take the role of agents of Euro-
peanization. As Warleigh points out:
to facilitate the Europeanization of civil society, the EU requires a set of 
actors from outside the official circles to demonstrate the value of engaging 
with EU decision- making processes, to train citizens with relevant skills . . . 
and to continue the process of generating transnational solidarity through 
the construction of cross- border supporter bases.
(2001: 621; see also Itçaina in this volume)
 Moreover, since every institutional change creates a situation of insecurity, 
one of the most important factors for the reproduction and consolidation of Euro-
pean democracy lies in the social cognitive capacity of learning and internalizing 
new norms, as well as generating social trust. In Europeanized networks, where 
negotiations are needed to formulate agreements and compromises, this capacity 
enables an organization to learn new techniques of resource circulation. Long- 
lasting bargaining of meanings, which is itself a form of socialization, leads to 
an increase in common trust and the institutionalization of consensus. The result-
ing agreement, which is often achieved in the form of compliance, becomes a 
proof of Europeanization, a value in itself, and is not a subject of exchange.
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 Both rational and sociological approaches include the notion of learning in 
their analyses, but each understands it in a different way. Rational choice refers 
to so- called ‘thin learning’, whereby actors adjust their strategies to enable them 
to achieve goals in a new context, using a menu of well- known responses. Socio-
logical institutionalism points to ‘thick learning’, involving changes in an actor’s 
behaviour and the reshaping of their preferences and goals according to social 
pressures and the logic of appropriateness. An example of NSA involvement in 
the process of European learning is the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) on 
Social Inclusion, which slowly began to include NGOs in its schemes and to 
become a catalyst for NSA mobilization at the European level (see the Swedish 
example in Jacobsson and Johansson 2007). The OMC might in fact serve to 
facilitate the Europeanization of NSAs, which, participating in the transnational 
transfer of European knowledge and good practice, become empowered through 
the opportunity for infusing debates with their knowledge and ideas, and are able 
to foster new alliances and networks. Keck and Sikkink (1998) also note a posit-
ive phenomenon called ‘the boomerang effect’ of NSAs, which after entering 
into transnational networks bring their newly acquired knowledge back into the 
national context. Another example of European socialization for creating a 
common code of conduct in the NGO sector at the European level is the Euro-
pean NGO Confederation for Relief and Development (CONCORD).12
Bridging the gap between calculation and ‘appropriateness’
There is wide- ranging consensus that EU institutions do not simply offer structural 
opportunities for interest groups (Marks and McAdam 19956; della Porta 2007; 
Eising 2008). They also shape the arenas of interest mediation in manifold ways. 
They set ‘the rules of the game’ that facilitate the process of resource exchange, as 
well as standards for appropriate interest group behaviour (European Commission 
2001, 2002). The EU sets regulations and passes laws which member states and 
NSAs must implement and comply with. Yet these regulations affect to a great 
extent the functioning of interest groups, enabling and constraining them within 
the European logic of appropriate action (March and Olsen 1989, 2005). Ideally, 
rules are followed because they are seen as natural, justified and legitimate. 
However, looking at the political and socio- economic cleavages as well as differ-
ent patterns of contestation and interest mediation in European states, we can 
expect national realpolitik and particular interests often to prevail over correct and 
generally accepted rules of conduct. Moreover, although the EU provides institu-
tional and normative bonds that tie citizens together (for example, the common 
market, currency and citizenship; participation in European Parliament elections; 
European rules and standards; supranational partnerships in developing public pol-
icies), the cognitive and intellectual development of ‘European society’ does not 
occur simultaneously. The explanation might lie in Kenneth Galbraith’s ‘cultural 
gap’ between society’s ‘conventional wisdom’ and the independent ‘march of 
events’ (Galbraith 1998). Galbraith noticed that the distance between ideas and 
ways of assimilating them, between perceptual progress and changes in people’s 
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thinking, are not synchronized with the progress of events. They both acquire their 
own dynamics and only the ‘struggle of ideas’ leads to a change in the ‘conven-
tional wisdom’. In the European realm institutions and formal rules can be created 
instantly, but the process of internalization and institutionalization of norms 
requires a long and conscious effort on the part of society and its elites. In spite of 
the new institutionalism’s claims that institutions reflect actor preferences (March 
and Olsen 1995), there are doubts in this field concerning the European democratic 
deficit and the role of NSAs in further integration. The goals and interests of social 
groups have a historical character, changing with the stream of events and interest 
constellations. Changed motives and preferences are followed by the creation of 
new systems of values and conduct. The thesis drawn from here might be that 
‘European civil society’ is not developing in parallel with the institutions of the 
EU, as has been illustrated by the initial rejection of the European constitution and 
the Lisbon Treaty.
 Arguments about this state of affairs are numerous and stem from ontological 
questions about the nature of the EU. Liberal intergovernmentalists view the 
integration process as the outcome of bargaining among member states where 
interest groups do not have much say in major policy decisions but rely entirely 
on their national governments to act as gatekeepers in the pursuit of their EU- 
related interests (Moravcsik 1998). On the other hand, supranationalists and gov-
ernance advocates argue that in the multi- layered and differentiated European 
institutional setting power has been dispersed away from central governments: 
upwards to the supranational level, downwards to sub- national jurisdictions and 
sideways to public and private networks of NSAs. This, together with the 
resource dependencies of EU institutions, increases the influence of NSAs, 
granting them some access to European policy making (Finke 2007; Kohler- 
Koch 2005). Here the involvement of NSAs assumes a legitimizing and control-
ling function and contributes to democratic European governance. Although 
different studies arrive at different conclusions, the general view on interest 
groups in the EU is becoming more favourable (Balme et al. 2002; della Porta 
2007). Many analysts claim that although domestic groups need to pursue a ‘dual 
strategy’ and promote their interests vis- à-vis both domestic and EU institutions 
(see Kohler- Koch 1997: 3), their overall lobbying strategies and logic of behavi-
our have become largely EU- dependent, thus Europeanized.
History matters?
For sociological institutionalism the major causal mechanism of institutional 
adaptation is isomorphism, which suggests that common interactions and a 
similar environment result in the convergence of rules and values. Authors 
relying on sociological institutionalism stress the importance of building a 
common European frame of meanings (Radaelli 2004) and focus on the dissemi-
nation of new ideas and concepts through European institutions (such as cooper-
ative governance or subsidiarity). They study how norms are incorporated and 
internalized (Follesdal 1999).
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 However, isomorphism poses a problem in explaining variations in the adap-
tation of different actors to the same institutional environment. Searching for 
responses to the variation in reactions to Europeanization, historical institution-
alists propose to analyse institutional adaptation as a long, incremental process 
that takes place along historically developed paths conditioned by institutional 
traditions. The path dependency model emphasizes the importance of practices 
embedded over time and explains how the set of decisions an actor faces in any 
given circumstance is limited by decisions he has made in the past, even though 
past circumstances may no longer be relevant. It points to stickiness and inertia 
as characteristics of institutions. By way of example, in the process of European-
ization the German Länder and Spanish regions have acquired different adapta-
tion modes and achieved different institutional results. Börzel explains 
differences in adaptation in terms of the distinct institutional cultures and pat-
terns of interest mediation in both countries. Spanish competitive regionalism 
and a lack of trust between different levels of government, as well as between 
interest groups, have resulted in higher costs of adaptation to the EU than in the 
case of German cooperative federalism, where the culture of trust and cost- 
sharing has resulted in a smoother and easier adaptation of the German political 
system (Börzel 2002).
 So far, systematic and comparative studies on the Europeanization of NSAs 
are confined to a limited number of member states (Börzel 2002; Falkner 2000; 
Schmidt 1999). It is therefore difficult to use these studies to draw any gener-
alizations about non- state interest mediation in the EU as a whole. Some obser-
vations could, however, be drawn concerning the changing nature and agency 
of some interest groups in the process of Europeanization. A core hypothesis is 
often that the degree of fit between the domestic and European institutions is 
decisive for national adaptation to the EU. In the case of economic NSAs and 
interest groups, the different modes of interest intermediation represented by 
particular countries (pluralism, corporatism, statism) have a significant influ-
ence on the degree of fit/misfit between the EU and domestic interest groups 
(see Cowles 2001; Schmidt 1999). There is general agreement that the EU is 
based on a policy network type of interest mediation and that the extension of 
the EU’s competence to new areas has been accompanied by the creation of 
newer, more diverse policy structures. Thus NSAs entering the European spec-
trum need to switch to different and often novel modes of interest mediation 
where nationally relevant solutions no longer serve their purpose. Moreover, 
the representation of non- economic NSAs in EU governance is still little 
explored and has been studied more in connection with the general debate on 
European civil society than from a comparative perspective. Therefore, apart 
from drawing the general conclusion that when European norms and ideas res-
onate with the internal norms of different actors, they are more likely to be 
incorporated into their existing structures and rules of conduct, it is difficult to 
determine the prevalent modes of Europeanization of NSAs in general and to 
establish their degree of fit. The historical and cultural heritage that constitutes 
crucial components of the circumstances in which different actors undergo the 
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process of Europeanization renders institutional changes complex in nature 
and difficult to control. Existing institutions and norms are not simply replaced 
by new ones, but require a long, incremental process of selection and absorp-
tion during which some actors need to undergo deeper and more time- 
consuming changes than others. Yet, unlike nation- states or national political 
parties, NSAs have a less rigid institutional structure and greater flexibility in 
coalition building. They are less government- dependent, and their logic of 
action is not based to such an extent upon national considerations. Therefore, 
it should be assumed that they possess a greater ability to adapt to internal 
norms, structure and agency in the European governance system. Moreover, 
whether they are pragmatic or ideologically charged might also influence how 
far NSAs are capable of Europeanization because such a move might be con-
sidered inappropriate in the eyes of their supporters.13
Conclusion
In this chapter I have tried to provide an analytical framework with which to 
investigate the impact of Europeanization upon NSAs. The variety of interests 
represented by different NSAs is a product of the complex processes of aggrega-
tion, articulation, politicization and operationalization of collective needs. And 
there is a multiplicity of organizational beings who work in the name of promot-
ing interests. This diversity causes NSA responses to the impact of the EU to 
manifest themselves in a variety of possible actions. These may include absorp-
tion, accommodation, confrontation, rejection, the circumvention of national 
governments, cooperation, competition or simply discourse. They may further 
require organizational changes, agency changes, increased mobilization and 
interdependence between different NSAs at a supranational level; specialization 
and expertise; or new linkages with European actors beyond the national polit-
ical system. The nature of European integration provokes a variety of reconfigu-
rations in the structure and behaviour of NSAs. They adapt to their environments 
using a catalogue of patterns described and explained by different schools of 
neo- institutionalism. In rational action theory, the mechanism of Europeaniza-
tion occurs through the redistribution of power resources, whereas in sociologi-
cal approaches it occurs through socialization and learning. Rational choice 
states that organizations are bound together within networks by resource interde-
pendence. These resource dependencies are the key variable in shaping the out-
comes of adaptation to Europeanization, since they set the chessboard on which 
social and economic, private and public interests manoeuvre for advantage. Soci-
ological and historical institutionalists, on the other hand, stress the importance 
of social norms, commonly shared values and historically developed paths of 
conduct that generate NSA responses to Europe. These responses may vary, 
depending on the tradition of interest mediation, the institutional and political 
culture of public discourse, the level of economic and democratic development 
of the member state or the liberal versus conservative profile of its social policy. 
There might be empirical examples that do not fit into the proposed scheme of 
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analysis, yet the above factors should be taken into consideration when engaging 
in comparative studies.
 A careful research design seeking to test for evidence of Europeanization can 
profitably incorporate various factors designed to compare NSA responses across 
member states or policy areas, bearing in mind that each political system repre-
sents a bundle of national- specific factors that condition particular NSA 
responses to the EU. Rational choice, normative approaches or historical institu-
tionalism are not exclusive and they all contribute to the understanding of adap-
tation to Europeanization, which should be interpreted through a mix of 
organizing factors and principles. March and Olsen (2005) suggest that true 
believers in any of the three can reduce each of the other two to the status of a 
‘special case’ of their preferred alternative. Yet, there is a tendency to supple-
ment rather than reject alternative approaches. Moreover, apart from testing the 
institutional mechanisms within their ‘rational’, ‘sociological’ and ‘historic’ per-
spectives, political scientists need to bring the ‘hated’ politics back into Euro-
pean analysis. It is not easy either to assess whether Europeanization strengthens 
one group of actors at the expense of another, or to judge the possible impacts of 
Europeanization in terms of convergence or divergence. This theoretical gap 
could be filled by focusing on European cleavages, insider and outsider lobbying 
strategies of NSAs, patterns of contestation among European NGOs, and the 
reasons for the democratic deficit. In other words, we should study the nature of 
European NSA realpolitik, which, one might assume, affects the impact of Euro-
peanization to a great extent.
 Finally, one inevitable question arises concerning the Europeanization of 
NSAs and the democratic deficit: whether and to what extent NSAs are empow-
ered by their roles as agents of Europeanization? It would be a task exceeding 
the scope of this chapter to analyse the agential role of NSAs in Europeanizing 
civil society. However, it is important to acknowledge that NSAs are the media-
tors between the EU and the people, since they were created directly by the 
people and for the people, for the protection of their interests. NSAs should thus 
be expected to act as socializing agents and opinion leaders for their grassroots 
and supporters while their organizational elites, instead of being just an ‘emerg-
ing polyglot Euro elite’ (Guiraudon, cited in Imig and Tarrow 2001), would 
engage in a process of translating Europe and making it ‘a grammar in use’ for 
the different segments of European society.
 Depending on what is actually lobbied for and needed from Europe in terms 
of European policy and governance, this area should be made intelligible to cit-
izens, ensuring conscious and democratic aggregation, articulation and participa-
tion in the pursuit of social interests at the European level.
Notes
 1 In 2009, there were 1,316 EU- level interest representatives on the EC register, with 
approximately 60 per cent stemming from business and trade associations and the rest 
representing diffuse or public interests. See https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/transpar-
ency/regrin/consultation/statistics.do.
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 2 For a general introduction to the issue of civil society and public space see Spini’s 
chapter in this volume.
 3 See Durkheim’s (1999) distinction of functional groups.
 4 Compare this with Godsäter and Söderbaum’s conceptualization of civil society in 
their chapter in this volume.
 5 The same definition is used by Itçaina in his chapter in this volume.
 6 A social actor is an individual, group or institution that plays a certain social role in a 
particular social situational context and influences other actors. In such interactions all 
actors are seen as social actors.
 7 The neo- institutional perspective can be divided into three main strands which are dis-
cussed in this chapter: rational choice institutionalism, sociological institutionalism 
and the historical perspective; see Marsh and Stoker (2002).
 8 The term rational choice is used by the main new institutionalism theorists, March 
and Olsen, whereas Tania Börzel prefers the resource dependency model, which I use 
in my chapter. For the different resource dependency approaches see Putnam (1988); 
Rhodes (1997).
 9 The mobilization and symbolic factors are discussed together since they are closely 
interdependent. The remaining four are: the financial factor, human capital, the insti-
tutional factor, and access to public goods, structure and coordination. See Sroka 
(2004).
10 See http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/what_en.html.
11 For more on symbolic resources and their influence on interest group policy see Sroka 
(2004).
12 For more information see www.concordeurope.org/.
13 For example, a left- wing workers’ organization might cooperate with some business 
sector organizations or with a political party in order to come to a wage agreement. 
This might be perceived by some part of the grassroots as a betrayal of the organiza-
tion’s principles and ideals.
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5 Between localisation and 
Europeanisation
Non- governmental organisations in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Erica Panighello
Introduction
The Thessaloniki European Council held in June 2003 formalised the promise of 
European integration to Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H) and the rest of the 
‘Western Balkans’. These countries could not become involved in the European 
project in the aftermath of 1989, but their current route is depicted in the following 
terms: ‘The future of the Balkans is within the European Union’ (European Com-
mission 2003). Since then, widespread trust in the EU’s so- called ‘transformative 
impact’ has progressively diminished. As far as B&H is concerned, the main 
problem turned out to be instability caused by internal nationalisms, whose effects 
are hindering the democratic (and European) transition of the country. The EU’s 
assumption regarding membership can basically be summarised by the formula 
‘membership = domestic pacification’, even if this equation is hardly explored: 
research about the impact of the EU on the Balkans, compared to that covering pre-
vious EU enlargement, is still in its infancy (Elbasani 2008). In other words, in what 
ways can the EU’s gravitational model support (or transform) the current domestic 
governance of B&H, whose main obstacle to membership is implementation of the 
ethnic principle into the political and social infrastructure of the country?
 Ethnos and demos are two alternative patterns of self- organisation for several 
polities (and many succeed in finding peaceful reconciliation between them). In 
the Bosnian case, we can arguably state that the two principles are embraced by 
the domestic nationalist leaderships (Serbian, Bosniak and Croatian) and the EU 
respectively. My interest in civil society organisations or, more specifically, 
NGOs in B&H arose during a number of visits to the country, where I happened 
to meet some NGO members whose outlook was anything but nationalistic. 
Despite the aggressive nationalistic rhetoric of political elites, there are some 
societal spaces where a more inclusive pattern of citizenship is proposed or – 
better yet – concretely practised, often in a hidden and silent way. NGOs consti-
tute today a sort of informal ‘counter- elite’ in B&H in ‘ways of doing things’, 
thanks to their focus on the person instead of the group member. This attitude 
fits perfectly with the emphasis on respect for individual rights and freedoms 
stressed by the EU, which is often neglected by the formal practices that prevail 
in the Bosnian socio- political environment.
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 Given these premises, and considering the prominent role that the EU is 
playing in B&H, this research focuses on the personal attempts of NGO staff 
members to reconcile the two alternative patterns of regulatory behaviour pro-
vided by inclusiveness (the model explicitly suggested by the EU) and exclu-
siveness (the model prevailing in the domestic arena). NGOs have been selected 
because, given the specificity of the Bosnian context, they emerge in the wider 
realm of civil society through their connections with the international environ-
ment (in its broader meaning: foreign governments, transnational NGOs, inter-
national governmental agencies, informal relationships with foreign actors, and 
so on), whereas other kinds of ‘traditional’ civil society organisations (trade 
unions, war veterans’ associations, sport clubs, and so on) do not have such 
connections.
 The empirical findings were collected through 27 semi- structured, face- to-
face interviews with NGO staff members that took place in the four main cities 
of B&H – Sarajevo, Tuzla, Banja Luka, Mostar – in February, April and June 
2008. The dimensions investigated and indicators are summarised in Table 5.1.
 With regard to nationalism, this wide concept usually encompasses three dis-
tinct aspects: sentiments, doctrines and politics (Breuilly 1999: 43). Considering 
the focus of this research on ‘issues such as national identity or culture or ways 
of life’ (Breuilly 1999: 43), nationalism is meant in terms of ‘sentiments’, that is, 
it is an identity bulwark which is both a collective and an individual phenome-
non (Jenkins 2008). The basic assumption at stake is that ethnicity – if appropri-
ately channelled through a constructive dialogue – can strengthen the democratic 
Table 5.1
Dimensions Indicators
Ethno-nationalism • ethno-national self-definitions (voluntary, not required)
•  presence of ‘ethno-nationalism’ when asked to list B&H’s 
problems
•  references to ethno-national issues when talking about the other 
two dimensions
Civil society • personal understanding of the concept
• NGOs’ role in Bosnian context
• perceptions of distinctness from ‘ordinary citizens’
•  awareness of the commitment: working at NGOs as ‘mission’ vs 
‘job’
Europeanisation • spontaneous definitions of Europe/EU
•  personal opinions about the EU’s role in B&H and the future 
membership of the country
•  personal understanding of some key expressions of the EU’s 
rhetoric (European values, Europe of citizens, normative power)
•  contacts/relationships with colleagues or friends living in 
European countries
•  relevance/frequency of the subject Europe in working activities 
and in private life
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process within a given pluralistic system, while ethnicisation (the politicisation 
of ethnicity) challenges the very core of a democratic system, that is the respect 
for differences in the achievement of the common good. As Schöpflin puts it, 
ethnicity ‘can undermine democracy when either the state or civil society or both 
is too weak to contain it and thereby ethnic criteria are used for state and civic 
purposes’ (1997: 14). Finally, it is useful to demarcate the phenomenon in ques-
tion as ‘ethno- nationalism’, in order to avoid misunderstanding nationalism as 
‘patriotism’ or ‘civic nationalism’ – that is, loyalty to one’s own state (Connor 
1995).
 I refer to the EU as a normative power, a global actor ‘founded on and 
[which] has as its foreign and development policy objectives the consolidation 
of democracy, rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms’ (Manners 2002: 241). EU institutions consider NGOs as ‘ideal part-
ners’ in the process of democracy- and civil society- building, especially as far as 
external relations and enlargement policies are concerned (European Commis-
sion 2000). As will become evident, a constructivist approach has shaped this 
qualitative research, since constructivism allows us to investigate the ‘trans-
formative impact’ of the European project on agents’ narratives, identity and 
preferences (Christiansen et al. 2001; Checkel 2001). Europeanisation is defined 
here as an ‘interactive process’, which can concern people even ‘without specific 
pressure from Brussels’ (Radaelli 2004: 4). It has been investigated through the 
narratives of Europe, which NGO members construct and interiorise.
Civil society in a transitional country
The crucial role of civil society in preserving and strengthening democratic 
regimes is nowadays unquestionable. In spite of different approaches, from de 
Tocqueville onwards – and after quite a long period of indifference towards the 
issue – the richness of associational life is unanimously considered as a marker 
of the good health of a polity, a watchdog against the possible degeneration of 
majority procedures, daily training wherein citizens can concretely improve their 
civic attitudes.1 Following Cesareo, we could say that the term ‘civil society’ 
maintains today a high level of ambiguity, since it holds at the same time the 
meanings of ‘political slogan, analytical concept, and normative ideal’ (Cesareo 
2003: 6).
 After the collapse of communism, a vacuum occurred on various fronts; the 
political culture of ethno- nationalism readily filled it up, demolishing at the very 
start proposals for any alternative model of citizenship (Schöpflin 2000), and 
destroying the idea of the ‘return of the citizen’, considered as the very core of 
the development of endogenous civil societies. From a social point of view, 
communism was not as impermeable a system as it seemed. Bianchini notes the 
existence of an ‘underground society’ in Yugoslavia which emerged in the 
1960s; independent intellectuals and feminist and ecological movements are 
examples of the dissent against the regime, even if they could not succeed in 
gaining individuals’ loyalty when communism collapsed (Bianchini 2000). In 
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B&H, the 1992–95 conflict aggravated the complex path to democratic trans-
ition, destroying the civic initiatives of citizens’ groups aimed at promoting 
alternative forms of citizenship founded on universalistic (instead of ethnic) cri-
teria (Kaldor 1998; Andjelić 1998).
 The role of civil society during the European communist regimes and during 
the first stages of democratic transition is still debated (Seligman 2002; Delli 
Zotti 1991; Bianchini 2000). The ideocratic denial of any individual and collect-
ive form of self- organisation imposed by socialist rule represents today a heavy 
heritage for the new democracies, whose citizens are often described as ‘apa-
thetic’, ‘atomised’ and ‘fatalist’. If the concept of civil society, from a philo-
sophical and historical perspective, is inextricably connected to the rise of the 
liberal- democratic political system (Gellner 1997), how can we approach the 
‘civil society project’, as defined by Michael Walzer (1997), in contexts with 
different backgrounds? The present research proposes a twofold path in order to 
deal with this general issue.
 First, one important trend, which invites us to consider civil society as a locus 
– instead of a medium – of democratisation could be isolated from the abundant 
literature on civil society: ‘Voice, rather than votes, is the vehicle of empower-
ment’ (Chambers 2002: 99). This approach does not consider civil society as a 
‘conveyor belt’ towards political institutions, but as a terrain of democratisation 
in itself. Far from being a reductive way of understanding civil society potential-
ities, this approach is, in my view, a very appropriate means of highlighting 
NGO practices in the transitional B&H. These fragments of civil society have 
emerged despite the lack of a comprehensive culture of civil society. The usual 
criticism they draw – their limited capacity to spread their good practices to the 
rest of society, both civil and political – can be put in perspective by emphasis-
ing their own empowerment as democratic societal agencies. After the failure of 
the political and economic agencies in the complex normalisation of the country, 
much trust has been placed on societal actors. A realistic analysis ought to avoid 
both considering their contribution as a panacea and underestimating their daily 
efforts in implementing non- discriminatory practices.
 Second, methodologically we should consider that a ‘low associative density’ 
(an indicator usually employed to emphasise the weakness of many new East 
European civil societies) does not necessary imply a functional weakness of a 
given civil society. Other characteristics such as the quality of the organisations 
and their connectedness (in this case study, particularly with the international 
arena) can be much more useful for understanding the state of the art of civil 
society in transitional countries (Kubik 2005). At this point, we can proceed by 
outlining the main characteristics of the organisations’ environment in B&H, 
since these should be considered ‘not only an additional matter of influence but 
constitutional part of their origin, emergence, being and future development’ 
(Herrmann 1998: 108).
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NGOs in Bosnia and Herzegovina: limits and capacities
Generally speaking, since the end of the Cold War the number of national and 
international NGOs all around the world has seen a huge growth; to the traditional 
fields of intervention like humanitarian aid or disaster relief, new sectors have been 
added, like conflict prevention, democracy promotion or ecologic programmes.2 
The low degree of homogenisation of the non- governmental sector causes some 
difficulties in reaching an unequivocal definition of ‘NGO’. Despite the huge 
variety of typologies, missions and internal structures, NGOs are first of all civil 
society organisations. This means they are organised, private, non- profit-
distributing, self- governing and voluntary entities (Salamon 1997: 61). In the wide 
realm of private, voluntary and not- for-profit organisations, a useful distinction has 
been provided by A. M. Rose between ‘expressive associations’ and ‘social- 
influence associations’ (Meister 1971). Through the first type people satisfy their 
own interests (sport clubs, chess associations, and so on), while through the second 
individuals aim at modifying the surrounding environment. It is this second kind 
of association we refer to when discussing NGOs. Even more specifically, it is 
possible to define NGOs operating in B&H today on the basis of their commitment 
to goals like ‘intercultural dialogue, human rights promotion, peace, environment 
protection’, a field that is often synthesised through the formula ‘development pro-
motion’ (Mascia 1991: 3). NGOs usually prompt an idea of genuineness and good 
practice, since they are triggered by popular action (bottom- up initiatives), without 
being subject to government directives, and they are not market- driven but – as 
often pointed out in specialist literature – ‘value- oriented’.
 Turning back to B&H, it is worth noting that the ‘set of NGOs’ has become 
synonymous with ‘civil society’. In the country, the huge growth of NGOs 
started in conjunction with the war: these new social actors quickly took place of 
the ‘anti- politics’ social movements which emerged during the 1980s in most of 
the East European regimes (Kaldor 1998). Compared to the previous protago-
nists of the social scene, NGOs immediately looked more professional, skilled 
and organised, overshadowing any other expression of social self- organisation 
and monopolising the international community’s attention (and resources), even 
if the best- informed analysts do not omit to report that ‘In Bosnia there are many 
NGOs but little civil society’ (Serwer, quoted in Karajkov 2007). The Organisa-
tion for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Mission in B&H (2003) 
describes civil society mostly in terms of a ‘broad range of organisations’, 
cutting away from the definition all the other modalities through which civil 
society can express itself (spontaneous demonstrations, social movements, non- 
formal groups, and so on). The same trend can be seen in NGO members’ opin-
ions. When asked to give a picture of the ‘civil society sector’ in their country, 
most of them only described the role of NGOs; when expressly asked to evaluate 
the impact of – say – spontaneous demonstrations on the process of democratisa-
tion, some of them questioned whether mass protests or informal citizens’ initia-
tives could be included in the realm of civil society, given their ‘not organised’ 
and ‘not professional’ nature.
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 Some 7,000 NGOs are formally registered in the country today, even if only 
half of them are really operative (USAID 2007), implementing projects that 
range from rural development to human rights protection, from civil society 
empowerment to advocacy initiatives. With regard to their foundational initia-
tives, we can schematically divide NGOs into ‘local’ (domestic input, local 
working staff ), ‘international’ (local expressions of foreign national/international 
NGOs, mixed working staff ), and ‘hybrid’ (local branches of a foreign NGO 
which rise after the departure of foreign staff members). We can now examine 
some peculiarities of the NGO sector in B&H.
Substituting for the state
Although the contribution made by NGOs can hardly be underestimated, the 
other side of the coin is to be found in the curtailment of state intervention, as 
both cause and effect of the NGO boom. Some analysts are very critical of this 
fact, because after half a century of state predominance, the balance is now going 
the other way, weakening the role of state institutions (Karajkov 2007). Not only 
financial resources, but also skills and professional capacities, are potentially 
drained from the governmental to the non- governmental sector, due to the higher 
salaries that NGOs can offer – thanks to the international support. It should be 
said, however, that NGOs provide services that the post- conflict state – still insti-
tutionally trapped by the mutual veto of different national interests – cannot 
manage to provide for its citizens. The main point here is that NGOs’ beneficiar-
ies are not subject to universalistic criteria of selection, and they are not 
addressed as ‘right bearers’, as in the case of welfare policies provided to cit-
izens (Ranci 1991). Furthermore, since NGOs are usually sensitive to their 
donors’ attitudes and preferences about the fields of intervention, the risk of their 
becoming more donor- oriented than needs- oriented is always latent. Needless to 
say, most international funding is currently channelled through NGOs. This is 
for pragmatic reasons: NGOs are efficient and quick in mobilising financial, 
human and technical resources in a short time; they are oriented to the grass-
roots, so they can easily identify the real needs of the recipient community, and 
so on. There are also some ‘ideological’ reasons – the good reputation of the 
sector, its ‘non- governmental’ status which implies political independence, and 
so on. This phenomenon undoubtedly curtails the support which would other-
wise be reserved for state agencies, and it generates heavy forms of foreign 
dependency, another feature of the NGO sector in the country.
Dependency on international donors
Although the level of international funding is slowly decreasing, the international 
community remains the main financial supporter of NGO activities. The sector 
would at present have difficulty relying solely on private donations (philanthropy) 
and public funds. The overwhelming economic depression is only one reason, and 
we should add the removal of political institutions from a sector often perceived as 
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the ‘fifth column’ of foreign interests. Things look better at the local level: munici-
palities more often recognise the role played by NGOs and assist in financing 
them, even if their contribution remains modest compared with demand. Relying 
on external support brings other important consequences: strong competition for 
(diminishing) resources results in rewards for the ‘best’ NGOs, those which are 
more skilled and professional, and those more familiar with the functioning of 
international networks and with the mechanisms of fund- raising. This works to the 
detriment of small NGOs, which traditionally are more grassroots- oriented and 
less responsive to the standards required by big donors. Consequently, those NGOs 
that manage to continue their activities thanks to international support become 
detached from the domestic terrain, making their connection with local govern-
ment (and local market actors) increasingly tenuous (Karajkov 2005).
 Finally, according to some authors, external interventionism brings important 
side- effects for the endogenous development of civil society, since it progres-
sively usurps those ‘watchdog functions’ which, in a democratic framework, 
should belong mainly to civil society (Belloni 2001). The main assumption of 
the international community has proved wrong: the development of NGOs has 
not automatically resulted in the empowerment of the whole civil society sector 
(Fischer 2006: 456). Nevertheless, I think we should consider a societally posit-
ive aspect which is often neglected: the international community provides 
Bosnian civil society’s actors with several of the means to overcome the local/
global divide, granting them concrete opportunities to do so (NGOs’ networks, 
exchanges, and so on).
‘Hostile’ social environment
Very often NGOs’ efforts are not appreciated by the population (and often they 
are not even known); their leaders must work ‘on behalf of a public that fre-
quently complains, but which lacks both a belief that change is possible and an 
understanding of how to change things’ (OSCE 2003: 2).3 In the words of one 
NGO staff member, ‘Friends make fun of me, they say that I earn money without 
doing anything!’ According to another interviewee who conducted research into 
the impact of NGOs in some of B&H’s municipalities, people usually perceive 
NGOs as private enterprises, aimed at paying salaries to their staff members (if 
not at making a profit), or as the international community’s supplements without 
any domestic substratum. If a certain population has not been given the oppor-
tunity to have a voice and to take an active part in the social and public space for 
a long time, it will need to make more effort to internalise more participative 
patterns of behaviour. At the same time, the frustration of those actors who feel 
trapped between their personal efforts and the community’s indifference is per-
fectly understandable. To quote one interviewee, ‘I sometimes think we will 
never change anything . . . we organise campaigns, we lobby . . . but to have any 
impact on the public opinion is almost impossible here!’
 Empirical data showed two different ways to understand one’s own engage-
ment in an NGO. On the one hand, we find those I call pragmatic workers; that 
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is, people who do their job professionally but without explicitly claiming to have 
(or being aware of having) any impact on the surrounding socio- political envir-
onment: ‘It is not my duty to go directly to persuade people . . . I work for and 
with our beneficiaries, that’s all!’ On the other hand, there are the activists, those 
who believe their work (or, better, their mission) must affect wider dynamics, 
starting from their personal daily relationships: ‘I’ve decided to do something, 
regardless of how difficult or useless it can be . . . my family and my friends do 
not understand what I feel as a front- liner, but I think no one but ourselves can 
change anything in this lethargic country’.
 Even if proposing generalisations on the base of qualitative surveys is often a 
sensitive operation, my data suggest that self- perceptions of people’s roles are 
related to the typology of the organisation they belong to. We are more likely to 
find ‘pragmatic workers’ in international NGOs, while ‘activists’ are more 
numerous in local NGOs, and they are usually the founders of the organisation. 
On this basis, we can suppose that NGOs constitute a privileged terrain for indi-
viduals who are already predisposed to forms of civic engagement, and who 
profit from the support given to this sector by the international community, in 
the absence of alternative ways through which to channel their commitment.
Working opportunity
Due to the dramatic economic conjuncture in B&H, the NGO sector seems to 
represent for many people a kind of ‘employment agency’ rather than a genuine 
will to be actively engaged in building civil society. It is a fact that NGOs offer 
job opportunities for many educated young people who would not have altern-
atives in any other sector. I would like to add that many actors (and scholars) of 
civil society consider volunteerism to be a crucial component of associational 
initiatives or membership: if you have no monetary benefits, your activity will 
be more genuine.4 This may be true, but it should not lead us to underestimate 
the effects which derive from such an activity, whatever to the underlying moti-
vation. Moreover, by inverse reasoning, the lack of material incentives is not a 
guarantee of disinterestedness. Many other reasons can support the decision to 
become involved in an NGO (personal reputation, social prestige, hope for future 
recruitment, and so on). Therefore it may not always be relevant – at least, for 
my concerns here – why these actors engage in some activities (because of 
receiving a salary or because of a need for civic- ness or personal satisfaction); 
rather, we should focus on how they do it and what results they get. After all, the 
empirical survey illustrates that there is no difference in self- awareness of soci-
etal actors on the basis of the ‘status’ of NGOs’ members (workers vs volun-
teers). The difference, as indicated above, is mainly attributable to personal 
features and (most likely) to the local vs international dimension of the organisa-
tion concerned.
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Narratives of Europe in a European periphery
In order to make B&H develop into a ‘functional, stable and viable state’, since 
the beginning of the conflict the EU has adopted a multifaceted approach through 
various programmes, progressively shifting its intervention from the initial 
humanitarian assistance programmes to institution- and capacity- building and 
economic recovery sectors.5 As far as civil society initiatives are concerned, 
several pieces of research outline a real entrepreneurship in EU institutions, in 
providing open access points for their active involvement (Sanchez- Salgado 
2006). Besides the hard conditionality adopted by the EU when dealing with its 
institutional interlocutors from candidate countries, we can find a softer condi-
tionality addressed to non- state actors, where opportunities and resources are 
allocated in order to promote ‘contacts and cooperation of domestic NGOs with 
their partners in Europe’ (Raik 2006: 14). Indirectly, there is also wider Euro-
pean integration from below. Persuasion, socialisation, peer pressure and learn-
ing are the leitmotifs of this ‘soft conditionality’ (Checkel 2000); the EU does 
not assume the role of ‘hegemonic actor’, as it does in the case of political and 
economic adaptation to the acquis, but it has created a set of opportunities, 
setting civil society organisations free to decide the modalities of their reciprocal 
interactions.
 At a first sight, all interviewees exhibited at least one of the indicators of 
structural Europeanisation (Della Porta and Caiani 2006: 177), namely coopera-
tion with other European NGOs, experiences abroad, and relationships with 
friends living in other European countries. Most exhibited all of them. If we 
assume that the process of European identity formation in many cases is based 
upon ‘constant relationships between citizens, governments, interest groups and 
many other actors’, this process seems to be already in motion in the case of my 
target group (Della Porta and Caiani 2006: 181). I identified two main frames 
about the ‘narratives of Europe’ theme. First, there is a valorial frame. It includes 
both positive images of Europe, as a ‘family’, as something that ‘can provide 
people with a higher ideal’, something to be ‘proud of ’; and negative, like 
‘ambivalence and confusion’. Second, there is an instrumental frame. It also 
includes positive attitudes, seeing Europe as a ‘watchdog’ against bad politi-
cians, and as offering ‘more possibilities and opportunities’, ‘stability’, ‘secur-
ity’, ‘solution to the isolation’; and negative ones, like ‘new rules, new taxes’, 
‘too much bureaucracy’ and ‘double standards’. This instrumental image brings 
to mind the conception of Europe as a ‘cold project’ (Nevola 2007: 31), some-
thing aimed not at awakening great passions but at defending interests and guar-
anteeing opportunities.
 The ‘European values’ item generated very interesting discussions. Its vague-
ness brought the interviewees each time to select those definitions closer to their 
social worlds and their personal experiences. In any case, none of them had a 
‘doctrinal’ outlook, and the findings can be basically divided into two main 
understandings. On the one hand, they illustrate a normative frame, which 
emphasises the realm of rights and liberties, identifying European values with 
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‘respect for diversity’, ‘human rights’, ‘democracy’, ‘cosmopolitanism’, ‘living 
together’ and ‘living without boundaries’. Particularly relevant for what con-
cerns us here, when asked to list some of these values three respondents 
expressly named recognition of the individual as one of the more meaningful for 
them. In their view, Europe is a place that allows people to be themselves, apart 
from their ethno- nationalist belonging. In the words of one interviewee: ‘I’m a 
very individualistic woman, and people here don’t like individualists!’ Second, 
they illustrate a technical frame. It includes all the definitions revolving around 
the concept of European standard. Like any other potential candidate country to 
EU membership, B&H must fulfil specific prerequisites in several sectors, and 
all its citizens have become acquainted with the term ‘standard’, widely used in 
the public sphere.
 It is worth noting that analysis of the survey findings shows a sort of dyscra-
sia between the personal conceptions of the interviewees and one of the main 
classifications which have been proposed in academia. Ian Manners (2002) indi-
cates a twofold typology of EU normative bases: core norms, which include 
peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms; and minor norms including social solidarity, anti- discrimination, sus-
tainable development and good governance. The discrepancy concerns one norm 
in particular, anti- discrimination, which one- third of the interviewees mentioned 
when asked to provide some examples of ‘European values’. In this way, they 
reveal as ‘central’ a value that is considered ‘minor’ within ‘the constitution and 
the practices of the EU’ (Manners 2002: 242). According to Klaus Eder (2005), 
the ‘peripheral Europeans’ – those who claim to be Europeans but are not yet 
fully recognised by the ‘core Europeans’ as part of their group – develop wider 
‘conceptions of a European identity’, mobilising their national past and transfer-
ring it into a cultural (non- political) notion of Europe. An empirical corrobora-
tion of Eder’s thesis can be provided by those same NGO members who evaluate 
anti- discrimination as a fundamental principle of the EU regulatory framework. 
In this case, they stress the equality of citizens (regardless of one’s own ethnic 
background) which – in their view – constitutes an uncontroversial rule in 
Europe, even though it is still neglected in their country. In this way, they are 
raising to a ‘European value’ a principle that, as NGO members, they already 
implement in their daily work, underlining the fact that it would be decidedly 
easier to carry out anti- discriminatory practices in a ‘European framework’.
NGOs between ethnos and demos
‘Political misuse of ethnic and religious diversity’ is indicated by the European 
Commission as one of the obstacles to a more intense development of civil 
society in B&H (European Commission 2006: 15). Frequent statements by polit-
ical leaders indicate the need to defend the national interests of the three constit-
uent peoples, fostering inter- ethnic intolerance. Repercussions of these political 
divisions can be found, unfortunately, in most parts of the social structures of the 
country. The most paradigmatic examples are where schools have separate 
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entrances for ‘different’ pupils. Self- definitions very rarely have an independent 
life in an ethnically constructed system. A refusal to be labelled according to 
ethnic belonging is always possible, until one has to deal with the most common 
daily affairs, like going to school or to hospital, searching for a job, voting, 
deciding whether to go to the ‘other part’ of the country, deciding whether to 
return to one’s place of birth, meeting someone who understands from one’s 
name what ‘group’ one belongs to, and so on.
 As a regulatory principle of collective life, ethno- nationalism questions the 
legitimacy of the civil society project, at least as it is conceived within the 
liberal- democratic tradition (the realm of mediation between individual and 
social principles). In B&H, different conceptions of civil society (civic vs ethno- 
political) jeopardise the potential partnership between societal and political 
actors (Sejfija 2006). What is the role of NGOs in such a framework? Collective 
identities – with their emphasis on exclusive practices – seem to be stifling in the 
view of all the people I interviewed. Pride in one’s own traditions and culture 
never overwhelms respect for other belongings, and in many cases they are 
explicitly distanced from ‘political extremisms’. Working for an NGO often 
helps to maintain this ‘open- minded’ outlook, since workers are regularly asked 
to interact with other people, and in general the statutory mission of these organ-
isations actively promotes anti- discriminatory initiatives. Inclusive patterns are 
implemented in a direct way, through projects explicitly aimed at fostering inter- 
ethnic dialogue, or in an indirect way, for example through the projects of those 
‘technical’ NGOs which offer their services to each individual.
 This sector is not representative of the whole civil society in B&H, and its 
‘critical mass’ is perhaps not yet sufficient to reverberate on all the social and 
political mechanisms which govern the country. Nevertheless, I think this sector 
is definable as a concrete locus of democratisation, where citizens are empow-
ered through the duties they are expected to implement. Civil society’s role con-
sists not only of monitoring the state’s performances, but also of protecting 
individual and social spheres from excessive state intervention: NGOs propose 
alternative channels and sets of values compared to those offered by the political 
rhetoric. Admittedly, people working or volunteering in the NGO sector are – as 
many of them like to make clear – ‘privileged’ compared to ordinary citizens: 
they have easier access to all sorts of information, and above all they can travel 
abroad more easily. Those working for an international NGO, for instance, are 
frequently required to convene in the organisation’s country headquarters for 
numerous reasons (training, debriefing, study visits, and so on). In any case, 
formal and informal contacts with foreigners, often occurring within the working 
environment, can be of some help in getting a visa. Generally speaking, indi-
viduals who get involved in the NGO sector already possess, prior to their 
involvement, some particular features or skills that enable them to be mobilised. 
It is a virtuous circle: even given that NGOs are not the only source of indi-
viduals’ various experiences, they nonetheless represent, in many cases, a posit-
ive mechanism which allows these specifically skilled people to remain in the 
mobility circuit. Considering that it is not unusual to hear expressions like 
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‘ghetto’ or ‘prison’ from interviewees referring to their country, I think this is an 
aspect that should not be underestimated. Moreover, it has often been proved 
that contacts between individuals tend to generate less prejudiced behaviours, 
while contacts between groups tend to radicalise ethnic distance (Mungiu- 
Pippidi 2006).
 NGO members can arguably be defined as multipliers of that socialisation to 
inclusiveness suggested by European institutions or, more broadly, by the wider 
European associational structure which constantly interact with the domestic 
organisations in B&H. For the European Commission, NGOs represent the ideal 
interlocutor for conveying a European message: given the specific context of 
B&H, such a message is to be interpreted mainly in anti- nationalistic terms. In 
view of this wide purpose, the preference generally given by the EU to this kind 
of organisation is understandable, although it is to the detriment of more ‘tradi-
tional’ expressions of civil society. Thus, for example, we are more likely to 
fund a microcredit project addressed at multi- ethnic communities than a mono- 
ethnic war veterans’ association.
 In the consciousness of NGO members, is Europe the realm of universalism 
rather than particularism, a place where no one would ask others ‘what group do 
you belong to?’ For some of them it is, for others it is Europe that should learn 
about how to live together. In any case, regardless of personal opinions, we can 
conclude that ‘Europe matters’ today in B&H. To quote one interviewee, ‘the 
only things we talk about in B&H are: how it was before the war, how it is after 
the war, and how it is in Europe’. Despite the fact that Europe does not always 
arouse positive opinions, it is recognised by almost all the interviewees that 
stronger European protection would contribute to removing ethnic boundaries, 
and to the definitive affirmation of the multicultural framework that has charac-
terised Bosnia for decades. In the static situation that is slowing B&H’s progress 
towards full democratisation, a European framework – particularly with regard 
to the promotion of individual rights – is simply fundamental in a country still 
dominated by separate collective belongings, as well as support by European 
organisations, agencies and associations for the myriad civil initiatives which 
refuse to submit to ethno- nationalistic logics of behaviour.
Notes
1 It is obviously impossible to reproduce here the variety of possible positions. See, for 
instance, Chambers and Kymlicka (2002); Cohen and Arato (1994); Keane (1988); 
Gellner (1996); Seligman (1992).
2 For a very clear description of the types, limits, potentials and challenges of NGOs in 
the ‘Age of Globalization’, see Debiel and Sticht (2005). An interesting ‘top- down’ 
explanation for the spread of NGOs in the post- war period is provided by Reimann 
(2006).
3 For an overview of citizens’ participation, see the research conducted by the Centres 
for Civic Initiatives BiH (2006) and the OSCE’s Public Opinion Research (OSCE 
2004).
4 The ‘volunteerism rhetoric’ (Melucci 1991) and the emphasis on ‘free actions’ are 
particularly strong in the Italian associational tradition.
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5 For a detailed overview of the various programmes, see the enlargement section of the 
EU website (EU, 14 January 2010, online. Available http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/
potential- candidates/bosnia_and_herzegovina/index_en.htm).
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6 European integration, cross- 
border cooperation and third 
sector mobilizations in the Basque 
Country1
Xabier Itçaina
Introduction
The Basque Country constitutes an ideal site to observe the ambivalent effects of 
European integration at the local level, for three reasons. First, as a border zone, 
the Basque Country has been affected by changes in the regulation of the internal 
borders of the EU. Second, as the scene of the last violent ethno- nationalist con-
flict in Western Europe, Basque political and social actors still have to deal with 
a transnational identity which challenges the border itself. The Basque border 
has thus become the scene of a complex game between distinct (cultural, institu-
tional and/or market- oriented) visions of cross- border cooperation. Third, civil 
society actors are strongly involved in cross- border relationships. This chapter 
investigates the role of third sector organizations in the increasing Basque cross- 
border mobilizations. To what extent do such mobilizations amount to an 
ongoing process of Europeanization? Europeanization refers to
processes of (a) construction, (b) diffusion, and (c) institutionalization of 
formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of 
doing things’, and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and con-
solidated in the making of EU public policy and politics and then incorpo-
rated in the logic of domestic discourses, identities, political structures, and 
public policies.
(Radaelli 2003: 30)
 Europeanization needs to be measured through sub- national units, as part of 
the domestic response to the EU (Murphy 2007). Broadly speaking, analysis of 
Europeanization at the sub- national level has to take into consideration the 
institutional impact of EU norms, as well as the Europeanization of organiza-
tions and institutions in terms of shared values and evolving attitudes towards 
the EU.
 In order to adapt this line of questioning to cross- border relationships, one 
can refer to a distinction drawn by O’Dowd and McCall (2008), with reference 
to Ireland. Cross- border relationships are conceptualized in terms of two analyti-
cally distinct processes, one internationalizing, the other transnationalizing:
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The former is primarily ‘border confirming’, in that it involves interaction 
between organizations with territorial remits clearly demarcated by the state 
border and by their role within the panoply of state institutions. Such inter-
action has the effect of mutually recognizing and re- affirming the distinctive 
‘national state’ basis of the organization involved. . . . Transnational relation-
ships may be deemed to be ‘border transcending’, in that their approach to 
territoriality is more elastic as they generate networks or institutions formed 
to accomplish functional tasks across borders. They may involve both state 
and non- state organizations.
(O’Dowd and McCall 2008: 85)
In the light of this distinction, I argue in this chapter that the strong involve-
ment of civil society and third sector organizations in the Basque cross- border 
collaborations fall within the transnational kind of relationships. Third sector 
refers here to an economic sector going beyond the mere non-­profit sector, 
notably with the inclusion of all the ‘organisations producing goods and serv-
ices which are not constituted under the principle of the maximisation of 
profit’ (Laville 2000: 4).2 Hence they have an ambivalent relationship to Euro-
peanization. On the one hand, cross- border relationships between Basque third 
sector organizations are border- transcending. Basque identity- based mobiliza-
tions have used cross- border contacts in order to set up well- structured trans-
national networks, which aim to bypass the state- controlled design of 
institutional cooperation. Some of these civil society initiatives are linked to 
wider transnational social movements which could be seen as part of a process 
of ‘Europeanisation from below’ (Della Porta 2007). On the other hand, third 
sector mobilization maintains ambivalent relations – from partnership to com-
petition – with cross- border cooperation policies that function on an inter- 
institutional basis. Therefore, these initiatives cannot be reduced to mere social 
movements which would only develop alternative initiatives. These trans-
national third sector mobilizations possess an instrumental, rather than 
identity- based, relationship to European integration. Europe, in this case, is 
regarded as an opportunity to go further in the institutionalization from below 
of a cross- border Basque common identity. As Reuter (2007) has argued con-
cerning cross- border NGO cooperation in the Baltic Sea region, Basque third 
sector actors are developing a cross- border regional civil society, but this 
‘micro- regionalism’ has to be understood in the light of the pursuit of different 
interests, going from local and/or nationalist conceptions to inclusion in a 
wider process of civil society transnationalization.
 This chapter will develop this argument in three parts. First, such cross- border 
relationships are made possible only thanks to a particularly dynamic civil 
society and to third sector organizations located on each side of the border. 
Second, their initiatives take place in an evolving institutional context character-
ized by the increasing role of cross- border policies, which give an institutional 
dimension to already existing civil society cross- border networks. Third, the 
involvement of some third sector organizations in cross- border collaboration will 
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illustrate this analysis, with two sectoral examples: mobilizations in favour of 
the Basque language and initiatives in favour of local economic development.
An organized and dynamic civil society on both sides of the 
border
Both the French and the Spanish Basque regions are well known for the dyna-
mism of their respective civil societies. These dynamics have been analysed 
from different standpoints on each side of the border. In order to clarify the com-
parative framework, this first part aims to draw an analytical distinction between 
analysis focusing on civil society mobilizations and those focusing on third 
sector and social economy organizations.
A ‘society of movements’
Several research projects have considered the dynamics of civil society, mostly 
in the Spanish Basque Country, through their relation to nationalist movements. 
Theories of resource mobilization were used to analyse the protest cycles closely 
associated with nationalist organizations, including those promoting political 
violence, such as ETA (Euskadi eta Askatasuna, Basque Homeland and 
Freedom), and other social movements. With the help of Tarrow’s variables in 
the political structure, to which he adds the extent of consciousness- raising and 
the mobilization of civil society, Tejerina (2001) scrutinizes the protest cycle of 
ETA’s violence from its origins at the beginning of the 1960s, through its con-
solidation in the 1970s, to its decline from the mid- 1980s onwards. The interac-
tions set up between the armed organization, social movements and civil society 
proved to be crucial for understanding its vicissitudes. Many observers have 
emphasized the extraordinary level of protest in the Basque Country since the 
1970s. Casquete (2006) has analysed the integrative function of protest for the 
group, by analysing Basque mass protests, conceptualized here as collective 
rituals. Protest rituals are seen here as a way of preserving group boundaries in 
order to face the generalized disapproval these groups may engender in wider 
society.
 Civil society mobilizations are not monopolized by the nationalists. In reac-
tion to the ethno- nationalist conflict, a pacifist third sector has developed in the 
Basque Country since the mid- 1980s, with the aim of overcoming the binary 
nationalist/non- nationalist division and the potential threats to the process of 
conflict resolution. These threats include the persistence of a culture of violence 
at the local level, the central government’s uncompromising positions, the influ-
ence of the international context and notably the war on terror since 9/11 (Con-
versi 2006). In such a context, activism within the peace movements proved to 
be a very delicate task as these movements gathered members from various 
political origins, from victims of terrorism to Basque nationalists. Mansvelt Beck 
(2005) distinguishes six groups acting for peace, founded between 1981 and 
1999, and emphasizes the handicaps to their respective initiatives. Funes (1998) 
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contrasts the strategies and support groups of the two main organizations, Gesto 
por la paz and Elkarri. Indeed the majority of Gesto members accepted the polit-
ical regime after the transition, gathering a wide spectrum of political move-
ments; Elkarri was closer to the nationalist left wing, though it rejected violence 
(Funes 1998: 508). Some organizations were concerned for the most part with 
the problem of compensation for the victims of ETA and excluded the Basque 
nationalist approach, while others stemmed from the critical factions within the 
Basque nationalist left wing. Mees highlights the fact that diverging opinions in 
the political sphere about the nature of the conflict may account for the differ-
ences among the peace movements (2003: 97). Contrary to Gesto por la paz, 
Elkarri considers that the debate is political, not ethical. The source of violence 
thus finds its origin in the opposition between a significant part of the population 
and the Spanish state on issues such as self- determination. Mees also points out 
that there is a risk in the openly political dimension of Elkarri’s action, since its 
efficiency depends on the support of the parties. Third sector initiatives may also 
be criticized as constituting interventions of non- elected bodies. The Catholic 
Church has seemingly incorporated this spectrum of initiatives, thus finding 
itself in a delicate position within a fragmented pacifist movement, all the more 
so as most of these pacifist movements expected the Church to adopt a clear 
stance, as if they still saw the Catholic institution as a mediator par excellence 
(Itçaina 2010).
 Recent research has also pointed out the emergence of new social movements 
in the Basque Country which are no longer directly linked to the ethno- 
nationalist conflict. The Parte hartuz research team (University of the Basque 
Country) considers Basque society as a ‘society of movements’ in light of the 
increasing number of associations and organizations favouring alternatives to the 
current politico- economical system. Environmental protest in the Basque 
Country was first characterized by its close association with Basque nationalism 
(Barcena et al. 2003). Nevertheless, over a decade (1988–1997), environmental 
concerns became increasingly autonomous with regard to the national question, 
and became more embedded in the struggles of local communities to preserve 
their quality of life. The majority of ecological organizations, while they appear 
to have distanced themselves from the protest- oriented and anti- institutional sce-
nario and discursive frame of radical Basque nationalism, have not embarked on 
a process of institutionalization. Instead, they seem to have found a new ecolo-
gical space, ‘eco- localism’, from which to continue their work (Barcena et al. 
2003). The mobilizations against the highway in the Leizaran and Urbina- 
Maltzaga valleys highlight the complex nature of the relationship between 
nationalism and environmentalism (Zubiaga Garate 2008). Many of today’s pac-
ifist movements borrow their repertoire of action – in terms of protest and medi-
ation – from the environmental mobilization movements of the early 1990s, 
rather than from other classical socializing institutions such as the traditional 
Catholic Church (Zubiaga Garate 2008).
 Neither the institutional context nor the socio- demographic reality of the 
French Basque Country gave birth to new social movements which would have 
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been comparable to southern ones, with the exception of some recent environ-
mental controversies. However, the debate about the institutionalization of the 
French Basque Country shed light on the dynamics emanating from very differ-
ent milieux. Chaussier (1996) and Ahedo (2005) stressed the crucial role of civil 
society actors in the mobilization in favour of territorial institutionalization for 
the French Basque Country. Batera (Together) in 1999 aggregated four distinct 
demands: a separate department for the Basque Country; a co- official status for 
the Basque language; an autonomous Chamber of Agriculture for the Basque 
Country; and an autonomous university. These demands were endorsed by 
sectors of Basque society going far beyond the nationalist spectrum.
 Some of these mobilizations, such as those in favour of the Basque language, 
are comparable to the Spanish Basque ones. Others are specific to French Basque 
civil society. More rural than the Spanish side, the French Basque region has 
been the scene of significant farmers’ mobilizations since the mid- 1970s. Col-
lective action took the form of a specific trade unionism and a set of producers’ 
initiatives in favour of a ‘peasant and sustainable agriculture’. Such a mobiliza-
tion was first supported by the ELB Union (Euskal Herriko Laborarien Sindikata, 
Union of the Farmers of the Basque Country), which constitutes the Basque 
branch of the French left- wing farmers’ union Confédération Paysanne. Produc-
ers have also instigated many initiatives since the 1980s including quality and 
organic farming, and associations of transhumant shepherds. The ELB and pro-
ducers’ organizations alike asked for specific institutional representation for 
Basque agriculture, separate from the departmental official Chamber of Agricul-
ture. The state administration and the Chamber of Agriculture of the Pyrénées-
Atlantiques repeatedly rejected such a demand in the name of the principle of 
‘one department, one chamber’. Supporters of an alternative chamber decided in 
January 2005 to found an associative Chamber of Agriculture for the Basque 
Country (Euskal Herriko Laborantxa Ganbara, EHLG) in the Lower Navarre. Its 
creation soon became highly controversial. Two legitimacies were at stake: state 
administration and the departmental chamber on one side, and supporters of 
farming and sustainable agriculture on the other. In this context, those standing 
for the alternative chamber tried to desectorialize their cause, by representing it 
not as the simple lobbying of farmers, but as an issue concerning all territorial 
actors, going far beyond the nationalist scope (Itçaina 2008).
An organized civil society: third sector and social economy actors
The literature cited above embraces a wide spectrum of actors. However, the 
focus is often on the more politicized mobilizations. To avoid this bias, the 
mobilization approach should be complemented by an organizational one, 
focused on third sector and social economy actors, as being more precise than 
civil society and more inclusive than the mere non- profit sector.
 The social economy is flourishing on both sides of the border, despite legal 
differences. In the late 1990s, Euskadi and Navarra ranked first out of the seven-
teen Spanish Autonomous Communities in terms of social capital (Mota and 
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Subirats 2000). In terms of interest and participation in public matters, the 
Basque Country ranked first out of the Spanish regions, followed by Navarra and 
La Rioja (Mota and Subirats 2000: 139). When considering associative net-
works, Mota and Subirats draw a distinction between economic and professional 
associations (private goods producers) on the one hand, and philanthropic and 
care- oriented associations (public goods producers) on the other. The more ‘indi-
vidualistic’ Autonomies, where relations of coordination are predominant, were 
Madrid, Catalonia and Canarias. The more ‘collectivist’ ones were the Basque 
Country and Navarra. One has to remain attentive to the political implications of 
such high levels of social capital. The political contextualization allows a 
description of social capital as either positive (strong associative involvement 
and a sense of community) or negative (collective mistrust due to political divi-
sions) (Ritaine 2001: 55). The Basco- Navarrese associative network originated 
in the period of Francoist repression and in the uncertainties of democratic trans-
ition. These caveats do not minimize the originality of a Basco- Navarrese asso-
ciative network, which originated from and contributed to cohesive associative 
networks and mutual mistrust, maintaining solidarities and divisions.
 Apart from the associations, the Basque Country is one of the leading regions 
in terms of cooperatives, together with Navarra, Andalusia and Valence. It owes 
this position to the cooperative complex of Mondragon,3 even if the Basque 
social economy as a whole cannot be reduced to this highly significant experi-
ence. Cooperatives ensured 47,975 jobs in the Basque Autonomous Community 
in 2004 (Gobierno Vasco 2007). Euskadi is also a leader in terms of sociedades 
laborales (12,974 jobs in 2004), an original entrepreneurial status located 
between the cooperative and the capitalist firm. In 2005 the Basque Autonomous 
Community ranked second behind Andalusia in terms of the aggregated number 
of workers in cooperatives and sociedades laborales.4 More recently, the Basque 
social economy started developing new forms of multi- stakeholder cooperatives 
associating public and private actors, and aimed at employing people systemati-
cally excluded from local labour markets and persons with mental, physical or 
social disabilities (Enciso Santocildes 2004).
 For obvious demographic and historical reasons, the French Basque Country 
cannot be systematically compared to its neighbour. However, this territory also 
has a very specific profile as regards its social economy, thanks to associative 
and cooperative dynamics. From the mid- 1970s, there was a burgeoning of asso-
ciations in favour of the Basque language and culture. In the economic sector, a 
movement of workers’ cooperatives emerged in the mid- 1970s, and became rep-
resentative of this territory at the national level. In the 1990s–2000s, the dynam-
ics of a social and solidarity- based economy intensified within this territory, 
albeit in different forms: cooperatives of service and small- sized industries, 
micro- finance, fair trade, social integration and local development. The French 
Basque Country ranked first in France in 2007 for its local micro- credit loan 
clubs for professional women (CLEFE, Local Club of Saving for Women Entre-
preneurs). These dynamics were to be found in many sectors, particularly in 
agriculture, trade and services.
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The ambivalent Europeanization of local cross- border 
policies
Third sector initiatives take place in an evolving institutional context. On both 
sides of the border, public policies started experiencing a strong process of Euro-
peanization or, more exactly, a mix between ‘ex post communautisation’ and ‘ex 
ante Europeanisation’ (Carter and Pasquier 2006)5 through the development of 
cross- border operations from the late 1980s. As a result, an institutional design 
favourable to cross- border collaboration was set up in the Basque Country, 
which attracted third sector actors. This context of Europeanization was per-
ceived as both an opportunity and a constraint by Basque nationalists. Increasing 
cross- border relations also brought to light the institutional asymmetry between 
the two sides of the border.
A new institutional design in favour of cross- border collaboration
The Europeanization process can be perceived first through its institutional 
dimensions. In his research devoted to the implementation of the INTERREG 
III- A France–Spain programme, Harguindéguy defines cross- border cooperation 
as ‘all types of negotiated actions between the public institutions of at least two 
neighbouring countries’ (2007: 317). Ten years earlier, Letamendia (1997) had 
emphasized the importance of the process of European integration as a factor 
encouraging cross- border cooperation in the Basque Country. According to him, 
European integration manifested two very different trends. On the one hand, 
control over the French–Spanish border was reinforced due to EU anti- terrorism 
and immigration policies. On the other hand, European integration encouraged a 
cooperative framework hitherto reserved to the nation- state because it fell within 
the scope of international relations.
 From 1983, the Aquitaine and the Basque Autonomous Community took part, 
together with the other seven border regions, in the Working Community of the 
Pyrenees. New programmes of cooperation appeared when Spain joined the 
Common Market in 1986. They were supported not only by civil society actors, 
but also by public authorities. The cooperation between the Basque Autonomous 
Community and the Aquitaine region enjoyed a major boost from 1989, ‘coin-
ciding with the Structural Funds Reform and the impulse given by the Single 
European Act to the Union’s regional policy’ (Letamendia 1997: 36). Identity- 
based cooperation was relayed through institutional cooperation, the latter being 
stimulated by European funds such as the INTERREG programmes from 1990. 
In the Basque Country, INTERREG funds, while reinforcing cross- border rela-
tions, renewed a strong tradition of collaboration between local authorities and 
civil society actors at the border. Several cooperative programmes were set up. 
Among others, the Aquitaine–Euskadi association,6 created in 1989, started a 
common fund in the domains of research, socio- economic development and 
training. The Bayonne–San Sebastián Eurocity, which started in 1995, strength-
ened cooperation on urban planning between the two urban areas. In the border 
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zone, the Eurodistrict Bidasoa–Txingudi (established in 1992) and the Consorcio 
Bidasoa–Txingudi (1998) brought together in one inter- city structure the French 
city of Hendaye and the Spanish cities of Fontarrabie and Irun. The Txingudi 
experience was seen as a successful example of inter- institutional collaboration 
when compared to other Pyrenean experiences (Harguindéguy 2007). The Treaty 
of Bayonne, signed between France and Spain in 1995, reinforced this legal 
framework by giving more latitude to the local authorities in terms of cross- 
border collaboration. These new institutional opportunities did not necessarily 
provoke an increase in the diffusion of ethnonationalism (Mansvelt Beck 2008) 
but they created a new institutional climate favouring the development of cross- 
border exchanges on a more regular basis.
The EU as a resource and/or a constraint for Basque nationalists
Such instruments of cross- border collaboration were likely to be promoted by 
Basque nationalists in order to strengthen the nation- building process. In particu-
lar, cross- border collaboration completed the international strategy of the gov-
ernment of Euskadi. Totoricagüena (2005) has emphasized how the Basque 
government has mobilized the Basque diaspora all over the world, and especially 
in Latin and North America, in order to elaborate a ‘paradiplomacy’ aimed at 
bypassing the Spanish state.7
 The relation of the Basque nationalist parties and movements to the EU and 
to European integration is more complex and goes far beyond the single political 
instrumentalization of EU programmes. Drawing evidence from minority nation-
alist parties in Wales and in Galicia, Elias has argued that ‘whilst minority 
nationalist parties may not have turned their back completely on the idea of a 
Europe of the Regions, a new pragmatism drives theses parties’ strategies and 
tactics for meeting their short- and long- term goals’ (2008: 557). Minority 
nationalist parties will assume one of four possible positions on European inte-
gration (Elias 2008: 562). First, Euro- enthusiast parties will combine support in 
principle for Europe as a framework for enhancing national autonomy. They 
evaluate positively the economic, political and cultural opportunities for the 
minority nation within the EU as it currently exists. Second, those who reject 
Europe will reject the notion that European integration can provide a long- term 
solution to the territorial autonomy question, and will be highly critical of the 
concrete institutional and political realities of the EU. Third, Euro- sceptic parties 
will accept that European integration may provide new solutions for reorganiz-
ing territorial authority in the long term, but will perceive the EU as it has 
developed in practice to be unsatisfactory. Fourth, Euro- pragmatists will support 
the EU on the basis of pragmatic or utilitarian considerations, since doing so 
means satisfying specific policy demands. However, such parties will reject the 
basic principles underlying the integration process, and will not recognize the 
long- term potential of European integration to meet core nationalist demands.
 Taken as a whole, Basque nationalists have evolved from a very pro- 
European attitude towards a more qualified one. However, distinctions should be 
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made according to different nationalist leanings, particularly in the Spanish 
Basque region where nationalism is stronger. Basque radical nationalists close to 
Batasuna could be seen at first glance as highly critical of the policy realities of 
the EU. The EU was perceived first as a Europe of states, then as an economi-
cally liberal and socially regressive project. Nevertheless, radical nationalists 
frequently used European institutional arenas (particularly the European Parlia-
ment and the European Court of Human Rights) in their strategy of international-
ization of the Basque conflict, against the Spanish state. The EU’s involvement 
in the Irish peace process was also invoked as a precedent by Basque national-
ists. This strategy had certain results, as on 13 December 2007 when the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights declared partly admissible the claim of Batasuna 
against the Spanish government concerning the banning of parties and electoral 
lists within the left- wing Basque pro- independence movement since 2003 on the 
grounds that it had failed to condemn the ETA killings and maintained alleged 
ties with the violent perpetrators. However, in June 2009, the Strasbourg Court 
finally confirmed the ruling by the Spanish Supreme and Constitutional Courts 
banning Batasuna.8 Batasuna and, in December 2008, Acción Nacionalista Vasca 
and Partido Comunista de las Tierras Vascas, parties belonging to radical left- 
wing Basque nationalism, were also included in the EU list of terrorist persons 
and organizations, together with ETA and its circle of supporters.9
 Moderate nationalists, on the other hand (PNV, Eusko Alkartasuna, Aralar, 
Abertzalen batasuna), which had been Euro- enthusiast were becoming more 
Euro- pragmatist. The Spanish Basque and Catalan autonomies tried to use the 
political and institutional resources of European integration in order to distance 
themselves from the Spanish central state (Ithurralde 2002). The strong involve-
ment of the autonomous government in cross- border cooperation was one feature 
of this strategy. Nevertheless, moderate nationalists realized that the EU could 
be instrumentalized in order to reinforce the central state. Ithurralde (2002: 262) 
and Bourne (2002) have analysed several disputes between EU and Spanish 
Basque authorities over the permissible scope of Basque taxation prerogatives. 
In these episodes, the EU’s market competition imperative provided a justifica-
tion for the depreciation of historically and politically significant Basque taxa-
tion competencies and there were more obstacles than opportunities for forming 
influential strategic alliances with EU authorities (Bourne 2002).
Institutional asymmetry as an obstacle to cross- border relations?
Nevertheless, the EU offered new opportunities for developing cross- border rela-
tions between Basques. These programmes implied that collaboration should be 
developed between equivalent institutional entities: the counterpart of the Basque 
Autonomous Community in Spain was not the French Basque Country, which had 
no institutional representation before the mid- 1990s, but the French region of 
Aquitaine. Letamendia (1997: 36) has stressed the gap in cooperation between 
equivalent institutional bodies, and the collaboration between Basques acting on 
the basis of a common identity. Institutional relations between Euskadi and the 
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Aquitaine region were also marked by an institutional asymmetry, since the budget 
of the Basque Autonomous Community was more than ten times greater than that 
of any French region. A gap also existed between the perception of interregional 
cooperation in a Regional Council of Aquitaine controlled by right- or left- wing 
French parties, and an Autonomous Basque Community controlled by moderate 
Basque nationalists supporting a strategy in accordance with which European inte-
gration should make nation- states redundant (Letamendia 1997: 37).
 According to Letamendia, cross- border collaboration became an element for 
exercising pressure in favour of the institutionalization of the French Basque 
Country. Things changed with the partial institutionalization of the French 
Basque Country in the mid- 1990s, when a Basque Country Development 
Council and a Council for Elected Representatives were set up in 1994 and 1995, 
respectively. These councils were conceived as new debating loci for elected 
officials and civil society representatives and as a compromise between national-
ists, civil society actors and public authorities:
although for the time being the reality of the Département of Pyrénées-
Atlantiques will not be questioned, a process will be initiated to proceed to a 
sort of ‘private’ institutionalization of its Basque territories . . . This goes in 
the opposite direction of the general trend of French decentralization, which 
gives pre- eminence to those who are elected.
(Letamendia 1997: 39)
For the first time in the last thirty years, a convergence was seen between the 
sphere of civil society inspired by Northern Basque nationalism as a whole, and 
the cross- border initiatives coming from the moderate and institutional Southern 
Basque nationalism (Letamendia 1997: 38).
 Letamendia’s position should be qualified in light of the socio- political evolu-
tion of the French Basque Country over the last ten years. First, the Pays Basque 
did not go in the opposite direction to French decentralization. On the contrary, 
the Basque experience was seen as a virtuous example of local development, and 
inspired the national policy of the pays. Second, the territorial institutionaliza-
tion of the French Basque Country, far from being controlled or inspired by 
Basque nationalists, was rather the result of a permanent compromise between 
different political tendencies (French right and centre- right, socialist, Green, 
Basque moderate nationalist) and socio- economic milieux. Third, the process of 
the institutionalization of the French Basque Country cannot be considered as a 
mere ‘private type of institutionalization’ or as compensation for the refusal to 
found a Basque department. Over the last ten years, new French Basque territo-
rial institutions have had tangible effects on territorial governance. Expert work 
conducted by the Development Council has resulted in concrete measures, such 
as territorial contracts involving the state, the Regional Council of Aquitaine, the 
General Council of the Pyrénées-Atlantiques and local authorities. Fourth, in 
such a context, it is not crucial to find out whether cross- border collaboration has 
become a real factor in institutional change in the Northern Basque Country. It is 
Third sector mobilizations: the Basque Country  117
crucial, rather, to evaluate the terms by which the new territorial institutionaliza-
tion of the French Basque Country has come to influence cross- border collabora-
tion. Cross- border collaboration ranked among the three priorities of the Basque 
Country Development Council in its Pays Basque 2020 prospective programme, 
together with territorial reciprocity (between the coastal zone and the inland 
countryside) and sustainable development.
 To sum up, the recent intensification of a cross- border policy in the Basque 
Country presents three characteristics. First, cross- border cooperation is not 
monopolized by Basque nationalist parties and movements, but rather is invested 
in by heterogeneous coalitions of actors. Second, and despite critical voices ema-
nating from radical nationalists, the institutionalization process of the French 
Basque Country from the mid- 1990s onwards reinforced cross- border collabora-
tion. Finally, the instrumental Europeanization of public policies did not auto-
matically lead to the Europeanization of shared norms and cultural values. 
Relying on her fieldwork in Txingudi, Bray (2006) emphasizes that even if a 
‘trans- frontier Basque public sphere’ is being set up, with more and more people 
living on one side of the border and working on the other, there is ‘no clear sign 
of this emerging cross- frontier reality extending to a stronger identification with 
Europe’ (Bray 2006: 540).
Third sector cross- border relations and Basque identity
The cross- border relationships between private companies and between public 
authorities are relatively well known, as well as the cross- border strategies imple-
mented by political parties and trade unions. This is far from the case for initiatives 
coming from the third sector. Yet such initiatives deserve special attention for 
three reasons. First, cross- border third sector mobilizations contribute to the con-
solidation of a transnational Basque identity in an original way, bypassing state- 
controlled policies and Basque nationalist political apparatus. Bray is right when 
expressing doubts about ‘the usage of the term ethnonational for describing all 
grassroot political mobilizations in places like the Basque Country’ (Bray 2006: 
534). Second, the strength of these mobilizations comes from the ability of third 
sector actors to draw on support from wider transnational networks. This allows 
them to make a connection between the Basque cause and wider transversal issues, 
such as the environment, sustainable agriculture and rural development or minority 
languages. Third, the relationship between these initiatives and local public author-
ities has evolved. Most of the cross- border initiatives experienced a partial institu-
tionalization when being integrated into emerging cross- border policy networks. 
Examples will be taken here from two sectors: mobilizations in favour of the 
Basque language and economic mobilizations.
Third sector and cross- border linguistic mobilizations
The core symbolic and functional role of language in the Basque collective iden-
tity has given special relevance to those third sector mobilizations in favour of 
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euskera (the Basque language). A survey conducted in the mid- 1990s among the 
projects funded by the Aquitaine–Euskadi Common Fund showed evidence that 
among economic, cultural and university- based projects, the cultural ones were 
those which attracted more actors from Euskadi and, in Aquitaine, from the 
French Basque Country (Itçaina et al. 1997). Partners from Aquitaine, and 
notably from Bordeaux, were involved in more research and economic projects. 
The importance of culture was directly linked to the shared Basque identity and 
language. However, several projects met with difficulties in their implementa-
tion, because of the institutional asymmetry between the two partners. Several 
projects related to Basque culture were endorsed by the Southern public institu-
tions, whereas their French Basque counterparts were often associations. Iden-
tity, which had given an impetus to cross- border cooperation, was confronted 
with the institutional gap between third sector actors on the one hand and public 
institutions on the other.
 These findings should probably be revised in 2009, for two reasons. First, the 
promotion of the Basque language was partly institutionalized in the French 
Basque Country with the foundation of the Council for the Basque Language in 
2001, which in 2005 became the Public Office for the Basque Language. Thus, 
the promotion of euskera was no longer exclusively for the benefit of associative 
activists. It soon became a sector of public policy in its own right. Until then, 
mediation between the associative third sector and public authorities concerning 
Basque cultural matters was conducted by the Basque Cultural Institute (Institut 
Culturel Basque, ICB). The foundation of an autonomous linguistic policy 
induced a formal distinction between linguistic and cultural policies, which had 
been more or less combined until then, except as regards bilingual schools10 and 
Basque lessons for adults.
 The recent institutionalization of a linguistic policy in the French Basque 
Country had consequences for cross- border relationships. Until then, cross- 
border linguistic relations could be seen as support coming from the South to the 
North. Such support took two forms: transnational associative networks, organ-
ized on a Basque ‘national’ basis; and institutional support from Southern public 
bodies towards Northern associations. Amado Borthayre (2006) makes a distinc-
tion between cross- border associative networks of interest groups aimed at 
changing public policies (Euskal Herrian Euskaraz, Kontseilua- Euskal konfeder-
azioa)11 and alternative socio- linguistic mobilizations. Far from limiting them-
selves to lobbying, the latter considered themselves as constituting educational 
and social alternatives. Significant examples are the associative schools (ikas-
tola), the association providing Basque lessons for adults, AEK,12 and the 
Basque Summer School (Udako Euskal Unibertsitatea). All of these experiences, 
and especially the alternative- oriented ones, share four characteristics. First, they 
have a transnational structure and engage in transnational activities. Second, 
their internal organization is based on democratic principles: collective decision- 
making and horizontal power relations. Third, many of these initiatives depend 
on Southern Basque financial resources (which reproduces at civil society level 
the institutional asymmetry). Fourth, Europe is used as a tool for enhancing 
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cross- border collaboration and for the promotion of euskera, notably via the 
European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages.
 The relationship between linguistic cross- border mobilizations and public 
authorities has taken at least two forms. On the one hand, cross- border social 
movements enhanced those public policies favouring the Basque language in the 
French Basque region. First, the Southern Autonomous government, controlled 
by the PNV until 2009, intervened in the French Basque Country from the 
1990s, through subsidies to the educational network and to Basque- speaking 
media. Such sub- state governmental intervention, beyond its jurisdiction, was 
coupled with initiatives coming from cross- border associations of local munici-
palities (Udalbide and Udalbiltza). Second, new public policies were set up 
jointly by public institutions from both sides of the border. The foundation of a 
cross- border radio station (Antxeta irratia) in Txingudi illustrates this point. In 
the same vein, sociolinguistic surveys were conducted on both sides of the 
border from 1996 by the Basque government, in association with Navarrese and 
French Basque bodies. The installation of the Public Office for the Basque Lan-
guage in 2005 in the French Basque region intensified the cooperation between 
public authorities. The Southern regional government had its institutional, even 
if not equivalent, counterpart in the North.
 On the other hand, this process of institutionalization, however partial, gener-
ated internal controversies within the social movements. When the Basque 
autonomous government set up a new service (HABE) for the teaching Basque 
language to adults in 1981, this was perceived as a challenge by the AEK, before 
an agreement was reached in 1994. The AEK was then recognized as an agency 
of general interest in favour of the Basque language. In France, the AEK bene-
fited from gaining the first official recognition as a vocational training body 
through the Specific Agreement for the Development of the French Basque 
Country between the state, the Aquitaine Region and the Pyrénées-Atlantiques 
department, signed in 2000. In the same vein, official recognition of the ikastola 
following an agreement with the French Ministry of Education in 1992 gener-
ated debates between the supporters of such institutionalization and those giving 
priority to the social movement dimension of the ikastola (Bortayrou et al. 
2005).
Third sector and cross- border economic cooperation
At first glance, the identity dimension of cross- border relations is less obvious in 
the case of economic mobilizations. Nevertheless, several socio- economic 
organizations have been very active in cross- border relations, as illustrated here 
by the workers’ cooperatives and the farmers’ mobilization. Socio- economic 
and, more precisely here, social economy organizations seized upon the new 
opportunities offered by Europe to develop new transnational relations. These 
programmes gave an institutional frame to an existing set of relations between 
the cooperative movements on both sides of the frontier. The French Basque 
workers’ cooperative had been directly inspired, in the 1970s, by the seminal 
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experience of Mondragón. In the 1990s–2000s, cross- border relations between 
French and Spanish Basque cooperatives were given a new impetus thanks to the 
new institutional design. Members of the French Basque cooperative movement 
took full advantage of such new possibilities, beyond simply commercial rela-
tions. The Hezkuntek association,13 whose objective is to promote the enrolment 
of young French Basques in Spanish Basque secondary schools for vocational 
training, offers an excellent illustration of the symbolic relations that can exist 
between a common Basque identity, cooperative values, economic development 
and transborder cooperation. Hezkuntek’s aim is ‘to further industrial develop-
ment in Labourd, Basse- Navarre and Soule through the promotion of technical 
and vocational training in the Basque- speaking population’ (Statutes of Hez-
kuntek). The main idea was to promote professional training in the Basque lan-
guage, which was a way of showing the economic relevance of minority 
languages and of improving the image of vocational training. The programme 
was supported by the manager of a workers’ cooperative on the French side, and 
by institutions that belonged to the Mondragón network in Spain. In 2003 Hez-
kuntek received financial support from Udalbiltza and in March 2006 it signed 
an agreement with the Ministry of Education of the Basque Autonomous gov-
ernment, in order to facilitate access to vocational training in Euskadi for French 
Basque- speaking students. Hezkuntek can thus be seen as a by- product of two 
complementary associations whose legitimacy rests on shared cultural refer-
ences, and is a good example of structuring partnerships between public semi- 
public, and cooperative and associative bodies.
 In a more direct way, European programmes also helped to reinforce cross- 
border links and eventually the cooperative movement itself. The ARIPTIC 
project, for instance, groups the Arizmendi Koop and the Institut Supérieure de 
Formation Permanente (INSUP). Arizmendi Koop, a Mondragón cooperative, 
promotes education and training programmes through a network of schools, with 
an emphasis on teaching in the Basque language. It is particularly active in cul-
tural and social domains. INSUP, a training body in Aquitaine, has developed its 
activities since 1980 in the field of integration programmes for young people 
who want to go back to work. Both bodies had already been partners in a series 
of projects financed by INTERREG or the Aquitaine–Euskadi Common Fund, 
which led to the creation of a European Economic Interest grouping in March 
2002, the first step towards a European Cooperative Society. The way ARINSUP 
has used INTERREG III (2000–2006) funding shows its desire to adopt a bal-
anced linguistic and cultural approach, such as e- learning programmes and pro-
viding courses in Basque, French and Spanish, together with secretarial and 
accountancy lessons. EU policies have thus provided the opportunity for cross- 
border actors from distinct institutional and social backgrounds to institutional-
ize their relationships.
 The French Basque movement in favour of sustainable farming and specific 
territorial institutionalization for Basque agriculture also benefited from great 
support from the transnational ‘Basque social movement industry’. The altern-
ative Chamber of Agriculture (EHLG), set up in 2005, was assisted by logistical 
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and financial resources from the Spanish Basque region. This was a way to com-
pensate it for the lack of public resources from the French side. As a non- profit-
making body (association in French), EHLG could not benefit from the 
para- fiscal taxes paid by farmers, which are the basic finances of the official 
Chambers of Agriculture. Moreover, local authority subsidies were allegedly 
illegal. The lack of resources motivated the promoters of EHLG to look for indi-
vidual and collective donors. Thanks to the contribution of the Manu Robles 
Arangiz Foundation, created by the moderate Basque nationalist union ELA, 
EHLG could purchase and renovate its headquarters. EHLG could also take 
advantage of institutional support from the Southern regional government. On 2 
November 2007, on the occasion of the agricultural fair Lurrama, EHLG signed 
agreements with the cross- border association of local councillors Udalbide and 
with Itsasmendikoia, a public agency for rural development linked to the Basque 
Autonomous government. Of a total budget of 410,000 euros for EHLG in 2007, 
41 per cent came from French Basque donors, 27 per cent were proper receipts, 
26 per cent came from Itsasmendikoia and Udalbide, and 3.9 per cent came from 
Spanish Basque donors (Euskal Herriko Laborantza Ganbara 2008).
 This new cross- border impetus was the continuation of an older partnership 
between French and Spanish Basque farmers’ unions: ELB on the French side 
and EHNE (Euskal Herriko Nekezarien Elkartasuna, Union of Farmers from the 
Basque Country) on the Spanish side. They have both been active members (via 
the European Confédération Paysanne) of the international peasant movement 
Via Campesina. In 2008, EHNE leader Paul Nicholson was one of the two repre-
sentatives for Europe of Via Campesina. Transnational support gave rise to 
cross- border projects such as the publication of a trilingual guide to the Basque 
countryside and a comparative study on agriculture in the French Basque 
Country, the Spanish Basque Autonomous Community and Navarra.
 In January 2009, on the eve of the legal proceedings started by the French 
state against EHLG, the Spanish Basque government made official a new part-
nership with the SUAT Pays Basque, a branch of the official departmental 
Chamber of Agriculture (Taberna 2009). This partnership focused on the devel-
opment of cross- border training programmes, thanks to European funds among 
others. Such an agreement was evidence of a strategy of institutional isomor-
phism, or mutual recognition between institutions, between the Basque govern-
ment and the official Chamber of Agriculture. On the very sensitive issue of 
agriculture, the Basque government was careful not to be seen to be interfering 
in French – even if Basque – affairs. Ideological proximity (between Southern 
Basque nationalists and Northern supporters of EHLG) had thus to be reconciled 
with institutional proximity (between the official Chamber of Agriculture of the 
Pyrénées-Atlantiques and the Basque autonomous government).
 Both cases (social economy and farmers’ movement) show that the economic 
and cultural spheres are deeply interconnected. Thus, the opinion stating that, in 
the Basque borderland, the economic and infrastructural content of cross- border 
cooperation has operated to the detriment of an identity or cultural content 
(Mansvelt Beck 2008: 380) should be qualified. This might be true of some of 
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the ‘top- down’ institutional cross- border initiatives. It has not necessarily been 
the case for the cross- border economic mobilizations emerging from the third 
sector and experiencing a partial process of institutionalization. Even if the 
above- mentioned experiences remain marginal for the territorial economies, they 
constitute highly significant cases of hybridization of resources (public, private, 
associative) and ideas (local development and cultural identity).
Conclusion
These two examples (linguistic and socio- economic mobilizations) illustrate how 
the third sector’s cross- border initiatives are part of a transnational and border- 
transcending relationship aimed at bypassing the state- controlled design of insti-
tutional cooperation. Such initiatives fuel an ambiguous relationship with 
Europeanization. Indeed, third sector mobilizations convey an instrumental, 
rather than identity- based, relationship to Europe. At the same time, every cross- 
border mobilization tries to include its cause within wider transnational mobili-
zations at the European and international level (social economy, farmers’ 
movement, promotion of minority languages) in order to gain international 
support. Such a complex relationship between local issues and international 
causes, civil society actors and multi- level institutional frames, requires further 
research, notably from a comparative perspective, on other border- transcending 
dynamics.
Notes
 1 I am grateful to the members of the GARNET Jointly Executed Research Programme 
‘Civil Society and Non State Actors’, and specially to Julie Gilson for her comments 
and decisive help in English language editing, and to Andy Smith and Cathal McCall 
for their comments. The seven historical Basque provinces fall within the Basque 
Autonomous Community (Euskadi), the Foral Community of Navarra in Spain and 
the western part of the Pyrénées-Atlantiques département in France.
 2 Salamon and Anheier (1995) include in the non-­profit­sector organizations presenting 
a formal constitution, a legally private status, a form of self- government, non- 
redistribution of profits and the participation of volunteers. This approach was con-
sidered to be too restrictive by supporters of the social and solidarity- based economy 
(Laville 2000). The condition of volunteering may exclude sectors of the traditional 
social economy, such as workers’ cooperatives and mutuals, which can redistribute 
benefits to their members in a limited way. Few countries use the American term 
‘non- profit sector’ to describe the set of organizations located between the private, 
for- profit and public sectors. For comparative purposes, ‘it seems useful to adopt the 
term “third sector” to designate all organizations which are neither profit- oriented 
businesses nor governmental agencies or bureaucracies’ (Seibel and Anheier 1990: 7). 
Some authors reject the expression ‘third sector’, considering that social economy 
organizations, far from constituting a separate sector, are part of the private sector 
while fulfilling general interest aims (Peyre 2004). The Spanish CIRIEC makes a dis-
tinction within the social economy between (a) the market- oriented sector, including 
democratically organized private businesses, and (b) the non- market-oriented sector 
including private non- profit institutions developing activities of services. See www.
observatorioeconomiasocial.es.
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 3 Located in Guipuzcoa, the cooperative consortium of Mondragón (MCC) is organized 
along four poles: financial, industrial, distributional and corporative. In December 
2007, MCC represented 103,731 jobs all over the world. Mondragón is based on ten 
principles: freedom of membership, democratic organization, sovereignty of labour 
over capital, participative management, limited scale of wages, inter- cooperation, 
social transformation, universality and education.
 4 CIREC, Cooperativas y Sociedades Laborales: Número de empresas y trabajadores 
en situación de alta en la Seguridad Social. Distribución por Comunidades Autóno-
mas a 31/12/05, Observatorio de la Economía Social, 2005.
 5 Carter and Pasquier (2006) suggest a need to distinguish, at the regional level, 
between ‘ex post Communautisation’ (the process by which domestic laws and rules 
are aligned to EU requirements in the implementation of Community laws and rules) 
and ex ante Europeanization (the phase of the policy cycle when domestic policies are 
up- loaded to the European level for negotiation).
 6 Navarra took part in this common fund before withdrawing due to disagreements with 
the Basque government. Therefore, Aquitaine has separate agreements with Euskadi, 
Navarra and Aragon.
 7 Most of this chapter was written before the 1 March 2009 elections for the Basque 
Parliament, which led to the first non- Basque nationalist autonomous government 
since 1980.
 8 ‘El Tribunal de Estrasburgo ratifica la ilegalización de Batasuna’, El País, 30 June 
2009.
 9 ‘L’Union européenne ajoute deux partis basques à sa liste terroriste’, Le Vif–
L’Express, 16 December 2008.
10 In France, the Basque language is taught in three educational networks: Ikastola asso-
ciative total immersion schools, public (Ikasbi) and Catholic (Euskal haziak) bilingual 
schools.
11 ‘Speaking Basque in the Basque Country’, ‘the Council – the Basque confederation’.
12 AEK (Alfabetatze Euskalduntze Koordinakundea: Coordination for literacy in 
euskera) is also the organizer, every two years, of Korrika, a symbolic race run in 
one- kilometre relays in favour of the teaching of the Basque language to adults. Del 
Valle (1994) looks at the emergence of Korrika as a modern ritual for expressing 
Basque identity. This race also implies a symbolic negation of the border.
13 Neologism, from hezkuntza (training) and teknikoa (technical).
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Part III
Civil society outside Europe

7 Governance and non- 
governmental organizations in 
East Asia
Building region- wide coalitions
Julie Gilson
Introduction
There is substantial debate within East Asia about the nature of civil society, but 
little agreement as to what it might actually signify in terms of governance struc-
tures and democratization. Alagappa notes that there have been many protests in 
the region, but to suggest that this reflects a build- up of civil society voices may 
be to overstate contemporary reality (Alagappa 2004: 4). Some scholars regard 
civil society as a Western concept that cannot be applied with ease to East Asia, 
while others suggest that it has strong links with economic development and 
regard the growth of civil society mechanisms as a reflection of a maturing 
economy. More recent scholarship has introduced the concept of ‘global civil 
society’, most often characterized as a direct response to the socio- cultural, polit-
ical, economic and institutional forces of globalization (Armstrong et al. 2004). 
The trans- border dimension of civil society forms the focus of this chapter, 
which examines participation in transnational advocacy networks through an 
understanding of the nature of the networks being formed and the means and 
targets of the advocacy being pursued. In addition, and given the contestations 
over the very idea of this region, the chapter also examines the extent to which 
projects of integration in East Asia affect and are affected by non- governmental 
activities. In order to analyse the role played by transnational groups, this chapter 
adopts a typology of action based on the work of Edwards and Foley (2001) and 
applies it to both the organizational structures of groups and the strategies they 
employ.
 The need to advocate at differentiated levels of authority means that the idea 
of seeking redress and lobbying those in power is changing across the world, as 
accountability mechanisms become more disparate. Information is passed 
rapidly from one group to another, the means of building a wider range of coali-
tions have proliferated and forms of authority and redress are seen to lie beyond 
state thresholds. For some scholars, coalitions of disparate interest groups even 
herald the dawn of a global civil society, where advocacy can transcend national 
boundaries (Wapner 1995: 313; Della Porta et al. 2006: 16; Saguier 2004: 9). 
Indeed, Cohen and Rai note that even when people are rooted in specific local 
realities, communication technologies permit a form of transnationalism that has 
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created ‘social fields’ which bring disparate actors together (Cohen and Rai 
2000: 14). Others illustrate how governance structures have become more frag-
mented and decentralized and that contemporary governance must therefore be 
regarded as multi- layered (Rumford 2003: 33; Scholte 2000: 143). In essence, 
the goals of those who advocate centre on the need to seek representation for the 
marginalized and to find forms of accountability for actions by higher authori-
ties. For Ebrahim and Weisband the slippery term ‘accountability’ refers broadly 
to a means of control that contains within it four facets: transparency, so that 
information is made available for public scrutiny; justification, or making sure 
that institutional leaders give clear reasons for their actions; compliance, or mon-
itoring and evaluating actions taken; and enforcement, or sanctions in the event 
that actions are not taken as promised or required (Ebrahim and Weisband 2007: 
2–4). The role of advocacy groups in securing accountability is therefore to 
expose publicly areas in which transparency is not forthcoming; to appeal 
directly to state leaders or their representatives to explain the reasons for their 
actions; to publish – now in a wide variety of communication channels – and 
disseminate information regarding areas where compliance has not been met; 
and although their enforcement actions may not include institutional sanctions, 
these may be achieved through gaining public support for petitions, boycotts and 
other forms of popular action against state decisions.
The idea of region in East Asia
Before defining and examining the role of various transnational networks, it is 
worth mentioning briefly how the very concept of regionalism in East Asia is 
currently being developed.1 From the origins in 1967 of the Association of 
South- East Asian Nations, to the 1997 ASEAN Plus Three process (including 
Japan, South Korea and China) and the first East Asian Summit in 2005 (adding 
India, Australia and New Zealand), there have been numerous institutional 
attempts to organize the states in this broad region into various political, eco-
nomic and security frameworks. In the case of ASEAN, one of the principal col-
lective goals has been to ensure the mutual respect of sovereign rights and 
territories and to uphold the cherished principle of non- interference. At the same 
time, ASEAN has moved towards closer economic cooperation, notably through 
its ASEAN Free Trade Area, designed to lower intra- regional tariffs (www.ase-
ansec.org). In addition, a new ‘ASEAN Charter for ASEAN Peoples’ came into 
force in December 2008, with the aim of responding to the financial crisis and 
emphasizing political- security, economic and socio- cultural dimensions. This 
third dimension is especially important for offering a ‘platform for engagement 
with representatives from governmental agencies, educational institutes and civil 
society organisations’ (www.aseansec.org). The extension of regional coopera-
tion in the form of the East Asian Summit has led to calls for the development of 
an East Asian Community, although at present regionalizing projects remains 
focused on the closer integration of ASEAN with a supporting role by the ‘Plus 
Three’ states. A number of observers have noted how ‘newly empowered civil 
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society elements’ are beginning to use regional institutions to promote their 
agenda (Acharya 2003: 377–8), and how non- state actors may even be creating a 
‘sense of a regional community with common concerns and shared values’, 
which itself may lead to new state responses (Yamamoto 1996: xii). Grugel, too, 
sees new forms of regionalism as being a ‘central element in global governance’ 
and for her new forms of regionalism offer new spaces for ‘civil society activ-
ism’ (2006: 210). Mittelman takes a slightly different route to a similar conclu-
sion when he notes that ‘transformative regionalism is partly a defensive reaction 
mounted by those left out of the mosaic of globalisation’ (2000: 128–9). All of 
these cases see the potential for a distinct form of regional activism, but different 
groups will instrumentalize and be affected by the institutional and discursive 
parameters of regionalism in different ways.
 Despite such institutional developments in East Asia, where governance insti-
tutions are often perceived to be less legalistic and formal, it is necessary to 
examine not only the physical reality of regional institutions, but also the very 
discourse of region that currently inhabits government and non- government 
ways of framing policies, particularly over issues that are seen to transcend 
national boundaries. What is clear from the examples below is that there is not 
simply one way of framing the region of Asia, either cognitively or institution-
ally, and that the way the very concept of region is employed by transnational 
networks may be affected by personal linkages, the ways in which groups are 
organized and the strategies they adopt.
Transnational advocacy networks
Networks may be regarded as agents of change that play the role of intermediary 
and advocate between those in power and the marginalized (Hudson 2001: 333). 
Edwards and Foley offer a useful point of departure for understanding trans-
national networks when they categorize them as: socializers, welfare providers 
or politicizers. First, as socializing agents of change, whose remit is based on the 
aims and objectives of their donors, they may seek to advance a community 
towards the development and maintenance of democratic rights and thereby seek 
to empower or bolster a citizenry (Edwards and Foley 2001: 5; see also Arm-
strong et al. 2004). To this end, close collaboration with host governments, local 
community groups or other groups in terms of implementing policies on the 
ground may cause practical difficulties when participating groups in a network 
do not share the same principles as one another despite having the same aims 
and goals. Second, as welfare providers, they often require some coordination in 
order to avoid unnecessary duplication in terms of the type and target of their 
provisions. However, decisions over the provisions to be offered and the under-
pinning prerequisites of donors may complicate any plans for collaboration, 
while NGOs themselves may become, unwittingly at times, pawns in debates 
over humanitarian assistance and aid, human rights and accountability (Duffield 
1994). Third, by playing a politicizing or contestatory function, NGOs may put 
pressure on governments or even protest against the state (Edwards and Foley 
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2001: 6; Gilson 2009). Thus, a project of resistance may challenge the very prin-
ciples upon which state (or supra- state) action is based (Armstrong et al. 2004). 
Riker shares many of these categories in his assessment of South- East Asia, and 
adds that networks may seek autonomy from the state or may bypass it alto-
gether (Riker 1995). Literature on transnational advocacy networks also points 
to the fluidity and voluntary nature of these structures which do not carry with 
them underlying assumptions of shared values, and which will be developed 
through the process of engagement itself (Hudson 2001: 334). In addition, they 
may be more necessary where attempts to advocate against a state from within 
are fruitless, and they can therefore serve an important purpose in addressing 
different levels of decision making simultaneously (van Tuijl and Jordan 1999). 
The roles outlined above may depend to a large extent upon the organizational 
structures of the networks and the strategies they choose to adopt.
 First, the composition of the participating organizations may vary tremen-
dously: from large- scale groups organized on both corporate and bureaucratic 
lines, to small- scale, local ad hoc groups; from those addressing a plethora of 
issues in the name of, for example, environmentalism or anti- globalization, to 
others focused on very localized and specific targets. They may also derive 
from a need to participate within or alongside international events or confer-
ences, such as the International Women’s Conference or the Asia–Europe 
Meeting (ASEM). In a field in which an array of disparate and differently con-
stituted NGOs come together, the summit to which their shadows cling can 
offer the central point of reference for all participants. When this reference 
point is regularized, moreover, the summit itself offers a forum for networking 
and socialization among NGO agents. While they may lobby and even become 
influential through persuasion, they may have no direct control of resources and 
frequently may not be very transparent themselves. In addition, the problem of 
inexperience, a dearth of resources and a lack of coordination can inhibit effect-
ive organization. What is more, different groups hold their own particular 
frames (based on, for example, culture, social roles or academic disciplines) 
and the ways in which they frame issues will determine whether or not coopera-
tion or conflict will ensue (Pahl- Wostl et al. 2007). These factors mean that 
when such organizations come together in coalition they may not easily be able 
to formulate ‘strategic approaches’ to those in authority they seek to challenge 
(Kim 2004: 25). In addition, although the process of engagement may lead to 
improvements in some of the organizational structures of participating groups 
and even to the creation of a ‘collective intentionality’ (Park 2004: 85; see also 
Cummings et al. 2006: 576), the ways in which their differing social structures 
are negotiated will determine the behaviour of networks, as ‘inter- network pol-
itics’ can constrain a group’s ability to come to decisions and take collective 
action (Carpenter 2007: 644).
 Second, the strategies adopted by a network may impact on their efficacy. 
Two approaches to networking are outlined by Clark et al., who examine those 
NGOs seeking to liaise with other NGOs and those trying to lobby governments 
for change (Clark et al. 1998: 9). This distinction is important for understanding 
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accountability: active lobbyist and advocacy campaigns seek explanation, justifi-
cation and redress; network- oriented NGOs have as their primary goal to develop 
relations with like- minded groups and to make their purpose and structures more 
professional. In the case of parallel summitry, although they may be convened 
for short- term purposes and may not seek long- term mobilization (Santa Cruz 
2004: 4), networks may de facto have a cumulative impact as they develop and 
refine common strategies and share best practice among the members of the 
group leading to ‘collective action frames’ (Mundy and Murphy 2001).
 Keck and Sikkink (1999: 98) outline five stages of network influence: issue 
creation and agenda setting; influencing discursive positions of states and 
regional and international organizations; influencing institutional procedures; 
influencing ‘target actors’, which may be states, international or regional organi-
zations, or private actors; and influencing state behaviour. Furthermore, the 
tactics used to achieve those goals are also important. First, the production and 
dissemination of information are essential to the definition of an advocacy 
network, and how it can generate and exchange information effectively. In so 
doing, groups may in fact help to create new issue areas or ways of interpreting 
them, and transform the very terms of debate (Keck and Sikkink 1999: 90). Park 
(2004) also notes that as communicative structures networks may also reshape or 
reconstitute the identity of international organizations, through the transmission 
of intersubjective norms, a factor that may be important in a regional setting 
where the very definition of that region is contested. Second, in the model 
created by Keck and Sikkink (1998), symbolic politics enable networks to 
develop a normative power and to expand their arsenal of ideas, symbols and 
different forms of leverage. Third, they address leverage politics, whereby net-
works use their collective strength to influence outcomes. For this reason, there 
is a constant (re)negotiation among different claimants within the process and 
the role of ‘weaker’ participants cannot be ignored. Finally, accountability pol-
itics means that in today’s reality a ‘thickened’ network of accountability locates 
formal mechanisms and their attendant sanctions alongside informal and discrete 
areas of input from multiple levels with different kinds of effects (Harlow and 
Rawlings 2006: 5).
A word about the state
Santa Cruz (2004: 1) offers a succinct review of the ways in which international 
civil society and transnational social movements have even come to throw into 
doubt the continued relevance of the state, in the face of the proliferation and 
growing relevance of non- state actors). Tarrow, for example, sees in trans-
national movements the potential to ‘challenge the continued autonomy, sover-
eignty and control by the national state over its own territory’ (1998: 6; see also 
Meyer and Tarrow 1998: 4). Indeed, for Evans such networks play an important 
counter- hegemonic role, linking poor communities into global hegemonic net-
works (Evans 2000: 231, cited in Hudson 2001: 335). Walzer (1998) questions 
the ongoing relevance of the state, while Wapner (1995) talks about ‘politics 
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beyond the state’. In a similar vein other commentators address the oppositional 
qualities of non- governmental groups and social movements, as they ‘promote 
or . . . resist social change with the use of public protest activities’ (Neidhardt 
and Rucht, cited in Santa Cruz 2004: 2; Meyer and Tarrow 1998: 4). However, 
despite the growing visibility of non- state actors, it is not yet clear that the state 
is defunct (Santa Cruz 2004: 1). As will be suggested below, these statements 
neglect to account for the role of international coalition building precisely as a 
means of lobbying state governments within East Asia, and this chapter will 
suggest that, in agreement with Santa Cruz, ‘the fact remains that as the constitu-
tive elements and ultimate enforcers of those regimes, states remain the central 
actors – and the focal point for transnational action’ (2004: 28).
 The very act of gathering alongside or within official institutional boundaries 
means that state agencies can have a strong influence on network behaviour. 
States can also form an important part of a network’s ability to perform, provid-
ing financial or other types of support, in addition to which they decide on inclu-
sion. Thus, in the case of some state- led institutional engagements (such as 
ASEM), government organizers have been warmly inclusive of business but 
decidedly cool about the prospect of including non- governmental organizations. 
Keck and Sikkink’s (1991: 1) boomerang pattern is an important representation 
of how campaigning groups can work: where a domestic group feels that its 
interests are not being addressed by its own state, it seeks partners (especially in 
developed countries) to influence that state’s behaviour. In this way, where lev-
erage within state boundaries is weak, a domestic non- governmental organiza-
tion can collaborate with similar groups beyond national boundaries to create 
collective leverage against that state. The need to reach back to the state may, 
however, skew non- state agendas, so that, for example, a land issue may be 
reframed as an environmental issue in order to obtain the necessary support 
(Lerche 2008: 239). In summary, ‘policy targets, issues, mobilization, and other 
organizational structures may strictly remain national and local, even when one 
of these elements takes a transnational guise (McCarthy 1997).
Civil society in East Asia
Alagappa (2004: 6) notes a ‘tendency in Asia, as elsewhere, to bracket civil 
society, idealize it as the moral conscience of society, and project its develop-
ment as critical for democratic transition and consolidation’. Some scholars 
argue that civil society is a Western concept; others that it has strong links with 
economic development (Alagappa 2004: 12–13). Win reflects on this rise of civil 
society within East Asia alongside economic development: in part, there has 
been a need to protest against the hardships brought about by rapid economic 
development on marginalized communities, for both labour and the environ-
ment. In the same context, Win also observes the concurrent economic and polit-
ical rise of the urban middle classes, whose participation lies at the heart of NGO 
activities (1998: 104). This scholarship sits alongside the reality of a rapid 
growth in the number of NGOs in East Asia, where there has been a general rise 
Governance and NGOs in East Asia  135
of NGO activity during the past decade in particular (Yamamoto 1996: 5–6, 
cited in Win 1998: 102). This growth resulted in part from the development of 
an ‘Asian arm’ to several international movements, as well as from the recogni-
tion of domestic groups of a need to act regionally, both to confront trans- border 
problems and to address particular ‘local’ needs. More funding and international 
changes also led in the 1980s to far more NGO activity around Asia, while a 
number of topics became extremely fashionable. In particular, the burgeoning of 
environmental activism had a major influence on advocacy in the region. As one 
Human Rights Watch report (1998) observed at the time of the Asian prepara-
tory meeting for the 1993 Vienna World Conference on Human Rights, there 
was an ‘impressive regional network, well- versed in international human rights 
standards’.
 In addition, there was a shift in focus as political repression lessened and 
concern grew over various marginalized groups, such as ethnic minorities and 
women. The expanded usage of the Internet also quickened the pace of social 
learning and development among such networks. Thus, with a changing interna-
tional environment, new forms of regime in the region itself and the organic 
growth of groups seeking accountability, there is now an accepted, or at the very 
least somewhat tolerated, role for NGOs in many parts of Asia. Significantly, 
networks have
evolved from a narrow domestic focus to a more international outlook, 
embracing global issues and working in solidarity with regional and interna-
tional movements in the struggle for human rights, sustainable development 
and environmental protection whilst continuing important social welfare and 
development work on the domestic front.
(Win 1998: 102)
This entails an increased participation at other regional and international levels 
in order to gain greater leverage and strengthen domestic claims. Alongside this 
growth in NGOs has been a proliferation of policy research institutes, such as 
the Conference on Security and Co- operation in East Asia and the Pacific 
(CSCAP) and think tanks such as the ASEAN Institute for Strategic and Interna-
tional Studies (ASEAN- ISIS). Such institutions have a role to play in the consol-
idation and dissemination of ideas (Yamamoto 1996: 11).
 These developments have led to two changing perspectives. First, various 
governments throughout East Asia have identified the growing role of the non- 
government sector, and several networks retain strong links with particular gov-
ernments. Many states now talk of the need for NGO inclusion in policy making 
or implementation, and regional groups such as ASEAN talk of the need to 
include greater NGO participation. However, states may also resist such inclu-
sion; thus, while Thailand and the Philippines have begun to embrace NGOs, 
China and Indonesia still have a long way to go before these organizations come 
to be officially accepted. Second, as Yamamoto (1996: xii) notes, with the rise of 
regional NGOs there has been a concomitant expansion in the use of the concept 
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of the region. Many of the groups in the region pay lip service to the regional 
parameters within which they function and attach their claims to growing institu-
tional frameworks.
 Against this growing background, then, there are more resources, experience 
and shared knowledge, and an awareness of the obstacles facing them, which 
have spurred the development and consolidation of inter- NGO networks. In the 
case of East Asia such political layering has resulted in new transnational net-
works, particularly over the issue of environmental protection (Kock 2006; 
Reimann 2005). And while the 1980s saw a rapid growth in the NGO sector in 
East Asian countries, even more dramatic has been the accompanying increase 
in the networking within countries and between countries – both within the 
region and with other regions. While in previous years NGOs within the region 
had a tendency to view one another with suspicion and a sense of rivalry, they 
have made marked attempts to improve relations among themselves, particularly 
within countries. Much of the existing tension is a result of differing views and 
positions vis- à-vis government, or of competition for what are often perceived as 
scarce financial resources from donors. This situation has greatly improved 
through increased interaction among NGOs and through growing networks of 
NGOs in Asia. The following section examines two networks, by tracing their 
origins, organizational capacities and strategies for advocacy.
Transnational networks in Asia: Forum- Asia and ANGOC
The nature of the groups
The region of East Asia is peppered with a variety of transnational acronyms, 
whose constituent groups have come together at different moments and for many 
different reasons. This section draws on different networks from Asia, but exam-
ines in detail two particular networks, selected because of the variety of their 
membership, topic specificity, longevity and membership numbers. Forum- Asia 
involves 40 organizations from 15 Asian states and issued from consultations 
among human rights and development NGOs in Manila in December 1991.2 Its 
current executive committee includes representatives from Nepal, Bangladesh, 
Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Mongolia and Sri Lanka and it has a secre-
tariat in Bangkok. Its membership includes a diverse array of NGO types and 
different legal registrations, such as Odhikar in Bangladesh (set up in 1994 by a 
group of human rights activists, see www.odhikar.org). Many of these groups, 
like the Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association (ADHOC) set 
up by former political prisoners in 1991 (www.adhoc- chra.org), and the Judicial 
System Monitoring Programme (JSMP, www.jsmp.minihub.org) in Timor Leste, 
were established as a result of particular domestic political changes. Many of the 
constituent NGOs of Forum- Asia have formal structures (such as a board of dir-
ectors and various committees) and websites, and are members of other trans-
national fora. As a result, they are increasingly becoming professionalized 
through these international networks of association. Forum- Asia itself has a 
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policy- making executive committee, which also supervises the secretariat and is 
elected by a general assembly held once every three years. The individual NGOs 
belonging to Forum- Asia have developed research and publication capabilities 
within their own regions (such as the Think Centre in Singapore, www.thinkcen-
tre.org). Most significantly, they share a broad remit to establish and protect fun-
damental human rights, and many of their vision statements include universal 
declarations as well as localized demands.
 The Asian NGO Coalition for Agrarian Reform and Rural Development 
(ANGOC) shares many characteristics of Forum- Asia, and is a regional network 
of 21 national and regional NGOs from 11 Asian countries, actively engaged in 
food security, agrarian reform, sustainable agriculture and rural development 
activities (www.angoc.ngo.ph). ANGOC was founded in Bangkok in February 
1979, following a two- year series of village- and national- level consultations in 
ten Asian countries leading to the World Conference on Agrarian Reform and 
Rural Development (WCARRD, Rome, 1979), under the auspices of the UN’s 
Food and Agriculture Organization. It claims that its member networks have an 
effective reach of some 3,000 NGOs throughout the region. The chair and vice 
chair of the board between 2004 and 2007 came from the Philippines and Japan, 
while other board members came from, inter alia, Bangladesh, Cambodia, 
China, India, Indonesia, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. In addition, ANGOC 
promotes its network members, such as the Asian Institute for Rural Develop-
ment (AIRD), South Asia Rural Reconstruction Association (SARRA), and the 
South East Asia Rural Social Leadership Institute (SEARSOLIN), alongside 
national member groups such as the Association of Development Agencies in 
Bangladesh (ADAB), the Cambodian NGO Alliance for Cooperation (CNAC), 
the China Association for NGO Cooperation (CANGO) and the Japanese NGO 
Center for International Cooperation (JANIC). Given the nature of the overall 
remit, it is no surprise that many of these groups are very localized, sparsely 
staffed organizations, with no website and few resources. By the very nature of 
its constituents, then, this network is more disparate than Forum- Asia, and tends 
to focus on the particular needs of target communities that have become margin-
alized as a result of the processes of globalization.
 Forum- Asia and ANGOC share characteristics with many of the networks 
around Asia, whose disparate compositions and varied remits nevertheless tend 
to follow a number of trends. First, it is worth pointing out that transnational 
advocacy groups are not a new phenomenon in Asia and those working in a few 
key topic areas in particular have been around for a long time. These include the 
Pan- Pacific and South- East Asian Women’s Association (PPSEAWA), the 
Center for Asia- Pacific Women in Politics, and the Asia Pacific Women, Law 
and Development (APWLD, www.apwld.org). One further issue that attracts a 
lot of network attention, as Söderbaum and Godsäter note in their contribution to 
this volume, is the environment. Although they are usually established to tackle 
localized and specific issues such as the building of a dam (www.ftope.org.tw), 
environmental issues are generally portrayed as a global problem relating to the 
degradation of the planet. For this reason, although the specific outcomes sought 
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may vary from one issue to another, the coalition groups are seen to form part of 
an important means of developing datasets and acting as monitors of a global set 
of problems that are intrinsically linked, and it is this discursive interlinking that 
often holds groups together. Finally, there is a proliferation of networks engaged 
in human rights issues, such as the Asia Pacific Human Rights Network, with its 
secretariat in New Delhi, which campaigns on specific issues within countries as 
well as providing training to human rights activists (www.aphrn.org). As shown 
by the APWLD and others, groups often combine issue areas in their activities.
 The second trend among Asian networks is the rise in regional summitry, 
which has spawned the establishment of a number of networks as a result of 
direct participation in, or as a direct response to, international summits, most 
notably those held by the United Nations. One notable example is the Asia- 
Pacific Women’s Watch, a network that advocates and monitors the implementa-
tion of the Beijing Platform for Action (BPFA) and the outcome document from 
the UN General Assembly on Women 2000, or Beijing + 5. The South East Asia 
Watch, or SEAWatch, was created for the same purpose. A more recent example 
is the Asia–Europe People’s Forum (AEPF ), which emerged in the mid- 1990s, 
to shadow directly the newly created Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM) of heads of 
state from the European Union and East Asia. The AEPF organizes a range of 
civil society meetings on the margins of ASEM summits and is an important 
portal for the sharing of information and for forming and implementing joint ini-
tiatives in the face of government (in)decisions. In its Final Declaration of 
October 2008, following its meeting alongside the Beijing ASEM summit, the 
AEPF, in its stated spirit of ‘critical engagement’ with states, called for specific 
actions to be taken by member states. These include the abolition of the anti- 
terrorist laws implemented as a result of the so- called ‘war on terror’; the 
strengthening of the International Criminal Court; legislation to remove US 
bases from the regions of Europe and Asia; and the phased withdrawal of foreign 
troops from Afghanistan and Iraq (www.tni.org). The AEPF has also emphas-
ized its role in creating and expanding the space for transnational interaction 
among different non- state actors. The membership of the AEPF does not shadow 
directly that of ASEM, but is open to all groups from Asia and Europe.
 Third, there are networks that may be regarded as functioning arms of inter-
national organizations. They include international non- state organizations such 
as Greenpeace Southeast, which has been tailored in response to the particular 
needs of this region in addition to the national chapters of the group (www.
greenpeace.org). In a similar way, Transparency International has created a 
global set of regional networks which aim to combat corruption and share 
information by focusing on the particular needs of the local environment in 
which they work. In Asia its group has four sub- regional groups. Since 2004, 
several national chapters have become more professionalized, now managing 
growing budgets and implementing multiple projects. One further example is the 
International Women’s Rights Action Watch Asia Pacific. It works through col-
laborative projects in order to achieve the domestic application of international 
human rights norms in relation to women’s rights. In summary, then, these 
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groups accommodate a range of actors and target communities, but are linked by 
commonly understood themes and increasingly through professional structures.
Strategies for advocacy
A number of networks bring together individuals, such as women lawyers, while 
others attract the participation of already established groups, creating bigger net-
works. Networks may have different targets: they may focus on trying to change the 
policies of a particular state or trying to attract the attention of a regional or interna-
tional organization. They may or may not be linked to, and sponsored by, external 
donors or international organizations. Their objectives also vary, but the examples 
of Forum- Asia and ANGOC typify the approaches of many regional networks.
 Forum- Asia aims to ‘empower people by advocating social justice, sustaina-
ble human development, participatory democracy, gender equality, peace and 
human security through collaboration and cooperation among human rights 
organisations in the region’ (UNHCR 2010). In order to achieve these goals, its 
members have recognized a need to establish a network of organizations at the 
local and global levels through which to develop ‘effective engagement with 
state and non- state actors’. As it draws on a broad set of issues situated around 
the idea of human rights, the scope of issues enables Forum- Asia to act as a 
coherent amalgamation of interests. For the most part, the Forum has worked to 
influence larger fora, by adopting a strategy of parallel summitry. In particular, it 
works very closely with the UN and since 2004 has enjoyed consultative status 
within the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). It has also used such 
engagement as a means of lobbying the Human Rights Council in Geneva. In 
Clark et al.’s terms noted above, Forum- Asia has a network- oriented role to act 
as a mechanism for capacity building among regional, ‘local’, NGOs. However, 
this role is seen as a cornerstone for the principal aim of activist lobbying against 
particular state actions, where the target of action is the states of the region them-
selves. Specific campaigns to date have included: a fight to highlight and seek 
redress for those adversely affected by chemical mining in Mongolia; seeking 
justice for victims of the 1991 Santa Cruz massacre in Timor Leste; lobbying 
against the human rights record of the Lao government; and encouraging the 
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) to prioritize human 
rights issues. Thus, the Forum is viewed as providing its members with a means 
of monitoring state actions from an ‘above- region’ or ‘beyond- region’ position.
 ANGOC’s mission is to
create a policy and social environment that enables Asian Rural Poor Com-
munities to exercise their rights to participatory development, gain access to 
and control of their natural resources, and engage in sustainable livelihoods 
while drawing from Asia’s rich spiritual and cultural traditions.
In so doing, it aims to promote alternative development experiences in agrarian 
reform, sustainable agriculture and rural development, as well as to strengthen 
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Asian grassroots action networks. In a similar vein to Forum- Asia, its original aim 
was to facilitate communication and coordination between government and non- 
government organizations, with respect to agrarian reform and rural development 
at national levels. In particular, ANGOC has focused on linking grassroots social 
action groups with larger institutional formats, through institutions such as the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the UN Conference on Environmental and 
Development (UNCED). It also works closely with private international campaign 
groups such as Friends of the Earth, in order to increase public interest and aware-
ness and begin to address accountability issues related to the major development 
banks. So successful has been this campaigning that in 1992 ANGOC was elected 
onto the NGO Working Group on the World Bank and its Steering Committee in 
1993. ANGOC aligns itself with many other groups, creating networks in a 
number of areas, such as networks on food security, agrarian reform, sustainable 
agriculture, and capacity building for which ANGOC was elected as a member of 
the International Steering Committee of the International Forum on Capacity 
Building (IFCB) for Southern NGOs at the international conference held in May 
1998 in Brussels. ANGOC has launched and worked on many programmes, 
including, for example, the 1985 promotion of GO- NGO-donor relationships, and 
it has a history of working together with other organizations around the world. For 
example, from 1991 to 1996, ANGOC organized the Asian Development Forum 
(ADF ) to look at community- based resource management, sustainable agriculture, 
sustainable livelihoods, transforming institutions and people- centred sustainable 
development. Over 25 years, the ANGOC network has written numerous reports 
and organized over 100 regional and national conferences, workshops and training 
courses. A key factor in the work of ANGOC is to disseminate information, which 
is also crucial for spreading the word about how networks breed and influence 
other networks. A key element in promoting people’s participation has been the 
strengthening of the capacity of grassroots groups or people’s organizations – not 
only NGOs – to become involved in decision making about development (www.
fao.org). All of these initiatives respond to a belief that top- down governmental 
approaches do not lead to the legitimate involvement of the people in organiza-
tions. Both Forum- Asia and ANGOC have provided much needed resources and 
learning experiences to their members, as well as facilitated technical cooperation 
and significant linkages with external groups. Indeed, studies on the NGO sector in 
different Asian countries have provided opportunities for ANGOC members to 
build their research and documentation capabilities. Through the proliferation of 
workshops, conferences, study visits and channels for communication, these two 
networks, in addition to the other networks mentioned, have enhanced the devel-
opment of an ‘NGO community’ within Asia.
 Although the means to achieving their ends have focused principally on the 
need to create more effective networks, the implicit target of many of the initia-
tives proposed by Forum- Asia and ANGOC has been the policies of particular 
states. Forum- Asia’s most recent statements to the UN Human Rights Council in 
Geneva included concerns over police assaults on freedom of expression in 
South Korea, calls for the Sri Lankan government to facilitate human assistance 
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for internally displaced persons and concerns over the deportation of Tibetan 
refugees by the Nepali government. This is consistent with the work of ANGOC, 
which has sought since 1997 to make an explicit link between calls for macro- 
level reforms and grassroots provisions (www.angoc.ngo.ph/200vp).
The nature of the region
There is no clear idea of the region within the networks illustrated in this chapter. 
These organic and fluid structures may be loosely based on a geographical frame 
of reference, but are primarily attached to specific targets. Instead, the groups 
tend to instrumentalize the idea of the region for particular purposes, rather than 
deriving their remits from it or being overly influenced by it. Forum- Asia, for 
example, records in its stated goals a need to strengthen its ‘regional dimension’. 
It clearly, therefore, has an idea that there is a ‘region’ to appeal to and repre-
sent, although its membership would suggest the widest interpretation of region. 
However, it utilizes an implied rather than applied idea of region, as it does not 
specifically identify institutions. The geographical frame of region is used by the 
Forum in order to shape the issues they work on, which include Dalits, Tibet and 
South Korean democracy, all regarded as part of ‘our’ region. And although the 
network frequently appeals to the decision makers of ASEAN, there is no sense 
that the region has an institutional role to play. Like Forum- Asia, ANGOC takes 
national concerns and priorities and uses this region- wide forum to influence 
state policy. In addition, the very disparate membership has led to calls for 
greater attention to be paid to the establishment of national directories and 
national coordination, in order primarily to create and maintain formal mechan-
isms for interaction with national governments. These are then seen as ‘interme-
diate NGOs’ with the task of ‘organizing and mobilizing primary groups, and 
acting at times as intermediaries between government and people’s organiza-
tions’ (www.fao.org/docrep). The role of the region for ANGOC, then, is a 
discursive- cultural one, wherein ANGOC aims to promote sustainable develop-
ment by building on a common ‘Asian identity and values’. Here too this notion 
is left vague. Other networks follow similar patterns. For example the Asia- 
Pacific Human Rights Network and the APWLD use the region to demarcate 
(loosely) their membership, but tend to focus on national strategies. The 
PPSEAWA, too, seeks to develop a more comprehensive network of activists 
within the broad ‘Pan- Pacific’ and ‘South- East Asia’ region in order to bolster a 
community of interests, but without having the region as an identifying agent, 
beyond these broad geographical borders.
Conclusion
ANGOC and Forum- Asia, like many other networks, evolved over time through 
the amalgamation of organic interests and the influence of international external 
fora. They derived from local groups seizing an opportunity for external repre-
sentation and from the socialization process that came with getting together for 
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the sake of participating in and with larger fora. Not only did they issue from 
these gatherings, but they also spawned new groups and in this way they are tes-
tament to how networks breed networks. Both groups have now been going for 
some time and have developed into broad memberships of increasingly profes-
sionalized NGOs, coming together as networks under the loose and adjustable 
banners of human rights and agrarian reform. This conclusion assesses the sig-
nificance of the nature of the groups and their forms of advocacy, as well as the 
influence of the state and region on the functioning of networks.
 First, the target issue of the network is likely to influence outcomes. Where a 
group of women lawyers come together with a specific target they are likely to 
create a more coherent coalition in the name of the environment. They bear out 
the findings of Moog Rodrigues (2002: 2), who shows that ‘the level of homoge-
neity of perceptions, interests, and expectations among the target- group or popu-
lation facilitates the formulation of a common approach’. In this way, the closer 
the frames of reference of the constituent participants, the greater the likelihood 
of success for a network. For this reason too, even seemingly straightforward 
issues where agreement might be anticipated can result in inter- network con-
straints when the ideational origins of the parties involved in the network are too 
different (Carpenter 2007: 644). In their work, Keck and Sikkink focus on the 
relative attributes of the issues taken up by networks, while Carpenter (2007: 
646) notes in addition a need to see how ‘savvy advocates gravitate toward ‘hot’ 
issues likely to draw donor funding and good media coverage for their organiza-
tions’. Thus, the issues of human rights, women and the environment may not 
simply be the most pressing issues impacting on local communities, but may 
also be the areas where greater funding is available.
 Second, the nature of the network is likely to affect advocacy outcomes. 
These networks bring together disparately constituted small, local groups under 
the banners of, for example, environmentalism or human rights. The examples of 
Forum- Asia and ANGOC demonstrate how the choice of issue is important in 
creating the scope to accommodate diverse interests. At the same time, the pro-
fessionalization of networks is becoming more important and the more 
developed those structures, the more likely that internal divisions can be 
addressed and overcome.
 Third, the strategies adopted by a given network will affect its efficacy. The 
networks illustrated above all have varied approaches to advocacy. In the main, 
historically, they have responded to particular issues in localized areas, which 
may or may not have wider implications. For this reason, they have traditionally 
focused on being welfare providers. In terms of campaigning, moreover, the net-
works commonly adopt cooperative strategies among regional groups and simul-
taneously network with international organizations. In the cases of Forum- Asia 
and ANGOC, the terms of campaigns are so broad and the internal structures so 
fluid that there has been apparently little inter- network tension. In terms of the 
five tactics outlined above, the most important is information politics. Both net-
works regard their primary role as to convey information to a wide audience. In 
terms of symbolic politics, there is both the suggestion that NGOs per se have 
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become more politically acceptable to governments in the region, and that there 
is a greater need to address local contexts. However, in general they appear to be 
strongly influenced by international organizations and therefore tend to imbibe 
rather than redraw the international terms of debate. They use such normative 
frames to influence local governments, and this also links into leverage politics. 
These factors contribute to the development of accountability politics, as inter-
national norms of reference (in, for example, environmental management or 
human rights) are used vis- à-vis national policy makers. In the light of these 
findings, transnational networks tend to focus more on the ‘self- reflexive strat-
egy which targets changing global decision- making structures and supporting 
local level struggles’, rather than attempting to seek ‘autonomous and provide 
forceful alternatives’ to the current order (Mundy and Murphy 2001). The net-
works illustrated do not campaign principally for changes to the world order or 
to the norms of advocacy. But aside from their particularistic concerns, they are 
influential in creating greater information about advocacy and challenging pre-
vailing ways of seeking accountability.
 Fourth, more attention needs to be paid to the role of states. In this prelimi-
nary sweep of the region, one key finding is that there is no apparent negation of 
the importance of the role of individual states. As noted in the previous section, 
networks of regional activists come together to lobby collectively specific states 
with reference to particular policy decisions. In so doing, they may draw upon 
the expertise, professionalism and normative frame of reference of international 
organizations. These networks appeal to regional and global governance struc-
tures precisely because they regard them as means to influencing particular state 
policy makers. Forum- Asia and ANGOC are making important attempts to influ-
ence national strategies. Far from ignoring or superseding the role of the state, 
then, they are seeking means of leverage to seek changes to what they regard 
still to be primordial state authority. As Human Rights Watch discovered, the 
‘focus of all of these and other organizations that emerged in the region at the 
time [early 2000s] was very specifically restoration of political and civil rights at 
home’ (1998: 157). There is, then, tremendous value in being able to lobby 
outside the country that is, de facto, the destination target. As a result of this 
form of lobbying we can see, in the area of human rights, for example, Human 
Rights Watch identify a growing cooperation between government human rights 
institutions and NGOs. At the same time, Lerche (2008: 239) warns of a possible 
skewing of agendas to achieve the ‘boomerang’ effect, so that, for example, 
‘conflicts over land and related problems of poverty and inequality may be 
reframed as environmental issues, and a focus on violence against women may 
substitute for a general move against patriarchy’. This has not evidently been the 
case for the examples illustrated here, although many of them have a broad remit 
that could accommodate a reallocation or relabelling.
 Finally, where does the region of Asia feature in the formation and mainte-
nance of networks in Asia? The role of the region for these networks has prin-
cipally been implied. Both Forum- Asia and ANGOC span a large number of 
countries and have a fairly straightforward relationship with the idea of region. 
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The other groups similarly derive from personal networks and are equally open 
and fluid in their membership. The region is invoked frequently by all the net-
works, but in a variety of ways. Thus, the idea of region serves as a useful geo-
graphical frame for these groups, but it may also be applied to justify certain 
values and a mythical- historical reference to a community of shared values. In 
the case of Forum- Asia and ANGOC, for example, each identifies something 
‘Asian’ about what it does. But this tends to represent a generic set of fluid 
values. It is principally a cognitive tool, although the physical rise of institutions 
means that there is more institutional engagement at a regional level. This insti-
tutional element is growing and as regional governments begin to embrace 
NGOs then there may be more of a coherent regional dimension to advocacy 
coalitions in the future, which may in turn influence the development of the 
region. Thus, while future networks may contribute to regional integration (Keck 
and Sikkink 1999: 89), at the moment the region tends to be used as another 
point of leverage, in addition to the ‘international’.
 In summary, advocacy networks in East Asia should not be regarded as part 
of a rise of global civil society or as a response to greater international engage-
ment. Rather, they offer an important means of disseminating and sharing 
information and resources, and an additional means of leverage for influencing 
national politics. In so doing, although critical of states, transnational networks 
implicitly affirm the legitimacy of state authority within regional governance. 
This bears out Santa Cruz’s statement that ‘the fact remains that as the constitu-
tive elements and ultimate enforcers of those regimes, states remain the central 
actors – and the focal point for transnational action’ (2004: 28). In these circum-
stances, there is considerable need for a greater understanding – through a sys-
tematic review of all transnational advocacy networks in Asia – of how ordinary 
people are beginning to state their claims in novel ways.
Notes
1 East Asia is broadly defined here as those countries involved in the ASEAN Plus Three 
process: namely, the states of ASEAN, and Japan, South Korea and China. The prob-
lems with this distinction will become clear throughout this chapter.
2 Its members come from Bangladesh, Burma/Thailand, Cambodia, Malaysia, Mongolia, 
Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan and Timor 
Leste.
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8 Civil society in regional 
governance in Eastern and 
Southern Africa
Andréas Godsäter and Fredrik Söderbaum
Introduction
The relatively scant emphasis given to civil society in studies dealing with 
regionalism would seem to suggest the low relevance of civil society in this 
regard. This is unfortunate because, as this chapter elaborates, civil society is a 
dynamic force at the regional level and deserves deeper analysis. To this end, 
this chapter seeks to contribute to the debate about civil society’s role in regional 
governance in Eastern and Southern Africa. We argue that the neglect of civil 
society in the study of regional governance is at least partly a theoretical and 
conceptual problem. As emphasized in the first part of this chapter, it is neces-
sary to acknowledge the heterogeneity of links between civil society and states 
that arise in different socio- cultural and political contexts. We argue in particular 
that theories and conceptualizations of civil society rooted in the Western or 
European experience risk misunderstanding the logic of African civil society and 
its involvement in regional governance.
 We delimit our empirical focus by concentrating on Eastern and Southern 
Africa. This focus is justified by the distinct history of civil society interaction 
in this part of Africa during decolonization, the recognized and quite distinct 
overall regionalization dynamic, and a multitude of state forms with different 
links to their respective civil societies. The most comprehensive understanding 
of Eastern and Southern Africa covers the Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC), and the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) group of countries, but 
there are also other informal and dynamic sub- regions within this definition. It 
is noteworthy that civil society interactions do not follow the membership of 
intergovernmental regional organizations. The next section discusses some 
theoretical and conceptual points of departure for the analysis of civil society 
in regional governance in Africa and presents a typology of four types of civil 
society involvement in regional governance. Based on this typology, the 
empirical section examines civil society involvement in regional governance 
in Africa.
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Framework
We take our point of departure from a reflectivist and critical perspective 
towards the study of regionalism, which has become established as the New 
Regionalism Approach (NRA).1 The NRA conceptualizes regionalization as a 
multidimensional process, occurring in many sectors and on different levels 
simultaneously, and driven by a variety of state and non- state actors. The NRA 
is based on a triangle of regionalizing actors, broadly grouped in terms of states 
(governments), markets (business) and civil society. One basic assumption is 
that not only economic, but also social and cultural, regional networks and 
projects are anticipated to develop more quickly than the formal state- led region-
alist projects. Rather than separating actors into perceived ‘autonomous’ groups 
or spheres of actors, the NRA suggests that actors will be grouped in formal or 
informal multi- actor networks, partnerships and modes of regional governance 
(Söderbaum 2004). Some key theorists in the NRA camp, such as Hettne and 
Mittelman, build on the ideas of Karl Polanyi about the political role of civil 
society as a means for the weak and the poor to protect themselves against often 
exploitative market forces in the context of economic globalization. In doing so, 
these scholars emphasize the counter- hegemonic and transformative role of civil 
society regionalization, such as pro- democracy forces, women’s movements and 
environmentalist groups. As Mittelman points out: ‘[A]t the end of the day, the 
possibilities and limitations of transformative regionalism rest on the strength of 
its links to civil society’ (2000: 225). In a similar fashion, Marchand draws atten-
tion to the regionalization of civil society in North America as a civil society- led 
counter- force against the ‘hyper liberal’ North American Free Trade Area 
(NAFTA), the former representing ‘the best’ and the latter ‘the worst’ of the new 
regionalism in North America (2001: 210). This notion of civil society’s counter-
 hegemonic and transformative potential reflects the deep dissatisfaction of these 
authors with neoliberal globalization and their eagerness to discover an altern-
ative order. Even if we are sympathetic to the critical and transformative ambi-
tions of such analysis, we argue for a broader and more open- ended framework, 
which is able to reflect a wider set of empirical outcomes (see Söderbaum 2007).
 There is a rich variety of definitions and meanings of ‘civil society’ (Scholte 
2000, 2002). It is often loosely defined as the public realm and the associational 
life existing between the state and the private sphere. From this perspective civil 
society is seen as an arena where different associations and interest groups can 
express their interests and engage with the state. Although not always conceptu-
alized in this way, civil society is generally considered to be distinct from the 
state. Scholte defines civil society as a political space where voluntary associ-
ations, intentional or unintentional, shape the rules that govern one or more 
aspects of social life (2002: 147). It includes a rich variety of actors and volun-
tary associations, such as non- governmental organizations (NGOs), community- 
based organizations, interest groups, trade unions, social movements, faith- based 
organizations, academic institutions, clan and kinship circles, lobbies, youth 
associations and development cooperation initiatives (grouped here collectively 
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as civil society organizations, CSOs). A group’s active political orientation is an 
important ingredient in this definition, but both profit- seeking actors and polit-
ical parties are excluded, since they pursue a direct quest for political power. 
However, contrary to Scholte, we argue that those voluntary associations that do 
not attempt to shape policies, norms or structures in society (for instance NGOs 
engaged in service delivery) are worth including in the study of civil society, 
since their activity contributes to the reproduction of the current social system.
 Most studies on civil society are heavily influenced by Western and liberal 
thinking. This implies focusing on the civility, autonomy and sovereignty of 
civil society. From such perspectives, only organizations with a normative 
potential may be considered part of civil society, ruling out for example certain 
ethnically and religiously based organizations (Chazan 1999: 111). Furthermore, 
according to liberal thinking, civil society has to be understood in terms of its 
own qualities and not in relation to the state (Azarya 1994: 83). We argue that 
one reason why civil society in Africa is widely misunderstood by scholars is the 
dominance of Western (liberal) political thought. Indeed, many African social 
scientists argue that the liberal concept of civil society needs to be contested; the 
liberal idea of an ‘autonomous’ civil society is a myth. Civil society cannot be 
seen in isolation, only in connection to the corresponding state and, according to 
these scholars, liberals fail to recognize the pluralism of state–society interaction 
in Africa (Mamdani 1995; Kasfir 1998). Many Africanist scholars consider civil 
society to be conflictual and contradictory, different civil society actors penet-
rating the state in different ways and vice versa (Habib 2004). Critics also argue 
that there is a tendency to idealize civil society, conceptualizing it as homogen-
ous and inherently democratic (Sjögren 1998). According to one critical scholar, 
‘[t]his tendency involves nothing less than a one- sided anti- state romanticisation 
of civil society’ (Mamdani 1995: 603). Another weakness in the conventional 
understanding of civil society is that a great deal of research in this field is based 
on the notion that civil society operates, and is consolidated, on a ‘national’ 
basis. In our view, this notion must be transcended in order to provide a perspec-
tive beyond the national government and provide a better account of civil society 
on the supranational regional level. In other words, civil society is not hermeti-
cally sealed from the external environment. On the contrary, civil society activ-
ities at different levels/scales tend to be closely connected.
 The framework developed here seeks to problematize civil society and to 
embrace a theoretical perspective that allows for the possibility that civil society 
contains an internal series of paradoxes and conflicts. Our framework also seeks 
to account for the fact that civil society actors may be involved in complex, 
rather than simple and straightforward, relationships with other types of actors, 
which, in turn, may blur the distinctions between civil society actors, states and 
private market actors. External actors also play an important role in the promo-
tion of civil society in Africa (Howell 2000). According to one commentator, 
however, generally this is seldom done on African terms since foreign donors 
tend to ‘bring in funds and consultants to shape civil society according to their 
own agenda’ (Muchie 2003: 71).
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A typology of civil society in regional governance
The concept of governance provides an opportunity to get out of the conceptual 
prison of state- centrism. In particular, the nation- state is being reorganized and 
non- state actors have assumed many responsibilities and functions traditionally 
reserved for the state. There is therefore a need to think in terms of more 
complex, multilevel and polyarchic modes of governance, which take into 
account the dispersal of power, authority, legitimacy, jurisdictions and respons-
ibility. Governance should not be confused with government: governance is 
more than government and in order to be able to speak of governance and 
‘systems of rule’ there must be a certain degree of control and continuity. 
Although the current analysis emphasizes the regional level, as already indi-
cated, the regional is interwoven with and closely related to other levels and 
scales, not least the national level. Although it is often possible to identify a dis-
tinct ‘regional’ arena, activities on the ‘national’ and ‘regional’ levels are inti-
mately interconnected. Even if CSOs engage regionally, they are first and 
foremost based and active within a national context. For example, many regional 
CSOs support the national work of their members and partners. What is of par-
ticular importance is how the regional arena manifests itself and how various 
types of CSOs use it to further their (local, national and regional) interests. This 
will be illustrated below. Furthermore, we contend that a strong emphasis on 
formal and public dimensions of governance in much of the literature has pre-
vented a more comprehensive understanding of the subject matter. In order, then, 
to understand the emerging and prevailing modes of governance and the interests 
and purposes they serve, it should be recognized that they are more than simply 
formal public systems of rule and authority structures for goal achievement 
(Jones 1998: 2). It is also crucial to acknowledge the fact that civil society con-
tributes to and tries to shape, resist or even manipulate regional governance.
 In line with Gilson’s chapter in this volume, we argue that the complex and 
multifaceted nature of civil society warrants some kind of categorization of the 
roles that civil society play in regional governance. Drawing on Armstrong et al. 
(2004), our typology emphasizes four partly competing types of civil society par-
ticipation in regional governance: (a) civil society as partner in regional govern-
ance; (b) civil society as legitimating regional governance; (c) civil society as 
resisting regional governance; and (d) civil society as manipulating regional gov-
ernance. Partner CSOs engage with state actors and regional interstate frameworks 
on a consultative basis, mainly in order to solve joint problems. These CSOs are 
fairly content with formal regional governance, even if they believe that some pol-
icies and programmes need to be modified and implementation accelerated. There-
fore, they play a monitoring role in relation to state actors, making sure that public 
policies are implemented and governments deliver what they have promised to 
deliver, as well as lobbying for the modification of regional policies. They also 
take a direct role in the provision of social services together with governments, 
especially in marginalized areas. This creates a partnership- based relationship. The 
second type of CSOs serves the function of legitimizing regional governance, 
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trying to fill the so- called democratic deficit within regional interstate frameworks. 
The legitimating CSOs critically engage state actors by advocating policy reform. 
However, legitimizing CSOs, like the partner CSOs, still underpin current govern-
ance structures but make them more accountable and legitimate. Third, civil 
society when resisting regional governance seeks to achieve a structural change in 
current regionalist regimes. These CSOs question the use of problem- solving 
activities, believing that pure service provision merely reproduces a highly unjust 
society and the prevailing capitalist order. Instead, the patterns of unsustainable 
development must be identified and transformed, and this can only be done 
through popular mobilization. The interaction with state actors is therefore conten-
tious. It is when manipulating regional governance that civil society becomes a 
repressive force, and serves as an instrument for narrow private economic and 
political gains. It is widely recognized in Africa that NGOs may be destructive 
forces in society. Even if so- called ‘briefcase NGOs’ or ‘My Own NGOs’ 
(MONGOs) may fulfil certain functions, their main purpose is to extract resources 
from those willing to pay. In principle CSOs manipulating regional governance 
have little interest in investing time and money in regional governance, or in taking 
part in regional civil society networks, unless this enables them to extract rents or 
achieve other goals. The following section applies these four typologies to the 
region of Eastern and Southern Africa.
Civil society in regional governance in Eastern and Southern 
Africa
The relationships between state and civil society need to be problematized. In 
the case of Africa, the role of the state varies between every society, as does the 
extent of state intervention in the economy and across society in general. The 
typology developed in the previous section is useful for categorizing the roles 
that civil society plays in regional governance. We focus on two broad sectors: 
sustainable development and social and economic justice (the latter group’s civil 
society actors operating in various fields, such as trade, debt and HIV/AIDS). 
The reasons for choosing these two sectors are threefold and built on our experi-
ences in the field: (a) regional cooperation in these sectors is rich; (b) the civil 
society configuration is different in the two sectors, which creates a basis for 
comparison; and (c) both sectors show a high involvement of donors. It should 
be noted that although we believe that we have captured some of the most 
important patterns in these sectors, our empirical coverage is not exhaustive. 
Instead we have used illustrative examples for each of the four types. Dividing 
lines between the types are seldom sharp in the real world and some CSOs may 
fit more than one type.
Civil society as partner in regional governance
Those parts of civil society that can be understood as partners in regional gov-
ernance basically accept and support the agenda formulated by regional inter-
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governmental organizations, such as the EAC, the SADC and COMESA. The 
political instruments for achieving socio- economically and environmentally 
sound regional governance are mostly in place, even if they need some fine- 
tuning. The main challenge is to accelerate the implementation of existing pro-
grammes and policies. It is possible to distinguish between two roles that civil 
society plays as partner: in service delivery and in lobbying/monitoring. Several 
partner CSOs perform both functions, albeit in different mixes. Osienala Friends 
of Lake Victoria is a regional NGO based in Kisumu, Kenya, with 15 partner 
organizations in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. The main objectives are to enable 
partners and other development CSOs around Lake Victoria, provide various 
services to local communities regionally and lobby local, national and regional 
policy makers (Osienala 2010). Osienala has a radio station, Radio Lake Victo-
ria, which seeks to educate fishing communities around the lake regarding envir-
onmental management. Furthermore, Osienala has been assigned as lead agent 
by the Kenyan government in assisting NGOs in Environmental Impact Assess-
ments and maintains a close working relationship with the states- led Lake Victo-
ria Basin Commission (LVBC).2 In short, the LVBC provides policy guidance 
on sustainable natural resource management at the same time as it seeks to coor-
dinate and facilitate development activities by both state and non- state actors in 
the basin area (LVBC 2007).
 The East African Communities’ Organization for Management of Lake Vic-
toria Resources (ECOVIC) is a regional network comprised of three country 
chapters in Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda with about 30 national member NGOs 
and community based organizations (CBOs) altogether. A regional secretariat is 
based in Jinja, Uganda. ECOVIC’s activities include service delivery, advocacy, 
lobbying, network building and capacity building for the sustainable use of Lake 
Victoria’s resources and enhanced regional integration (ECOVIC 2007). 
ECOVIC is very active in the regional arena. With regard to service delivery, 
among other things it provides sanitation facilities and clean water in various 
communities in the Lake Victoria region. Most activities are carried out in close 
collaboration with local authorities. ECOVIC is also involved in lobbying, for 
instance towards the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA), the independ-
ent legislative arm of the EAC with the mandate to oversee its work (EALA 
2010). In this regard, ECOVIC holds meetings and workshops with members of 
the EALA and suggests improvements in policy making related to the use and 
management of Lake Victoria’s resources. ECOVIC has also been granted 
observer status in the EAC Council of Ministers. Furthermore, ECOVIC collab-
orates with the Lake Victoria Fisheries Organization (LVFO), a regional organ-
ization under the EAC responsible for coordinating and managing fisheries 
resources of Lake Victoria (LVFO 2010a). One important example of joint 
state–civil society regional governance is the so- called ‘co- management initi-
ative’, a partnership arrangement in which local communities, local governments 
and other stakeholders share responsibility and the authority for the management 
of the fishery. Co- management is partly implemented through the so- called 
Beach Management Unit- system (LVFO 2010b), set up and supported by 
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Osienala, ECOVIC and the LVFO. According to one representative of ECOVIC, 
the interaction with the LVFO is ‘smooth’.3
 In Eastern African, regional CSOs often collaborate with state actors in 
policy making and seem to have developed a good relationship. One example 
is the Eastern African Sub- regional Initiative for the Advancement of Women 
(EASSI), a regional membership- based CSO with headquarters in Kampala, 
Uganda, linking 16 national women’s associations in eight countries in North-
ern and Eastern Africa around the promotion of gender equality and women’s 
rights.4 As part of its work, EASSI assesses the implementation by regional 
governments of the so- called Beijing Platform for Action (BPFA), a UN initi-
ative that sets out measures to ensure that a gender perspective is reflected in 
all policies and programmes at the national, regional and international levels 
(EASSI 2010). EASSI also organizes regional civil society fora, for example 
within the realm of the Women’s Affairs Ministers Meetings in the region, 
bringing together policy makers and CSOs for policy dialogue (EASSI 2007). 
In addition, EASSI is collaborating with the EAC to put in place a regional 
gender declaration. According to representatives of EASSI, there is a general 
openness for partnership with civil society on the part of the EAC.5 Similarly, 
the Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment (ACODE) is a 
regional independent policy research and advocacy NGO based in Kampala, 
Uganda, with several partners throughout the region. Its mission is to influence 
development and governance policies for the promotion of social justice in 
Eastern Africa, through policy research, advocacy and community empower-
ment (ACODE 2007). Based on its own research, ACODE provides govern-
mental institutions in Uganda, as well as EAC institutions, with policy options 
that are environmentally sound and sensitive to public development concerns. 
For example, they push the EAC to harmonize further farmers’ rights in 
Eastern Africa. ACODE also sits on a number of governmental technical 
working committees in Uganda, as do its partners in Tanzania and Kenya. Fur-
thermore, ACODE regularly organizes regional fora for scientists and policy 
makers on intellectual property rights and development, in partnership with 
national state agencies. ACODE claims that it has emerged ‘as an effective 
government partner in the policy development process’ (ACODE 2007), and 
that its policy recommendations are taken seriously and incorporated into new 
acts and bills.6
 In Southern Africa, the picture is more ambiguous. Here, most lobbying activ-
ities centre on the SADC as a counterpart. The Wildlife and Environment 
Society of South Africa (WESSA) is a South African environmental NGO 
dealing with both education and advocacy. WESSA is the implementing agency 
of the SADC Regional Environmental Education Programme (SADC REEP), 
which is coordinated by the SADC Secretariat. The programme aims to enable 
environmental education practitioners in the SADC region to stimulate environ-
mental education in their home countries. This is done through strengthening 
training capacity, the compilation and distribution of information and educa-
tional material, and regional networking (WESSA 2010). Other examples of 
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policy collaboration with SADC include the Southern African Research and 
Development Centre (SARDC). This is a resource centre based in Zimbabwe, 
with a satellite office in Mozambique, which produces and disseminates informa-
tion about development processes in the SADC region. It works closely with the 
SADC Secretariat, and the relationship is formalized in a Memorandum of 
Understanding entitling the SARDC to have a seat in various SADC fora. 
Through lobbying and research the SARDC tries to influence SADC policy 
making in areas such as informal trade and the monitoring of the SADC’s devel-
opment programmes. According to the SARDC itself, it is taken seriously 
because: ‘we don’t see governments as our enemies . . . we want to complement 
the governments’ work. It is clear that SARDC’s policy advices are incorporated 
in many SADC resolutions’.7 However, there are many less successful partner-
ships between civil society and the SADC, especially as far as lobbying is con-
cerned. One important example is the SADC Council of Non- Governmental 
Organizations (SADC- CNGO), which is a civil society umbrella organization 
with participants from all over the SADC region. The SADC- CNGO seeks to 
influence development policies in the SADC, accelerate implementation and put 
forward NGO interests and perspectives (SADC- CNGO 2005). This endeavour 
is encouraged by the SADC, which frequently and strongly proclaims the need 
to involve civil society in regional governance. Paragraph 23 of the SADC 
Treaty stipulates that:
SADC shall seek to involve fully the people of the Region and non- 
governmental organizations in the process of regional integration. . . . SADC 
shall co- operate with, and support the initiatives of the peoples of the 
Region and non- governmental organizations, contributing to the objectives 
of this Treaty in the areas of co- operation in order to foster closer relations 
among the communities, associations and people of the Region.
(SADC 1992)
 The SADC and the SADC- CNGO have in fact formulated a Memorandum of 
Understanding on general cooperation where the parties commit themselves to 
collaborate on the implementation of the goals of the SADC Treaty (SADC- 
CNGO 2003). The SADC- CNGO has been active in arranging a number of 
SADC civil society fora parallel to the official SADC summits, where the dele-
gates discuss and hope to influence the processes within the SADC (cf. Gilson’s 
chapter for similar processes in Asia). However, the fundamental problem is 
exclusion. The Secretary General of the SADC- CNGO, Abie Ditlhake, claims 
that ‘in practice, they don’t consult us’ (quoted in Nduru 2006). The marginali-
zation and exclusion of civil society from the SADC framework are observed by 
both researchers (Landsberg 2002) and civil society actors (SADC- CNGO 
2006), as well as by SADC representatives. According to one official, it is very 
difficult to have access to the SADC since it is a closed institution, which in 
reality has not prioritized collaboration with civil society, in spite of resolutions 
stating otherwise.8 Lastly, the African Network of AIDS Service Organizations 
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(SANASO) seeks to unite the efforts of national AIDS service CSOs around the 
region and promote cooperation between civil society and governments. After 
many struggles, it has managed to establish institutionalized links with the 
SADC Secretariat, engaged in areas like health and human resources develop-
ment (SANASO 2010). However, it is uncertain whether SANASO will manage 
to push and monitor the formation and implementation of policies related to 
health and HIV/AIDS in the SADC region, as aimed for, considering the tend-
ency of SADC towards exclusion.
Civil society as legitimating regional governance
Civil society as legitimating regional governance refers to CSOs that seek to col-
laborate with state actors, but which have a critical engagement more than a 
straightforward partnership. Their objectives are to enhance policy reform rather 
than the development and implementation of existing policies, and, ultimately, 
to make regional governance more accountable and democratic. Their critical 
approach means that relations with state actors and regional organizations are 
tenser and more controversial than the previous type. The East African Sustaina-
bility Watch Network (EASWN) is a loosely organized coalition of three 
national networks: the Uganda Coalition for Sustainable Development (UCSD); 
the Kenya Organization of Environment Education (KOEE); and the Tanzania 
Coalition for Sustainable Development (TCSD). A regional secretariat is hosted 
by the UCSD (EASWN 2007). The EASWN’s most important project is the East 
African Civil Society Watchdog Project for Sustainable Development in the 
Lake Victoria basin, which tries to increase citizen participation in reforming 
policies related to sustainable development and scaling up networking and 
information sharing on sustainable development. During the process of estab-
lishing the LVBC, the EASWN made a submission to the EAC’s Lake Victoria 
Commission Bill of 2007. In the process it managed to arrange a meeting with 
the speaker from EALA as well as to hold informal discussions with EALA 
members, to demand more accountable decision- making procedures and more 
space for popular participation.9 Another example of civil society as legitimator 
is the National Association of Professional Environmentalists (NAPE), a national 
advocacy group on environmental issues based in Uganda but operating region-
ally in East Africa. NAPE lobbies the LVBC to adopt a ‘bottom- up’ approach 
when coordinating development activities in the region. According to NAPE, the 
LVBC and EAC are crucial for governing the development processes in the 
region, but interaction with local communities and CSOs must be radically 
improved. Even though NAPE in general is recognized by governmental offi-
cials as an important actor in the process, its critical approach creates a conten-
tious relationship. As one interviewee observed: ‘if you are advocating for 
transparency, if you are advocating against non- compliance, very few govern-
mental organizations would want to bring you near’.10
 In Southern Africa, the Southern African Trade Unions Co- ordinating Council 
(SATUCC) is a membership- based regional organization based in Botswana, 
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formed and constituted by national labour unions throughout the region. The 
Council coordinates trade union coalitions in the region and serves an advocacy 
role vis- à-vis the SADC, trying to reform regional socio- economic policy 
making and incorporate labour issues. According to its secretary general, 
SATUCC has been successful in interacting with the SADC and influencing 
policy making, for example by joining a regional tripartite structure with busi-
ness and SADC states where important policy documents are developed.11 Sim-
ilarly, Mwelekeo wa NGO (MWENGO) is a regional partnership- based NGO 
based in Zimbabwe, building the institutional capacity and advocacy skills of 
NGOs in Southern Africa, and dealing with social justice issues through work-
shops, networking and training. MWENGO tries to enable its partner NGOs to 
become advocates for more democratic governance institutions, such as the 
SADC. Its primary objective is to enhance the role and ability of CSOs to parti-
cipate in the policy- making processes related to development at national and 
regional levels, and to have the interests of its constituencies represented in 
various governmental institutions (MWENGO 2009). However, its critical stand-
point does leave it increasingly marginalized. The last example of civil society 
as legitimator is Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), a South Africa- based NGO 
pushing for increased treatment of people with HIV and reduction of HIV infec-
tions in the region through fundamental policy reform. Even though it focuses 
on the national arena, TAC also arranges regional workshops for HIV/AIDS 
activists in Southern Africa. Among several regional campaigns, one targeted 
the secretariat of the Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU) and trade minis-
tries in the region. Through the coordination of TAC, partners in the region col-
lectively demanded that international trade agreements should be opened up for 
public scrutiny and not jeopardize popular access to AIDS medicines.12
Civil society as resisting regional governance
Examples of civil society resisting regional governance prevail above all in 
Southern Africa. In contrast to partner and legitimating CSOs, the aims and 
objectives of states- led regional governance are interpreted differently and 
resisted, not acknowledged. The current analysis highlights three examples of 
civil society resisting regional governance: the Southern African Centre for Eco-
nomic Justice (SACEJ), the Southern African Peoples’ Solidarity Network 
(SAPSN) and the Anti- Privatization Forum (APF ). SACEJ is a Johannesburg- 
based regional activist platform, which addresses issues of economic justice 
from a regional perspective. SACEJ supports existing and emerging networks 
and social movements in the region, and seeks to mobilize local communities 
over issues such as poverty and water. SACEJ organizes joint campaigns and 
unites community- based struggles in the region.13 SAPSN has become estab-
lished as one of the key nodes in Southern Africa of the so- called ‘anti- 
globalization movement’. The SAPSN network involves a broad range of civil 
society organizations and institutions, including trade unions, development 
NGOs, church- based social organizations and community- based movements, all 
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working towards regional development and against economic and ‘hyper liberal’ 
globalization. Its aims are to share experiences, develop capacity, exchange 
information, increase awareness, and contribute to the mobilization and building 
of mass movements. The secretariat is currently based at the Zimbabwe Coali-
tion on Debt and Development (ZIMCODD), another resisting CSO, in Harare, 
Zimbabwe (SAPSN 2010). SAPSN is critical of much of the state- driven region-
alism. It claims that most Southern African political regimes only engage in rhe-
torical declarations about development cooperation and integration. Various 
SAPSN statements charge that SADC leaders are using the SADC as a self- 
serving ‘old boys’ club’ for mutual support ‘whenever the interests and power of 
the ruling elites come into conflict with the human rights, and the democratic 
and development aspirations of their own populations’ (SAPSN 2000). SAPSN’s 
vision emphasizes the limits of state- steered regionalism at the same time as it 
calls for the effective participation of organized forces of civil society and 
peoples. Among other activities, SAPSN regularly holds joint regional work-
shops, hosted by individual SAPSN member organizations, on issues related to 
regional integration. Some of these workshops have taken the form of people’s 
summits parallel to official SADC meetings (SAPSN 2010). At the summit in 
August 2006 a plan of action was developed to start the process of reclaiming 
the SADC for people’s solidarity and development cooperation. A People’s Dec-
laration was written, criticizing the current SADC process and demanding 
greater transparency (OSISA 2006). The APF is another example of civil society 
resisting regional governance. It is an activist platform for 30 community- based 
organizations and social movements in South Africa contesting the privatization 
of water, electricity, housing, education and health through direct action. 
According to a representative of the APF, they refuse to join the ‘NGO crowd’ 
and to participate in states- led regional schemes like the African Union (AU) 
and SADC, which, he claims, bring in civil society only as a means to gain (arti-
ficial) public legitimacy. Therefore, its view on the SADC NGO Council, 
addressed above, is very critical: ‘to be very blunt, we think it is a joke and we 
don’t take it very seriously . . . It is a classic example of institutionalized co- 
option’.14 Even if primarily operating on a national level, the APF is also active 
in the regional arena and, for example, was instrumental in developing the Social 
Forum process in the region.
 It has to be said that resisting regional governance and striving towards 
‘transformation’ does not automatically make these CSOs positive forces in 
society or for democracy. Agents of civil society as resisting regional govern-
ance have clearly managed to fill a vacuum created by the absence of real 
alternative state- led regionalisms. But in filling this gap, these agents are not 
necessarily ‘peoples driven’, and their frequently proclaimed links to the grass 
roots and to ‘peoples’ need to be scrutinized and debated. Sections of resisting 
civil society are an elite- led process, dominated by a relatively small number 
of NGO representatives and activists. Contrary to SATUCC (see p. 000 above), 
most CSOs participating in SAPSN are not membership- based. The number of 
participants and stakeholders involved is steadily increasing, but the agenda 
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and output are dominated by a limited number of vocal activists. Their ability 
to deliver their message (their ‘voice’) and to finance their activities is heavily 
dependent on how successful they are in attracting donor funding or other 
support from Western NGOs. This is particularly pertinent for regional net-
working and regional cooperation. These critical factors are not necessarily 
problematic but they raise questions about legitimacy, accountability and rep-
resentation. In this way, some resisting CSOs resemble the so- called ‘briefcase 
NGOs’ described below.
Civil society as manipulating regional governance
The CSOs that arise in order to manipulate regional governance for purposes 
of economic and political profit appear to be closely associated with the preva-
lence of what are often called neo- patrimonial regimes, such as Botswana, 
Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Rwanda, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Many 
of the states throughout the region are rentier- based economies whose state 
forms are ripe for patrimonialism. Indeed, in some African states where neo- 
patrimonialism is strong, it is difficult to distinguish between the state and civil 
society. Furthermore, many NGOs in Eastern and Southern Africa are staffed 
by relatives or close associates of the ruling political elites, using civil society 
as a platform for gaining personal political and economic gain. Such structures 
may sometimes be justified in cases such as charitable- purpose NGOs. Obvi-
ously, there is a thin line between these and problem- solving NGOs. Rent- 
seeking NGOs raise serious issues about independence and undue influence 
among NGOs and governments. As one well- regarded expert on African pol-
itics points out: ‘[I]f you or anyone else was to look at a[n] NGO in Botswana, 
the first thing you need to find out is: who is the head and the leading office- 
holders in the NGO?’ Due to often being a ‘one- man show’, these NGOs in 
Botswana and elsewhere have been nicknamed ‘MONGOs’ (My Own NGO). 
This is not to say that every NGO with government links is compromised, and 
some may still demonstrate independence by challenging and criticizing gov-
ernment actions and policies.15
 Political elites and governments may use and abuse civil society in order to 
gain accountability and legitimacy for their own crumbling regimes. Hence, civil 
society may play the ‘political’ role of reinforcing and legitimating controver-
sial, and sometimes repressive, dimensions of regional governance, such as 
large- scale regional infrastructural projects and state facilitation for the regional 
operation of big enterprises. This role is played by regional NGOs, or rather 
‘semi- governmental organizations’ (SGOs), which are merely an extension of 
intergovernmental institutions, and donors, whose development agendas in prin-
ciple converge. In this type the links with regional state actors are obviously very 
strong and they often intertwine. Apart from service delivery, such regional 
NGOs often use propaganda, disguised as ‘information- sharing’ and ‘popular 
education’, as important strategies for their economic and political ends. Indeed, 
it is a common strategy of many governments in the region to establish research 
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institutes, think tanks and NGOs that operate as extended arms of, or fronts for, 
the government. These actors rarely criticize their benefactor governments, and 
instead play a role in seeking to legitimize often authoritarian or even illegal 
government activities. The NGO set up by Zambia’s former president, Frederick 
Chiluba, to debate his (unconstitutional) third presidential term is one classic 
example. Another example is Ditshwanelo, a human rights NGO in Botswana 
headed by a daughter of the then foreign minister. It had previously been pub-
licly critical of the government’s treatment of the minority San people, but at the 
2001 World Conference in Durban on Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenopho-
bia and Related Intolerance the organization was conspicuously silent on this 
issue. Ditshwanelo’s behaviour was subsequently debated in Botswana, and 
opinion concluded that the organization had been influenced by this familial link 
to attempt to minimize international embarrassment for Botswana and its 
government.16
 Representatives of the state and civil society actors in Southern and Eastern 
Africa often mention the fact that manipulative CSOs constitute obstacles for 
development and regional governance, serving the needs of donors and polit-
ical and economic elites rather than local communities. According to one com-
mentator, many NGOs in Eastern Africa are formed because ‘someone wants 
to make some quick money somewhere . . . or some [donor] agency somewhere 
has convinced them to form so that . . . they can serve as a channel for the 
agency to do what it wants to do’.17 The significant inflow of donor money into 
civil society in Africa and elsewhere in the South has made it ‘the place to 
make money’ (Hearn 2007: 1102), generating what Dicklitch and others have 
referred to as ‘briefcase NGOs’ (Dicklitch 1998: 8), driven primarily by eco-
nomic self- interest. In reality, however, such NGOs remain difficult to expose, 
as they invest heavily in creating a benevolent (development) facade. In 
general, the quest for making money makes NGOs professionalized and 
increasingly headed by members of the middle class, revealing a narrow social 
representation (Dicklitch 1998: 159). Therefore some African NGOs are seen 
merely as an extension of the dominant donor aid agenda and agents of 
Western interests. One commentator concludes that many African NGOs have 
become ‘local managers of foreign aid money, not managers of local African 
development processes’ (Hearn 2007: 1107). The briefcase NGOs and many 
rent- seeking MONGOs are mainly interested in promoting and participating in 
regional cooperation and governance when they enhance economic or political 
gain. This is especially so when donors make such funding available. The pre-
liminary finding is that civil society as ‘manipulators’ may be a bigger problem 
in national governance than in regional governance.
Conclusion
This chapter has analysed the role of civil society in regional governance in 
Eastern and Southern Africa. It has argued that the study of civil society in 
regional governance is underdeveloped and that there is a need to reflect on how 
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it is theorized and conceptualized. In particular, it is important to account for the 
paradoxes and conflicts within civil society itself, as well as the heterogeneity of 
links between civil society and states that arise in different socio- cultural and 
political contexts. The chapter developed a typology outlining four (partly com-
peting and partly overlapping) roles for civil society in regional governance. 
Civil society as partner in regional governance is carried out by CSOs that 
engage with state actors and interstate frameworks such as the SADC on a part-
nership and consultative basis, in order to solve joint problems. Civil society as 
legitimating regional governance is played by CSOs seeking reformist policy 
change by critically engaging state actors, often in terms of collective regional 
lobbying. Civil society as resisting regional governance is played by CSOs that 
want to see a more fundamental transformation of the current regionalist 
regimes, building regional social movements through popular mobilization. 
Finally, civil society as manipulating regional governance occurs when civil 
society serves as a instrument for manipulation and for achieving narrow private 
economic and political gains.
 Despite a degree of enthusiasm over the prospects for increased interaction 
between civil society and states in Eastern and Southern Africa during the mid- 
and late 1990s, today civil society organizations have in many instances become 
increasingly marginalized. At the same time, there are several examples of suc-
cessful civil society participation in regional governance. The general trend is 
that civil society in Eastern Africa is less radical and more inclined to be a 
‘partner’ or ‘legitimator’ than in Southern Africa. Generally speaking, there 
appears to be a more cooperative relationship between civil society and govern-
ments in Eastern Africa. However, civil society in Eastern and Southern Africa 
suffers from internal conflicts and rivalries, due to competition for scarce 
resources as well as ideological divergences, which in turn influence their rela-
tionships with both donors and governments. Even if some CSOs, especially in 
Eastern Africa, appear to be quite successful in influencing and participating in 
states- led regional governance, they also suffer from fragmentation. One main 
reason for this is to be found in the competition for donor funds. CSOs have a 
tendency to duplicate their work, flooding the currently most popular develop-
ment sectors while ignoring others. There are no effective mechanisms for con-
solidating or steering development activities by NGOs and CBOs in the region. 
For instance, the legitimacy of Osienala to lead regional civil society in Eastern 
Africa does not seem to extend outside its 15 partner NGOs and ECOVIC seems 
to suffer from weak internal leadership, a lack of transparency, lack of resources 
and, not least, conflicts between country chapters.18 The overall problem is that 
the cumbersome quest for donor funding forces national as well as regional 
CSOs to ‘mind their own business’.19 When NGOs put most of their effort into 
trying to secure income, this creates indifference towards what is best for civil 
society as a whole.
 In Southern Africa, the quarrel is often over ideology and strategy towards 
intergovernmental regional governance. Such quarrels ultimately boil down to 
the fact that different types of CSOs often have fundamentally different views on 
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Southern African regionalism itself. This situation appears similar to the various 
civil society cross- border initiatives advancing the Basque cause that have 
ambiguous relations with regional integration in Europe, as presented by Itçaina 
in this volume. Partner CSOs argue that lobbying is the most effective strategy, 
and they see the SADC as an important instrument for regional development, 
even if in need of certain reforms. In contrast, critical voices claim that ‘it is 
incredibly difficult for us to work with the government’ because those who try 
risk becoming co- opted into a statist, neo- liberal agenda.20 Real change for 
people on the ground can only be achieved by delinking from the state and 
through the mobilization of people in social movements.21 Such disputes over 
strategies are highlighted at civil society gatherings. At the Southern African 
Social Forum in Lusaka 2003, for example, there were divisions within civil 
society. Some CSOs saw their primary role as to lobby their governments to 
lessen the impact of neoliberalism, whereas more radical social movements had 
as their objective to challenge the prevailing hegemonic order through social 
mobilization. These tensions resulted in the failure to present a common plan of 
action on how the demands raised at the forum should be put forward (Globalise 
Resistance 2006). And, as we has seen above, the very existence of two differ-
ent, and competing, civil society fora parallel to the official SADC summits is 
itself a sign of intra- civil society rivalry.
 Divergences related to strategy, as well as ideology, do not necessarily have 
to lead to divisions within civil society. Indeed, they can also strengthen civil 
society participation in regional governance. Most observers, both in civil 
society and in government, seem to agree, however, that civil society in both 
Southern and Eastern Africa is weakly coordinated and needs to organize itself 
more effectively on a regional level.22 It is claimed that the missing link is ‘stra-
tegic leadership’ and strategic alliance building within civil society. Few CSOs 
see the potential and usefulness in collaboration over ideological divides. Partner 
and legitimating CSOs often lack information and knowledge from the ground 
when doing lobbying and advocacy (that is, their work is not evidence- based), 
whereas resisting CSOs through social mobilization have a deeper insight into 
poor people’s daily struggles and are better equipped to make a critical political- 
economic analysis of regional policy making, despite the fact that they refuse to 
engage with policy makers. Merging such ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ strategies 
might be the key for successful civil society influence in regional governance 
around Africa. For civil society to have a stronger impact on regional govern-
ance in Eastern and Southern Africa, greater intra- civil society collaboration is 
needed. We agree with Gilson’s findings in Chapter 7 above that the type of 
strategies adopted, or, more specifically, the combination of strategies, will 
fundamentally affect the outcome of regional civil society networks and coali-
tions. In this process, civil society as partner, legitimator and resister need not be 
mutually exclusive roles in regional governance.
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Notes
 1 For an overview of the NRA and similar approaches, see Söderbaum and Shaw 
(2003). For more detailed accounts of the NRA, see Hettne et al. (1999) and Söder-
baum (2004).
 2 Interview with Obiero Ong’ang’a, Osienala, 8 April 2008.
 3 Interview with Keefa Kaweesa, ECOVIC Uganda, 13 April 2008.
 4 Interview with Jane Ocaya- Irama and Josephine Watuulo, EASSI, 28 March 2008.
 5 Interview with Jane Ocaya- Irama and Josephine Watuulo, EASSI, 28 March 2008.
 6 Interview with Onesmus Mugynyaki, ACODE, 15 April 2008.
 7 Interview with Bayano Valy, SARDC, 21 November 2008.
 8 Interview with Janah Ncube, SADC Secretariat, 8 December 2008.
 9 Interview with Richard Kimbowa, UCSD, 26 March 2008.
10 Interview with Frank Muramuzi, NAPE, 26 March 2008.
11 Interview with Moses Katchima, SATUCC, 8 December 2008.
12 Interview with Njogu Morgan, TAC, 14 March 2005.
13 Interview with George Dor, SACEJ, 11 February 2005.
14 Interview with Dale McKinley, APF, 1 December 2008.
15 Thanks to Professor Ian Taylor for highlighting these examples.
16 Ibid.
17 Interview with Dr Julius P. Ayo- Odongo, Lake Victoria Local Authorities Coopera-
tion (LVLAC), 14 April 2008.
18 Interviews with Silas W. Ng’habi, Victoria Environmental and Fishery Development 
Association (VEFDA), 6 April 2008; Obiero Ong’ang’a, Osienala, 8 April 2008; Matano 
A. Saidi, LVBC, 9 April 2008; and Dr Julius P. Ayo- Odongo, LVLAC, 14 April 2008.
19 Interview with Jennipher A. Kere, Women in Fisheries Industry Programme for Edu-
cation and Development, 11 April 2008, and Benedict Kwangu, Lake Nyanza Envir-
onmental and Sanitation Organization, 1 April 2008.
20 Interview with George Dor, Jubilee South Africa, 4 March 2003.
21 Interview with Diamanthino Nhampossa, UNAC, 31 January 2003.
22 Cf. Landsberg (2002); SADC- CNGO (2005); interview with Neville Gabriel, South-
ern Africa Trust, 2 December 2008; and interview with Janah Ncube, SADC, 8 
December 2008.
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9 The role of civil society in regional 
governance in the Middle East
Michael Schulz
Introduction
This chapter considers the issue of how regional civil society networks and their 
activities in the Middle East impact on regional governance. The role of a Middle 
East civil society has rarely been researched from a regional perspective. This 
reflects the fact that most analysts do not see the potential for regional integration 
there. The theory of new regionalism has occasionally been applied to the Middle 
East context, despite the fact that the region’s integration is usually envisaged as 
slow or even unlikely (see Harders and Legrenzi 2008; Lindholm Schulz and 
Schulz 2005). The region tends to be described as post- Westphalian, states still 
playing the most important role. Nevertheless, many regional projects have not only 
been launched, but have also been discussed by various players in the Middle East, 
as well as outside the region, and civil society representatives have been involved in 
these discussions. Civil society not only acts within each country in the region, but 
also through transnational networks. In this way, it constitutes a forerunner not only 
to regionalization but also to democratization in the regional context.
 Before the 1990s, in order to identify the potential for political change the state 
was seen as one key actor alongside elites within the Middle Eastern states. 
However, in the 1990s civil society came to be part of the political agenda in the 
Middle East. In relation to the potential for democratization, one could see state-
ments such as: ‘[n]o doubt, the defining flavor of the 1990s is participation’ 
(Norton 1995: 5). Others emphasized the developmental capacity of civil society, 
not least its ‘Islamic’ sector, claiming that it provided help to the poorest and those 
in greatest need. More recent research has been critical of these assumptions, and 
suggests that civil society is still a marginal part of Middle Eastern states. Islamic 
civil society, often criticized for not constituting one, has rather been seen as a 
breeding ground for Islamic radicalism and jihadists (Kramer 2001).
The conceptual definition of civil society and its application 
to the Middle East
The concept of civil society is admittedly a contested notion, as illustrated 
throughout this volume. Here, civil society is used to mean voluntary associ-
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ations outside the realm of the state itself. Civil society, however, requires a rela-
tionship with the state, a legally mandated autonomy involving rights guaranteed 
by the state. According to a liberal definition, civil society is not necessarily in 
opposition to the state. From a Gramscian perspective, civil society is seen as a 
sphere of resistance. Diamond also states that democracy is strengthened by civil 
society’s acts of ‘containing the power of the state through public scrutiny’ 
(Diamond and Plattner 1993: 8). In ‘Third World’ contexts, it is also debatable 
whether civil society could also encompass patron–-client relations, tribal 
systems, ethnicities, and so on. The general literature on processes of democrat-
ization in the Middle East deals primarily with the Arab state system (Salamé 
1994; Ayubi 1995). The many authoritarian states in the region have been chal-
lenged by civil society, which regards itself as the guarantor of at least some sort 
of scrutiny of the states. Even less researched is the issue of regional governance 
and the role played by civil society within it.
 Some researchers include political parties as part of civil society (Ibrahim 
1995: 28; Moussali 1995: 52); others claim, however, that parties are linked to 
the state structure (Cohen and Arato 1997: 350). However, most authors under-
line the fact that civil society belongs to the public sphere and not to the private 
one. There is consent in the majority of studies that the term does not include the 
financial sphere, which is made up of private, profit- making companies and 
financial corporations. Another unresolved issue is whether civil society refers to 
organizations with voluntary association only, or whether patron–client relations, 
extended families, tribes and ethnicities are part of civil society as, in fact, the 
initial definition might suggest. In this chapter these are seen as part of civil 
society, since they are often described as being neither state nor market actors, 
but as playing an important role, not least in terms of personal security, within 
Middle Eastern societies. Although the borders between the various spheres are 
often analytically blurred, the informal structures of civil society constitute a 
sphere between the population/citizens in a society, and government structures. 
Hence, a distinction between formal and informal sectors of civil society can be 
made.
 Further, it is often assumed from a liberal point of view that civil society 
refers to values, such as civility, implying tolerance, pluralism, ‘a cast of mind, a 
willingness to live and let live’ (Norton 1995: 12). However, this amounts to a 
romanticized and idealistic perception. Civil society might also breed prejudice 
and hatred, and therefore is not regarded in this chapter as being inherently soci-
etally benign, despite the fact that Middle Eastern citizens often trust civil 
society more then they trust government structures. Rothstein (2001, 2000) 
emphasizes the importance of the socialization process: our perceptions and 
norms in relation to our societal institutions begin to be formed when we are 
small children. From our parents’ stories and the social environment, perceptions 
and collective memories of whom to trust are internalized. Hence, in the Middle 
East one might expect citizens within historically authoritarian structures to 
develop their trust and values from such informal processes. This does not, 
however, imply that civil society is always a counterforce to governmental 
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 structures (Cohen and Arato 1997; Ibrahim 1995: 28–29; Moussali 1995: 81; 
Norton 1995: 1–11). In essence, the actions of a particular sector of civil society 
can only be judged through empirical investigation.
Previous research
Can one study a phenomenon that does not exist? The question is justified since 
Middle East regionalism is an embryonic process. From a comparative perspective 
the Middle East is one of the least regionalized regions in the world (see Schulz et 
al. 2001; Harders and Legrenzi 2008). One might even expect regional governance 
and civil society in the Middle East to be close to non- existent. In contrast, this 
chapter argues that civil society is increasingly, though slowly and gradually 
playing an influential role as an agenda setter in regional governance. Previous 
studies have not focused on this aspect, although civil society and its role within 
the Middle East state system have been discussed. For the most part, civil society 
has been discussed in relation to democratization within the states in the region. 
This is an important debate, since civil society’s space for manoeuvre and capacity 
are restricted to a large extent by the state. This is not to say that civil society 
cannot exist within an authoritarian structure; however, its capacity to influence 
and engender change is thereby compromised (Sariologhalam 1997).
 Democratization in the Middle East has been on the agenda since the 1990s 
and civil society has often been seen as its forerunner. What role does civil 
society play in Middle East democratization? The Middle East is usually seen as 
a region where democratization has not occurred (Salamé 1994). In general, it is 
often stated that the Middle East is something of a ‘lost cause’ (Deegan 1993: 
8–9). Arguments in previous research usually relate to the specific characteristics 
of the region, where states are: ‘weak institutionally; divided ethnically; tethered 
to authoritarian structures of government; lacking in unity, political legitimacy 
and tolerance of opposition; exploited by the external factor of the Cold War and 
recently, in thrall to fundamentalist religion’ (Deegan 1993: 8–9).
 All in all, these factors are regarded as serious obstacles to any form of demo-
cratization, now or in the future. However, it has been shown that at the national 
level civil society has played an immensely important role in terms of democrat-
ization from below. For instance, in the Palestinian case, it is claimed that a 
strong and viable civil society has been one of the few institutions that has func-
tioned during the Israeli occupation, and continued to play a scrutinizing role 
vis- à-vis the Arafat- led Palestinian Authority established in 1993/94 (see Schulz 
2003). In Egypt, Algeria and Morocco, for instance, civil society pushes the state 
to address human rights. From above, gradual changes have followed in states 
such as Jordan and Egypt, in which semi- open elections have taken place after 
pressure from, among others, civil society organizations. Thus, state elites often 
open up to democratic practice in reaction to the requests of civil society actors.
 Increased awareness of this small but growing civil society in the Middle East 
also contributes to regional networking, fostering new cooperation, and also cre-
ating a more vivid debate around the issue of democracy. Globalization itself 
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further increases awareness and stimulates the growth of networks with actors 
external to the Middle East. This in itself further strengthens the chances for 
establishing and consolidating a vivid and democratic regional debate across the 
states. Hence, we need to understand more about the strength of civil society in 
the region.
 Although definitely a late- comer, the Middle East has entered the debate on 
global democratization, although many have argued (from different positions) that 
the area is an exception to this trend (for example, Salamé 1994), in the sense that 
traditional kingdoms or security- dominated regimes still cling to power and the 
strongest force of opposition (namely Islamism) does not have democracy on its 
agenda. In one of the most oft- quoted works (Diamond et al. 1989) on the ‘third 
wave of democratization’ (Huntington 1991), it is argued that the Arab states ‘gen-
erally lack previous democratic experience and most appear to have little prospect 
of transition even to semi- democracy’ (Diamond et al. 1989). According to Van-
hanen’s index on democracy for states recoded into a regional democracy index, 
the Middle East scored 2.70 in 1980 and 3.69 in 1988 (Vanhanen 1990: 27). 
According to Vanhanen, a state is considered democratic when it reaches 5.00 or 
above on the index. In comparison to South America, which scored 5.56 in 1980 
and 14.67 in 1988, there is a vast discrepancy in both the speed and level of demo-
cratization. Although his database has not been applied to the current time period, 
other data, such as the Freedom House index, confirm that his data are still rele-
vant. Middle East alleged ‘exceptionalism’ is ‘explained’ by a variety of variables, 
depending on the author. Orientalists still point to the broad and oversimplified 
category of ‘culture’ and Islam (for example, Kedourie 1992). Others hold that 
nation- building projects have failed and that loyalties are mainly sub- national and 
horizontal, preventing national democracy from taking root; the state as such is 
imposed by external actors and is thus floating, void of meaningful relations to its 
citizens (Alavi 1979). The existence of ‘rentier economies’ (Luciani 1990; Brynen 
1992) and the weak taxation system are other factors, as is the fluid class structure 
and interdependence between the enlarged intermediate strata in the form of state 
bureaucracy and the regimes (Ayubi 1995). Lastly, conflicts and wars have paved 
the way for militarized states to legitimize themselves through ‘missions’, such as 
the struggle against imperialism, for Arab unity, and for the liberation of Palestine, 
rather than through rule by the people. A historical and structural approach would 
look, rather, at the processes and patterns of state formation since independence as 
well as the role of classes. From the outset then, the Middle East does not seem to 
have many prerequisites for true democratization.
 In spite of these assertions, in recent years Jordan, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, 
Egypt, Yemen, Lebanon and the Palestinian self- ruling areas have entered into 
different experiments with electoral practices, thus paving the way for discus-
sions about the potential for the democratization of Arab political systems. The 
end of the Cold War, the Gulf War and the decline of the Arab–Israeli conflict 
have induced political change. This process is sometimes called ‘formal demo-
cratization’ (Ayubi 1995: 396), ‘facade democracy’ or instrumentalism accom-
panying structural adjustment programmes. In that sense, they provide some 
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evidence for the argument that the trend towards political liberalization is merely 
a response to pressures from global capitalism. Whatever the causes, and 
however cosmetic, there is today obviously a need for Arab regimes to bring the 
concept of democracy into their political discourse. There is then also currently a 
need to look into the sphere of non- state actors in order to investigate prospects 
of further political liberalization. As is argued by many authors (for example, 
Norton 1995; Dryzek 1996), changes towards democratization are often initiated 
by actors in civil society: ‘[P]ressures for greater democracy almost always 
emanate from oppositional civil society, rarely or never from the state itself ’ 
(Dryzek 1996: 476).
 Some analysts would claim that democratization by Islamists and Islamic 
civil society is not possible since Islam is inherently incompatible with demo-
cracy (cf. Sørensen 1993; Huntington 1993; Tibi 1998; Kramer 2001; Spencer 
2005). For example, Spencer claims that in Islamic law, all non- Muslims have 
an inferior position vis- à-vis Muslims. Another argument put forward is that 
Islam constitutes a threat to the basic values of the West, including its demo-
cratic mode of governance. Others (Esposito and Voll 1996; Midlarsky 1998) 
claim that the democratic structures of Islamic organizations come from the 
grassroots level. Furthermore, and in contrast to their regimes, democratic 
popular political culture is strong all over the region (Goddard 2002; Tessler 
2002; Inglehart 2004). Most studies relate to Islamist movements or parties 
outside the government (Norton 1995; Özdalga and Persson 1997); to cases 
outside the Arab world, such as Iran (Ansari 2000) or Turkey (Özdalga 1998; 
Liel 2003); or to the failed attempts in the Arab world (not least Algeria). It is 
rare to see connections in this kind of analysis, which would suggest that the 
political behaviour of Islamist parties/movements could be explained through an 
analysis of political culture (see Tessler 2002) and in relation to regional 
governance.
 Finally, one should not underestimate the impact of external influences on 
both the state structures and the civil society sectors in the Middle East. The US 
takeover of Iraq in 2003, as a result of which democracy has been partly 
imposed, has also had an overall impact in the Middle East, in so far as debates 
occur regarding different strategies and ideas on how to democratize. Not sur-
prisingly, particularly among Islamist groups that are critical of the US demo-
cracy strategy in the Middle East, a vivid debate on democracy is taking place. 
Islamists have their own debate on how Islam and democracy are linked, and 
how best practices can be developed.
Middle Eastern regionalism and transnationalism
Middle Eastern regionalism has been described at best as cooperation, and more 
often as competition rather than integration. Several experiments of a regional 
character have been tried out; however, a genuine regional project has not yet 
been realized. Many projects are sub- regional, such as the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU). The better- known regional 
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organizations that include countries from the Middle East are the Arab League 
(excluding Iran, Israel and Turkey), the Organization of the Islamic Conference 
(including non- Middle East states), the Greater Arab Free Trade Area and the 
Mediterranean Arab Free Trade Agreement (the two latter excluding Iran, Israel 
and Turkey). Also, the oil- producing organizations such as the OPEC (including 
many non- Middle Eastern states such as Nigeria and Venezuela) and the OAPEC 
(excluding non- Arab members of the Middle East) can be seen as partly regional 
projects. In addition, inter- regional arrangements have been discussed and 
developed between the EU (in the framework of its neighbourhood strategy) and 
parts of the Arab world. These regional projects were launched in 1995 under 
the umbrella of the so- called Barcelona process. What is common to all these 
projects is that they are formal and deeply state- driven (and partly market- 
driven) (see Lindholm Schulz and Schulz 1998; 2005).
 In line with Lawson (2008), one has to differentiate between regionalist projects 
along four dimensions: the degree to which regional institutions have the authority 
to formulate and implement policy with regard to important issue areas, independ-
ently of the member states concerned; the rules that govern decision making in 
such regional institutions; the extent to which regional formations have the capac-
ity to provide incentives to induce member states to comply with programmes that 
further the interest of the region as a whole; and the degree to which regional insti-
tutions and agencies provide a foundation for heightened economic interdepend-
ence among member states (Lawson 2008: 22). Middle East regional projects have 
scored low on all four dimensions. No real regional governance capacity exists in 
the contemporary regional formations. For instance, Saudi Arabia can block any 
decisions within the GCC decision- making institutions if they are not in its 
national interest. Further, the oil- producing countries in the Arab world have had 
difficulties in creating incentives for economic interdependence due to their highly 
globalized petrodollar industries. Competition rather than cooperation is the basis 
for their relations. Hence, although embryonic and weak, pressure for change 
comes from below, and inside the states themselves.
Civil society in the Middle East
Civil society in the Middle East is not as strong and vivid as in other parts of the 
world. Further, the strong internal security apparatus, the Mukhabarat, in the 
Arab states, often controls the activities of civil society, thereby severely limit-
ing its capacity to act freely. In Egypt, for instance, all new non- governmental 
organizations (NGOs) have to register and receive the permission of the state to 
operate. Historically, one can identify four major trends in the development of 
civil society in the region. First, the period before the arrival of the European 
colonial powers when civil society mainly consisted of ‘community based self 
help groups, guilds, and religiously oriented charity and educational institutions, 
these last funded by Islamic endowments known as waafs (plural awqaf )’ (Haw-
thorne 2005: 84). The second period when civil society developed came with the 
arrival of the colonial powers. Professional organizations, trade unions, cultural 
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clubs and Islamic organizations came into existence, not least the Muslim Broth-
erhood. Characteristic of these forms of civil society was that they both sup-
ported the idea of pan- Arabism but simultaneously had very particular national 
orientations. In the third phase, civil society came under Arab state control, since 
these regimes feared challenges from a free civil society. After years of repres-
sion civil society saw new ways to develop when the Arab states opened up, 
very much under the impact of globalization, liberalized their societies gradu-
ally, and gave way to a freer civil society (Hawthorne 2005). Civil society in 
Turkey and Iran followed much the same pattern as the Arab states. Israel’s 
pattern is more similar to the Western world; for instance, the Israeli trade union 
Histadrut had a very influential position in national society, although it became 
gradually weaker from the 1980s following set- backs for leftist governments, 
and as a result of the liberalization of the Israeli economy.
 The five sectors of Middle Eastern civil society are Islamist associations and 
organizations, non- governmental service organizations, professional organizations, 
companionship and solidarity NGOs, and pro- democracy associations. The pro- 
democracy sector is the youngest and smallest, while the Islamist associations and 
organizations comprise the biggest and most influential sector (Hawthorne 2005). 
These different sectors are unequally distributed in the region, and have very dif-
ferent options for action within their societies. In Syria, Libya and some of the 
Gulf states, civil society has very restricted space for manoeuvre, or is even 
regarded by the state as illegal. In Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates various forms of Islamic charity organizations have been able to gain a 
semi- accepted status. In Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Tunisia and 
Yemen, civil society has been relatively vivid and part of the societal debate. In 
these states, there has been far less repression and fewer restrictions on civil 
society. In the 1950s and 1960s various professional organizations and trade 
unions had significant influence but the Islamist associations have become the 
most important part of today’s civil society, and have taken over many important 
service sectors. These sectors are financed mainly by the Islamic zakat, or partly 
by donations from foreign governments. Besides Israeli civil society, Arab civil 
society in Lebanon, Morocco and the Palestinian territories has been the freest and 
most influential. In fact, before the Declaration of Principle between the Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel in 1993, civil society institutions in the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip were the only bodies able to provide services to the 
Palestinian people. Still, Palestinian civil society involves hardly more than 10 per 
cent of the population. (Hawthorne 2005; Schulz 2003). These various develop-
ments and different sectors of civil society in the region have contributed to trans-
national cooperation. The issues at stake are to what extent they have contributed 
to form a regional governance capacity, and in what areas.
Civil society in regional governance in the Middle East
Can we talk about civil society when Middle East regional governance can 
hardly be claimed to exist? It is important to underline the fact that the civil 
Civil society in the Middle East  173
society activities and networking that are taking place across the countries in the 
region constitute de facto an informal regionalization project from below. As has 
been explained elsewhere, regionalization can take place in various forms, from 
above and/or from below, and by different state, market and civil society actors 
(see Schulz et al. 2001).
 NGOs that deal with issues that are similar for the entire region have indi-
rectly contributed to ‘regionalizing’ issues that still mainly receive national 
attention. For instance, issues such as severe human rights violations in the 
authoritarian states, HIV/AIDS issues that have been defined as taboos in many 
Arab states, or gender and development issues have all been addressed and 
brought to the regional agenda by civil societies networking. Civil society also 
works to lobby organizations such as the Arab League and the Islamic Confer-
ence. In addition, with the creation of new TV stations such as al- Jazeera, a 
regional news consciousness is being developed by the media in the Arab- 
speaking Middle East.
Civil society as agenda setter of regional issues
Historically, and apart from general pan- Arab ideologies, the Palestine question 
has been the one issue that has helped to unite the Arab world. But it has also 
helped to split the region, since it naturally excluded Israel from the Arab world. 
However, Arab nationalism also came to exclude Iran and Turkey. Although 
pan- Arabism lost its attraction among Arab leaders, particularly after the failed 
Arab union between Egypt and Syria (1958–62) and Iraq–Jordan union (in 
1958), the masses of many Arab states still have a sense of belonging to an Arab 
‘imagined community’ (Anderson 1991). Hence, civil society organization is 
also identified with Arab identity, as well as with the Palestinian issue.
 The Palestinian issue has been on the formal regional agenda since the Arab 
League was founded in 1945. The Arab League was in fact formed as a reaction 
against Western colonialism, as well as against the Zionist movement’s attempt 
to create a Jewish state in Palestine. Support for Palestinian statehood has also 
been addressed in strong terms by various civil society organizations in the 
Middle East. In more recent times we can see how civil society has protested 
against Israeli military actions in the self- rule areas, as well as against Palestin-
ian positions in other parts of the Middle East. For instance, when Hezbollah and 
Israel had their war of summer 2006, a war that severely hit Lebanon, civil 
society was deeply involved in various ways (organizing psychological help for 
those who had suffered traumas, helping those in need of food, shelter and so 
on). However, one could argue that these issues of pan- Arabism and the Pales-
tine question are linked to what used to be labelled ‘old regionalism’, excluding 
non- Arab actors in the regional awareness of the Middle East. During the heyday 
of the Oslo peace process between Israel and the PLO (1991/93–2000), many 
NGOs contributed to redefining the future Middle Eastern map. All of a sudden 
Israel was a potential partner in the region. The multilateral tracks of the 
so- called Madrid conferences that started in 1991 led to participation by the 
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business and investor worlds as well as by NGOs, and a regional awareness took 
form. In these multilateral talks, issues like refugees, environmental problems, 
weapons of mass destruction, water and refugees were on the agenda. The 
Israel–Palestine Peace NGO Forum and Alliance for Middle East Peace, for 
example, are umbrella organizations that are setting new agendas outside Israel 
and the Palestinian areas in the search for potential new peace ideas and 
alternatives.
 In the last decade, however, new issues such as climate change, water and 
HIV/AIDS have been identified as problems transcending the boundaries of the 
traditional nation- state. Civil society in the Middle East has not only taken part 
in agenda setting but has even been its key driving force. For instance, the Arab 
Climate Network formed in 2005, and the Arab Climate Alliance formed in 
2008, are attempts by the NGO sector to unite and bring climate issues onto 
regional agendas such as the Arab League’s. The League immediately sub-
scribed to the Kyoto agreement and called on Arab states to take part in that 
agreement. Hence, civil society contributes to setting the agenda, and influences 
leaders in the region to take the view that regional issues need common regional 
agreements and policies. The organization Arab Integrated Water Resources 
Management Network (AWARENET) comprises research institutes, NGOs and 
government experts within a regional frame. It helps the public by providing 
them with water resources. It exists in 18 different Arab countries. States such as 
Iraq, Syria and Turkey have always seen water as a national security issue, but, 
AWARENET focuses on water as a regional concern, and emphasizes the need 
to look at the problem from grassroots perspectives and create a participatory 
bottom- up process. It also works closely with different United Nations (UN) 
organs.
 Further, HIV/AIDS has always been a taboo issue in the Middle East. Gov-
ernments have had an attitude of avoidance, often downplaying the problem by 
underestimating the real figures, even though these are lower than in other 
regions. Iran, Israel and Turkey have a relatively well- developed system of reg-
istering HIV/AIDS cases, but any such system is still underdeveloped in the 
Arab world. NGOs like the Red Crescent and prison organizations work with 
UN branches to develop increased awareness, as well as to push regional organi-
zations to develop a common plan. The Arab League has been forced to act on 
the issue. Hence, despite the fact that HIV/AIDS is still downplayed in the Arab 
world, civil society has contributed to debates to launch a new health system, 
and fundamentally to increase awareness of the illness itself, and thereby break 
taboos.
Civil society as regional social security provider
Civil society organizations have for a long time taken care of social issues, such 
as education, health care and sports activities, for the weakest sectors of society. 
However, the tremendous development problems due to poverty and educational 
needs in societies undergoing rapid demographic change create huge challenges. 
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These have come increasingly to be regarded as common to many Middle 
Eastern societies. Civil society has become a social security provider for many 
societies in the region. The state and public institutions are generally less trusted 
and less able to deliver the social welfare that is needed. Hence, civil society and 
NGOs constitute the real support system, apart from traditional clan and family 
systems that provide social security for individuals.
 More recently regional networks and NGOs have been formed with the aim 
of tackling development issues. For instance, the Arab NGOs Network for 
Development (ANND) that was formed in 1996 has a mission to strengthen the 
role of civil society. It works in 12 different countries, and aims to enable the 
NGO sector to work more freely and with less government control, and to 
provide the social welfare that the state cannot handle. It operates through net-
working, campaigning, research, lobbying, media and communication, capacity 
building and active participation in global, regional and national meetings and 
conferences. ANND works with three overarching themes linked to develop-
ment, democracy and trade. Hence, coordination among NGOs across the Arab 
states increases pressure from below on the states’ leaders as well as regional 
organizations. Typical of these regional umbrella networks is that they work 
closely with international non- governmental organizations (INGOs), as well as 
with global institutions and donors (the UN, the World Health Organization, the 
World Bank, and so on). Thus, they are also influenced to a significant extent by 
issues that are important in the West, not least concerning democracy and human 
rights. In the context of the ‘war on terror’ after 11 September 2001, many civil 
society organizations in the Middle East began to form advocacy organizations 
for democracy. Several regional NGOs such as the Arab Centre for the Inde-
pendence of the Judiciary and the Legal Profession, the Arab Commission for 
Human Rights and the Arab Organization for Human Rights are examples of 
regional NGOs working on human rights for individuals and freedoms in the 
Arab states. Some have a more focused target, such as the Centre for Media 
Freedom which mainly works on press and media freedom, or Habitat Interna-
tional Coalition – Housing and Land Rights Network which works with land and 
justice issues in the Palestinian context but also with minorities and tribes in dif-
ferent Arab states. NGOs, such as the Gay and Lesbian Arab Society, also work 
on sexual minority issues that are taboo in most of the Middle East. Most NGOs 
have a national focus, but constantly search for similar organizations in the 
region in order to strengthen their advocacy capacity, and to raise key issues in 
regional and international arenas.
 This category of regional NGO networks is characterized as being highly glo-
balized, and often secular, or with a non- religious approach. They usually have 
close connections and relations with INGOs, in the sense that they collaborate, 
and apply jointly for funds from mainly Western and Japanese donors. They are 
often accused of being donor- driven, following a too Western approach, with 
little relevance to the regional needs of the Middle East. Although justifiable 
criticisms have been made (see Ritchmond 2005; Duffield 2001), it is also the 
case that some of the critiques have come from authoritarian regimes, or from 
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Islamist associations that perceive many of these NGOs as being corrupted by 
Western ideas and money, imposing non- religious, non- Islamic, thoughts on the 
public. At the same time, analysts have often seen them as the drivers of demo-
cracy in the Middle East (Norton 1995). As mentioned above, it is also the case 
that many of these national and regional NGOs have been important advocates 
for promoting democracy. However, there are still relatively few of these types 
of NGOs and they often have little strength. Paradoxically, the most critical 
sectors of Middle Eastern societies against secular NGOs come from within 
Islamic civil society.
 Islamic civil society movements and organizations are keen to work with 
Islamic religious representatives on social and developmental issues. Analysts 
have made the mistake of underestimating their role in the democratization of Arab 
states. Kramer (2001) would even go as far as to say that analysts have put forward 
too romantic a view of civil societies’ capacity, and that describing Islamist associ-
ations as democratic underestimates the violent and terrorist activities of some of 
these groups. However, the Islamist associations have very different approaches to 
the social issues they deal with, not least democracy. For example, all decisions 
take in the Iranian Islamic Republic (by the President, parliament and so on) have 
first to be approved by the Shiia clerics. This is in fundamental contrast to how 
Hamas perceives that democracy should be run. Hamas underlines the fact that 
concentration of power is not their preference; on the contrary, a division of 
powers is necessary for a healthy and democratic society. The executive, juridical 
and legislative powers are tools for implementing the rule of law, democracy and 
reforms that can serve the people. Hamas strongly dismisses the Iranian system of 
Sharia rule (Gunning 2008; Schulz 2009).
 Despite these differences, Islamic civil society contributes to resistance 
against the authoritarian and often secular regimes in the Middle East (Crooke 
2009). Hence, links between them contribute to raising development issues, the 
lack of democracy, abuses of human rights, and religious issues at the regional 
level. Further, in contrast to many secular NGOs, these Islamic organizations 
and movements have strong popular support. The legitimacy they derive from 
the public therefore constitutes strong opposition to the repressive states in the 
Middle East. The form of social infrastructure and networking established by 
Islamist organizations might themselves serve as a catalyst for increased partici-
patory politics. Islamic institution- building and networking in the form of 
schools, mosques, health clinics, kindergartens and so on represent a form of 
mobilization from below, although there are also instrumentalist political reasons 
behind this. Hence, Islamist NGOs and movements can contribute to placing 
regional issues on the agenda and also to creating a new regional dynamic to 
challenge traditional state structures. These movements may be Hezbollah in 
Lebanon, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Jordan, Islamist groups in Iraq, 
or Hamas in the Palestinian areas, and many more. Although very different in 
their settings, they all represent regional resistance and challenge the deficits in 
democracy and the development problems in the existing state structures. The 
challenge for Middle East states, as well as the West, is to create a dialogue and 
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ensure that they stay on the road to pragmatism and reform instead of violent 
resistance and terror.
Conclusion
Civil society in the Middle East is weak in comparison with many other parts of 
the world. At the same time, despite its relative size, analysts have high hopes 
that it can be a driving force in various areas, such as democratization, develop-
ment and, not least, regionalization, bringing positive change to the otherwise 
Westphalian Middle East system. This chapter has shown that civil society has 
been active in several key areas related to social welfare, development, peace 
and security, democracy and human rights, as well as resources and climate 
change. Many studies have shown that it has been an initiator, agenda setter and 
advocate for these issues, and hence has put pressure on those weak states that 
have failed to meet the needs of their populations. This chapter has attempted to 
show some of the important activities that are taking place across the state 
system of the Middle East. Regional integration in the Middle East is at best 
embryonic in comparison with other parts of the world. There is no determinism 
in claiming that Middle East civil society, with all its various different sectors, is 
de facto transcending the state system and becoming regionalized. However, it is 
clear that its contribution must be further analysed, since it contributes de facto 
to challenging the many authoritarian states in the region. Thus, it contributes to 
a transnational identification process, and thereby creates an awareness of issues 
such as democracy, development and human rights in the region. In turn, this 
fosters new networks and cooperation at the regional level. Hence, civil society 
organizations frame issues as regional governance needs, but also build coopera-
tion across state borders, strengthen civil society and advance the issues they 
advocate vis- à-vis the many authoritarian regimes in the region. Pressure for 
change, such as democratization, cannot be completely ignored within one state, 
since the increasing number of transnational civil society organizations and their 
networks can continue to advocate and lobby for change.
 This chapter concludes that civil society is an initiator, agenda setter and 
advocate of regional governance, and is lobbying from below. Regionalization in 
the Middle East is embryonic and a social project still coming into being. It is an 
empirical question for the future to decide whether civil society, besides initiat-
ing a regional debate, can also constitute the first building blocks for continued 
regionalization. In such a process, current embryonic tendencies will be strength-
ened and have a direct impact on democratization in the region, but will also 
influence other areas such as development, education and health. In addition, is 
the civil society networking that is criss- crossing the entire region a social 
power, questioning rigid state realism from below, and thereby implicitly creat-
ing a common imagined regional identification? The answer lies in the future 
and partly in the strength Middle East regional organizations develop. One 
crucial future research task therefore is to assess the strength of civil society if it 
continues to push for regional governance capacities in the Middle East.
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10 Transnational labour 
mobilization in the Americas
Marcelo Saguier
Introduction1
Processes of globalization and regionalization are transforming the dynamics of 
mobilization and rights- demanding practices of the labour movement. The trans-
national organization of production and capital mobility pose great challenges to 
the international labour movement. The rising pressure of competition between 
national and regional economies is driving labour conditions and wages down, 
introducing regulatory competition between weakening national labour regimes 
and threatening the bargaining power of the labour movement (Eder 2002; van 
Liemt 1999: 113). While competition with cheap labour has been a key concern 
of workers in the industrialized North, it has also become a crucial feature of 
South–South relations since the rise of China and India as emerging economies 
in receipt of foreign direct investment (FDI) (Ross and Chan 2002). Other 
changes in the labour market include increased informality, flexibility, outsourc-
ing, the deterioration of the quality of work, and legal and illegal migration. All 
this undermines the capacity of trade unions to represent the rights of workers.
 Trade policy in particular becomes a key site of engagement for the labour 
movement in the context of a globalizing/regionalizing political economy. The 
opportunities for trade unions to participate in trade processes are significantly 
affected by the ‘forum shift’ tactics used by powerful states and corporations. 
Forum shifting means moving between decision arenas in order to secure the 
desired outcomes in the places where this is expected to be more likely. When 
multilateral (World Trade Organization, WTO) and regional (Free Trade Area of 
the Americas, FTAA) trade negotiations break down, the liberalization agenda is 
often pursued bilaterally – as in the Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) promoted by 
the US government and the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) spon-
sored by the EU. This compromises the trade unions’ efforts to influence the 
processes of trade policy making.
 Forum shifting demands that trade unions mobilize across various institu-
tional and geographical sites. Forum shifting in trade negotiations renders obso-
lete those labour tactics centred exclusively on the nation- state (Appelbaum 
2005: 371; Harrod and O’Brien 2002; Mazur 2000). It then becomes crucial to 
combine national and transnational scales of action (Herod 2002: 83; Stevis 
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2002: 130). In the twenty- first century trade unionism ‘has to be local, national 
and international at one and the same time’ (Hyman 2004: 27). Some unions are 
beginning to adopt new dynamics of mobilization by creating flexible multisec-
toral networks and transborder alliances to take part in global campaigns and 
lobbying practices in international governance institutions (Harrod and O’Brien 
2002; O’Brien et al. 2000; Waterman 2001). More than ever, the renewal of a 
critical labour movement is tied to its ability to mobilize at multiple decision- 
making levels, articulating transnational strategies directed at the institutional, 
material and ideational power structures of neoliberal globalization.
 This chapter examines the dynamics of mobilization and rights- demanding 
practices of the labour movement in the Western Hemisphere, as evidenced in its 
coordinated response to the FTAA process. In many ways the labour responses 
to this trade project reveal the opportunities and challenges faced by the interna-
tional labour movement in its efforts to reinvent itself in a context of trans-
national production and increased corporate power.
 The project to create an FTAA was originally announced in 1994 by 34 states 
in the Western Hemisphere. Negotiations began in 1998, but they were never 
completed, due to a lack of governmental consensus over the agenda, as well as 
the hard opposition mobilized continentally by many social movements, which 
denounced the undemocratic and socially regressive implications of this trade 
project. The FTAA proposed to introduce a form of ‘new constitutionalism’ (Gill 
2002), a system of regional economic governance to lock in liberalization 
reforms undertaken during the 1990s, and to extend property rights in areas pre-
viously excluded from liberalization and rule- bound commitments (services, 
investment rules, intellectual property rights, government procurements and 
competition policy). This trade agenda has serious implications for sustainable 
development and democracy (Anderson and Arruda 2002; Barenberg and Evans 
2004; Estay and Sánchez 2005; Hillebrand 2003; Icaza et al. 2010; Sangmeister 
and Taalouch 2003). It prompted a response from many labour organizations 
throughout the region, which first sought to include a labour agenda in the trade 
agreement, and later decided to try to halt it altogether once it became evident 
that the FTAA was incompatible with sustainable development. In 2005 the 
FTAA process reached a final standstill after years of stagnated negotiations.
 It is argued that the dynamics of labour mobilization around the FTAA 
process manifests new trajectories in the renewal of the hemispheric labour 
movement. While some of these dynamics can be attributed to labour strategies 
that predate the FTAA process, others are the result of specific struggles to 
prevent the deepening of a neoliberal approach to integration captured in the 
FTAA project. In this regard, labour’s engagement with the FTAA process can 
be understood as a path- dependent process contributing to the exploration of 
new opportunities for mobilization. This chapter identifies four distinct labour 
practices that demonstrate a transformation in the movement’s dynamics of 
mobilization.
 The first section concentrates on the practices of engagement of a group of 
leading trade union organizations in the formal FTAA negotiations. It discusses 
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the extent to which trade unions were able to open the negotiations to include a 
social perspective in the agenda- setting process of the FTAA. The second section 
deals with the initiatives taken to unite politically and organizationally the 
various factions of trade union organizations into a single hemispheric move-
ment. Some of the North–South tensions of alliance building across national and 
regional scales are addressed. Moreover, the third section covers the practices of 
coalition building between labour organizations and social movements. It 
explores the extent to which such multi- sectoral coalitions redefine the basis of 
‘representation’ of the labour movement, by incorporating a broader range of 
social demands that were not traditionally covered by a labour movement 
centred on urban/industrial employment issues. Finally, the fourth section deals 
with the participation of the labour movement in the creation of informal polit-
ical spaces at the grassroots levels to mobilize popular support against the exclu-
sionary impacts of the FTAA.
Engagement in trade negotiation processes
The FTAA process has been criticized for its ‘democratic deficit’ by many social 
movements in the region that pursued different initiatives to democratize this 
and other trade processes implemented since the 1990s (Icaza Garza et al. 2009). 
The labour movement in particular played a leading role in the efforts to open up 
the decision- making structures of the FTAA negotiations and to influence the 
definition of the trade agreement’s agenda.
 To increase their influence in the negotiations, trade unions affiliated to the 
Inter- American Regional Labour Organization (ORIT) – the Western Hemi-
spheric branch of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) 
– pressed for the formal incorporation of a Labour Forum as a consultative body 
into the FTAA negotiation governance structure (ORIT/ICFTU 1997). The 
Labour Forum process started in 1995 when ORIT began to organize parallel 
conferences to FTAA ministerial meetings and other summits.2 The lack of offi-
cial recognition of the Labour Forum contrasted with the formal recognition of a 
Business Forum. This forum was set up by the largest companies in the region to 
identify its demands and issue recommendations to trade ministers in the defini-
tion of the agreement’s agenda. ORIT’s attempt to obtain official status for the 
Labour Forum was nonetheless never successful.
 Simultaneous with the efforts to open up the decision- making structures of 
the FTAA negotiations, trade union organizations in the region also sought to 
democratize the trade process by participating in a series of official consultations 
set up as part of the formal negotiation structure of the FTAA. In particular, 
some unions participated in a series of consultations launched by the FTAA 
Committee of Government Representatives on the Participation of Civil Society 
(CGR) in 1998 and 2000.
 The CGR nonetheless proved to be an inadequate vehicle for the inclusion of 
labour demands in the official negotiation process. Its function was merely to 
‘transmit’ the views of civil society organizations to the FTAA trade ministers, 
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rather than to create an adequate space for political deliberation about the agenda 
of the eventual trade agreement. The limited scope of the CGR reflected the reti-
cence of some Latin American governments with regard to establishing any kind 
of supranational initiative that could eventually complicate the executive 
branches’ control of the negotiation process (Botto and Tussie 2003: 43). Policy 
recommendations were submitted by trade unions and other social organizations 
via the Internet, to be incorporated as terms of reference in the negotiations. This 
input was not followed by any kind of feedback from government officials that 
could be sent to the trade unions and other organizations that formulated recom-
mendations. This prevented a two- way political dialogue from taking place 
between trade ministers and trade unionists (ART 2003: 2).
 Trade ministers also retained the discretionary power to filter out any submis-
sions from civil society organizations that they considered ‘inappropriate’. Any-
thing that could politicize, and hence potentially obstruct or delay, the goal of 
market liberalization would count as an inappropriate submission. Governments 
specified that the CGR would accept only ‘trade- related matters’ presented in a 
‘constructive’ manner. Issues such as human rights, gender, poverty and others, 
which are commonly treated by some officials as ‘non- trade issues’, were not 
brought into the trade discussions (Shamsie 2003: 16).
 This led trade union organizations and other social organizations to reject this 
mechanism of participation as useless for influencing the negotiation process. It 
was claimed that the real function of the CGR was ‘to keep up the appearance of 
dialogue’ (ART 2003). Moreover, it became increasingly clear to the trade 
unions that the proposed form of participation for civil society was intended to 
furnish an exclusionary FTAA process with a veneer of democratic legitimacy.
 In 2001 trade union organizations in the Americas stopped participating in 
official initiatives for the inclusion of civil society organizations. Instead, the 
unions affiliated to ORIT joined forces with other social organizations from the 
continent in an attempt to derail the FTAA process, as there now appeared to be 
no chance to ‘reform’ it in order to accommodate a developmental agenda. The 
outcomes of past labour mobilizations leading to the establishment of NAFTA’s 
North American Agreement on Labour Cooperation (NAALC) and MERCO-
SUR’s Socio- Labour Declaration demonstrated that the labour movement could 
not settle for institutional arrangements that effectively meant the cooptation of 
labour demands by installing weak institutional arrangements deprived of any 
enforcement power.
Unification of the labour movement in the Americas
A second practice adopted by the labour movement in the Americas in response 
to the FTAA process has been the closing of ranks between trade union organi-
zations in the region. Important steps were taken in this respect with the creation 
of the Labour’s Platform for the Americas (LPA) and with the Trade Union Con-
federation of the Americas (TUCA). Although the regional unification of the 
labour movement had begun to take place prior to the launch of the FTAA 
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process, labour opposition to this trade integration project contributed signifi-
cantly to the acceleration of labour convergence.
 The main drive behind the unification process was undertaken in the framework 
of ORIT with the leadership of the Brazilian United Workers’ Federation (CUT), 
the AFL- CIO from the US and the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC). A number of 
independent unions like the PIT- CNT from Uruguay, the Central of Argentine 
Workers (CTA), the CTC from Cuba and the CGT of Peru and Chile were also 
instrumental in mobilizing efforts towards union convergence around the FTAA 
project. The Labour Fora that were set up from 1995 as a venue to debate labour 
concerns regarding the FTAA project provided a space to develop a common posi-
tion that could represent all of the participating trade unions in a united front. 
Efforts to unite trade unions under a common position rested on earlier initiatives of 
transnational labour solidarity, which provided a background of shared experiences 
and working links between unions. One important case was the solidarity between 
trade unions in the US, Canada, Mexico and some Central American and Caribbean 
countries as part of the anti- sweatshop movement that emerged in the 1980s 
(Armbruster- Sandoval 2005; Coronado and Staudt 2002; Quinteros 2000). Labour 
alliances prompted by the NAFTA process (Carr 1999; Compa 2001), MERCO-
SUR in the Southern Cone Union Coordination (CCSC), the Andean Labour Con-
sultative Council (CCLA) of the Andean Community of Nations, the Central 
American and Caribbean Union Coordination (CCSCAC) and the Caribbean Con-
gress on Labour (CCL) (ORIT/CIOSL 2006) were also part of this background.
 Efforts to build a united labour strategy in the Americas had to overcome the 
North–South tensions that often characterize the international labour movement 
(Anner 2006). The current economic governance system gives capital the 
advantage of moving freely across borders, creating a system in which labour 
movements become subsumed in a logic of inter- state and/or inter- regional com-
petition to attract investments. This situation undermines the potential for greater 
international labour solidarity. Furthermore, it exacerbates nationalism, xeno-
phobia and cultural chauvinism. The breakdown of class compromise that fol-
lowed the post- World War II era led to more rights for workers and better living 
conditions in Northern industrial countries. This resulted in Northern unions 
becoming increasingly defensive and centred on issues of wage and job security 
(Anner 2006). Workers on the other side of the globe, predominantly in South-
ern, less industrialized countries, have not achieved the same development and 
their unions focus instead on bread and butter issues while also seeking broader 
alliances with other social actors (Eder 2002: 167).
 North–South divisions surfaced in debates about the inclusion of a ‘social 
clause’ in the WTO in relation to the creation of a system to enforce interna-
tional labour standards. Regardless of the relative merits of this instrument, this 
labour agenda has been criticized as representing the priorities and demands of 
Northern unions exclusively (Anner 2006; Harrod and O’Brien 2002; Jakobsen 
2001; Waterman 2001; van Roozendaal 2002).
 Some of the tensions that characterize the international labour movement 
were also present in the unification process of the labour movement in the 
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 Americas. They are mainly reflected in the different approaches between unions 
in the North and the South to defining the challenges and responses of workers 
to the FTAA project. Northern unions sought to improve working conditions 
throughout the continent by prioritizing the inclusion of a ‘social clause’ at the 
core of the FTAA agreement. This would have affected the trade rights that sig-
natory countries are given, by linking an FTAA with respect for a set of basic 
internationally recognized workers’ rights in line with the 1998 ILO Declaration 
on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.
 Latin American unions had a different understanding of the challenges posed 
by the FTAA project to workers. On the one hand, they tend to be sceptical 
about the potential (mis)use of ‘social clauses’ for protectionist reasons; namely, 
to defend job security in light of competition from Southern economies with 
cheaper labour costs. Such reluctance to include ‘social clauses’ in trade agree-
ments is also shared by most governments in Latin America, which fear that they 
might be manipulated to restrict exports. As Elliott claims, ‘the experience with 
American antidumping and countervailing duty policies certainly gives develop-
ing countries ample reason to be suspicious of potential new avenues for “con-
tingent protection” ’ (2004: 648).
 On the other hand, Latin American unions believe that an FTAA ‘social 
clause’ to safeguard basic labour rights was too narrow an approach to be able to 
address the deep developmental implications raised by the FTAA. Labour and 
social rights cannot be realized if the FTAA project has a negative impact on the 
availability and quality of employment (FLA 2005; ORIT/CIOSL 2006: 11). 
Social clauses in trade agreements cannot be separated from the broader strug-
gles to modernize economic systems and the active participation of the state as a 
promoter of development (Godio 2003: 38). As Jakobsen from the Brazilian 
CUT puts it:
When it comes to the effects of globalization in the form of ‘free trade’, the 
restructuring of production, or the liberalization of investments, it is not suf-
ficient to demand that the basic rights of workers are safeguarded. What is 
the good of guaranteeing the right to freely organize and bargain collec-
tively, for example, after the jobs have been destroyed? For the workers of 
the South, it is fundamentally important that the international trade union 
agenda also includes unambiguous opposition to the neoliberal experiment 
and the discussion of alternatives that allow sustainable development with 
the generation of employment and income and the preservation of basic 
human and trade union rights.
(2001: 370)
This debate added to the increasing unity of the labour movement. Underlying 
existing political differences, the labour movement shared a commitment to pre-
venting the FTAA from institutionalizing a trade governance model that made 
low wages and poor working conditions the main competitive advantages for 
attracting investment. In this respect, even if the ‘social clause’ was not a 
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panacea for solving the problems of employment, wages and working conditions, 
it served as a meeting point around which diverse labour unions from the conti-
nent could begin to articulate a more elaborate labour perspective on a regional 
integration alternative to the FTAA model.
 A historical breakthrough in hemispheric labour unity was reached in 2005 
with the creation of ‘Labour’s Platform for the Americas’ (CSA 2005). The LPA 
contains a proposal for alternative development for the Americas based on 
‘Decent Work for Sustainable Development’. It is the result of a ‘democratic 
process of reflection, debate and consultation bringing together regional labour 
perspectives, researchers and representatives of other social sectors’ (CSA 2005: 
1). The LPA was publicly launched in the context of the Summit of the Ameri-
cas of Mar del Plata in which employment was the central theme. At this meeting 
a coalition of governments led by the US tried to rescue the FTAA process from 
the terminal stagnation into which it had languished since 2003.
 ORIT played the leading role in mobilizing unions into agreeing a common 
programmatic document like the LPA. Additionally, the document was sup-
ported by independent trade unions that were not affiliated to ORIT, as well as 
by the other main international labour organization in the region: the Latin 
American Confederation of Workers (CLAT) – the regional branch of the World 
Confederation of Labour (WCL). One of the greatest merits of the LPA is that 
its process of discussions incorporated unions with different ideological tradi-
tions. This factor contributed to the unity of the labour movement (Godio 2007: 
103). The LPA represents an unprecedented accomplishment in efforts to reach 
political convergence between the main trade union organizations in the Ameri-
cas. However, the LPA still remains an instrument of labour unity that is shared 
almost exclusively at the level of top representatives of trade unions.
 Finally, important organizational changes were led by ORIT in its efforts to 
create a single international organization at the hemispheric level. Steps taken 
towards the unification of labour unions in the Americas are inscribed in a 
broader process of the international labour movement oriented to overcoming 
the divisions inherited from the Cold War years (Chaloult and Fernández 2001; 
Dagenais 2005: 3; Mazur 2000; Munck 2002; Waterman 2001). Such efforts to 
unite the international labour movement resulted in the establishment of the 
International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) in November 2006 with the 
merging of some national trade unions and mainly the ICFTU/GU (Global 
Union) and WCL as the two major international trade union centres.
 The political convergence mobilized by the LPA process, and the debate 
about the future of the labour movement of the Americas, were triggered by the 
creation of ITUC in a favourable context of left- of-centre governments coming 
to power in many Latin American countries (Wachendorfer 2007). This led to 
the creation of the Trade Union Confederation of the Americas (TUCA) in 
March 2008. As the regional branch of the ITUC, TUCA became the single 
labour organization in the Western Hemisphere representing 65 national organi-
zations in 29 countries, affiliating more than 50 million workers. Its creation was 
made possible by the convergence of ORIT, CLAT and a series of independent 
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unions that historically have refrained from any affiliation to international organ-
izations (ORIT/ICFTU 1997).
 Opposition to the corporate agenda contained in the FTAA project opened a 
political opportunity to accelerate ongoing unification processes, facilitating 
political and organizational convergence. The need to influence the FTAA 
process with a labour perspective and later the rejection of the FTAA altogether 
demanded cohesion and concerted action between the unions. Most importantly, 
opposition to the FTAA created conditions for the renewal of the labour move-
ment with the struggle for ‘sustainable development’, a view which goes beyond 
the traditional demands of the labour union centred on wage and work con-
ditions. The fact that it incorporated demands from other social movements and 
labour perspectives also creates a new context for the renewal of the labour 
movement. The connection of the trade unions to various social movements is 
addressed in the next section.
Coalition building with other social organizations and 
movements
The labour movement of the Americas has also engaged in a strategy of coalition 
building with a wide range of allied social organizations and movements in the hem-
isphere. In the short term, the value of this strategy rested on its potential to increase 
labour leverage vis- à-vis the trade negotiation processes by mobilizing a broad front 
with social movements to oppose the advancement of neoliberal trade integration 
initiatives in the region. However, in the long run the forging of enduring coalitions 
with different social forces allows the labour movement in the Americas (or at least 
parts of it) to begin renewing itself by expanding its superseded bases of representa-
tion of workers in light of ongoing transformations in the labour market.
 Neoliberal globalization and regionalization have radically transformed the 
structure of the labour market in the Americas. The rise of informal work under-
mines the basis of representation of trade unions, since informal workers cannot 
enjoy basic rights such as freedom of association and collective bargaining. 
Informality also considerably weakens the power of unions to mobilize and 
organize workers at the grassroots levels, as well as contributing to fragmenta-
tion. There is also the challenge of organizing and representing workers in a 
growing tertiary service sector where they have fewer rights and little experience 
of unionization. All these factors pose the challenge of redefining the ways in 
which the labour movement represents workers (ORIT/CIOSL 2006: 9–10).
 Post- Fordism has ended the traditional image of the working class as being 
made up of white, male blue- collar workers, but it has shifted social relations of 
production (Eder 2002: 167). Unions are slowly moving away from such a 
simple representation of existing members, altering their traditional image of the 
representation of workers, and displaying more readiness to include new forms 
of work (Harrod and O’Brien 2002; Waterman 2001). In so doing, they have 
begun to address wider social issues, such as development, gender and human 
rights (Muro and Themudo 2003: 57).
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 As Muro and Themudo (2003: 57) claim, ‘fighting for social justice objec-
tives [trade unions] are forging new relations with “the poor” and those who 
defend their interests’. There is renewed energy to protest against current forms 
of globalization and it is widely acknowledged that trade union internationalism 
is central to that struggle. What else is central, however, is the seeking of alli-
ances with civil society actors (Harrod and O’Brien 2002; Waterman and Willis 
2001; Mazur 2000). The formation of coalitions with civil society is heralded by 
all authors as crucial for labour taking up new challenges and for reaching a 
wider audience (Waterman 2001; Lambert 2002). This has been reflected in the 
establishment of coalitions between trade unions and the so- called ‘anti and/or 
alter- globalization’ movements (ICFTU 2004).
 The labour response to the advance of neoliberal trade projects in the Ameri-
cas provided a political opportunity to forge such ties with other social forces. 
Some of these developments were discussed in the previous section. Yet the 
political representation of work does not take place exclusively at the level of 
inter- labour dialogue. As this section discusses, it is also manifested in the 
efforts of unions to establish close links with various other social organizations 
that represent a wide array of demands. Such demands include the need to recog-
nize the gender perspective on work relations; and an environmental approach to 
production which transcends the logic of a development rooted in assumptions 
of industrialization and rationalism resulting from the particularly Western 
experience of modernity.
 As with the other aspects of labour mobilization, the politics of coalition 
building with other social actors has also been largely facilitated by widespread 
social opposition to the trade integration initiatives being pursued during the 
1990s. The NAFTA process led to unprecedented forms of transnational collabo-
ration between trade unions of the US, Mexico and Canada, and gave rise to the 
Mexican Action Network on Free Trade (RMALC) in 1991. This coalition of 
trade unions, peasant and indigenous organizations, environmental groups, 
NGOs and researchers was united by a mission to analyse, contest and influence 
economic policy in general, and particularly trade policy in Mexico. The Alli-
ance for Responsible Trade (ART) emerged in the US and Common Frontiers 
and the Réseau Québécois sur l’Intégration Continentale (RQIC) were set up in 
Canada.
 Resistance to the FTAA process led to the hemispheric extension of such 
labour coalitions with other social forces under the umbrella of the Hemispheric 
Social Alliance (HSA). The main regional NGO networks working in the Ameri-
cas on environment, human rights, gender, rural and indigenous issues were 
invited to participate in the Labour Forum hosted by the Brazilian CUT at Belo 
Horizonte in 1997. This meeting marked the beginning of a process of alignment 
of labour movements with a vast number of social organizations on the continent. 
This becomes explicit in the final declaration of this meeting where it gives its 
goal as working towards ‘effective complementarity between the perspectives and 
action strategies of the trade union movement and those of other social move-
ments’ (Foro Nuestra América 1997). The HSA has emerged as a hemispheric 
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transnational advocacy network linking trade unions and more than 50 large 
organizations and networks from throughout the Western Hemisphere, with the 
objective of generating a continental social agenda alternative to the ‘free trade’ 
agenda proposed in the FTAA project.
 The creation of this multi- sectoral coalition fostered the formation of other 
nationwide multi- sectoral coalitions that became integrated in the HSA as 
national chapters of the alliance: the Brazilian Network for the People’s Integra-
tion (REBRIP) in 1998; the Autoconvocatoria No al ALCA (later renamed the 
Movimiento Si de los Pueblos – MOSIP) in Argentina in which the CTA plays a 
pivotal role; the Colombian Network Against Free Trade (RECALCA); and less 
formally organized coalitions in Central America, Paraguay, Uruguay, Chile, 
Peru and (to a lesser extent) Bolivia. All these national coalitions are intercon-
nected hemispherically as national nodes of the HSA, which has an executive 
secretariat located at RECALCA (previously it was hosted by RMALC and later 
by the Brazilian CUT and ORIT).
 The space of intersectoral dialogue facilitated by the HSA produced a series 
of policy documents, ‘Alternatives for the Americas’. These documents contain 
the basis of consensus reached between the many organizations and networks 
that participated in a continental debate about how regional integration should be 
approached in the Americas, as an alternative model to the neoliberal FTAA 
project. This social agenda of integration would later be taken by the Venezuelan 
government as the basis for the proposed Alternative for the Americas (ALBA) 
project and the Bolivian People’s Trade Agreement (TCP) launched by Evo 
Morales in April 2006 (Saguier 2007).
 In spite of the widespread optimism about alliance seeking and its positive 
potential for the labour movement, it remains questionable how successful unions 
really are in opening up to such alliances and what role they can play in a coalition 
of civil society actors (Waterman and Willis 2001: 306). It remains to be seen how 
far the involvement of unions in multi- sectoral coalitions like the HSA will go 
beyond its tactical value of increasing labour’s influence in trade (or other) proc-
esses by building support among other social constituencies. The challenge of 
expanding traditional notions of work representation remains real, considering the 
existence of informal work and other unrepresented/invisible forms of labour.
Spaces of participation at the grassroots level
The labour movement in the Americas has also participated in and supported the 
creation of alternative democratic spaces to formulate and articulate its demands 
in relation to the FTAA process. Trade unions participated (along with the HSA) 
in the creation of the People’s Summits process, the World Social Forum (WSF ) 
and a Continental Campaign against the FTAA. These informal spaces became 
points of leverage that strengthened labour positions in denouncing the socially 
and democratically regressive FTAA project.
 People’s Summits, where the FTAA project featured as a key area of labour 
mobilization, were held in the context of the Summit of the Americas (Santiago 
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in 1998, Quebec in 2001 and Mar del Plata in 2005) and FTAA trade ministerial 
meetings. The People’s Summits provided a space where all trade union repre-
sentatives and other social organizations could meet and exchange information, 
reach common positions and coordinate hemispheric- wide actions. A final decla-
ration and plan of action were issued at the end of each summit with the conclu-
sions of the event and workshops. The mobilizations that took place at the 
Buenos Aires People’s Summit of 2001 (parallel to the FTAA Ministerial 
Meeting) pressured governments into the public release of the FTAA draft docu-
ment which took place later that year.
 Another important space for the participation of the labour movement from 
2000 is the WSF. Since the first WSF in Porto Alegre, Brazil, there have been 
myriad versions of this forum, including regional versions in the Americas, Africa, 
Europe, Asia and North America, national fora and theme- based fora. The Ameri-
cas Social Forum, held in Ecuador in 2003, was particularly important for mobiliz-
ing opposition to the FTAA at a time when it became clear that the trade 
negotiations had stagnated. Unlike the People’s Summits, the WSF issues no final 
declaration aimed at representing the views and demands of all participants.
 The choice of the spaces for labour participation at the grassroots level has 
also depended on changes in the political context in the region, as well as in the 
FTAA process. Since the start of FTAA negotiations in 1998, the engagement of 
trade unions with this process has prioritized efforts to influence negotiations 
and reform the trade agenda with a commitment to a labour clause. This strategy 
was abandoned in the aftermath of the Quebec Summit of the Americas in 2001. 
The shortcomings of earlier engagements with this process were evident from 
the reduced capacity of the labour movement to influence the terms of the nego-
tiations. Growing opposition to neoliberal globalization in public opinion, as 
illustrated by the Quebec demonstrations, also contributed to a shift in the labour 
movement’s approach to the FTAA process. The new strategy would aim to 
derail the FTAA process altogether.
 In this context, the labour movement was accompanied by an initiative of the 
HSA and other social forces in Latin America critical of neoliberal policies to 
launch a Continental Campaign against the FTAA. Established and active social 
movement networks such as Jubilee South, Cry of the Excluded, Convergence of 
Movements of the Peoples of the Americas and others joined the campaign to 
oppose the FTAA. The main strategy of the Campaign was the organization and 
transnational coordination of a continent- wide popular consultation on the 
FTAA. This aimed at providing information on the consequences of the FTAA, 
in terms of fostering public debate on the links between trade policies and devel-
opment. The popular consultations also sought to mobilize support behind gov-
ernments to hold official plebiscites on the FTAA in every country as a 
precondition for eventual adherence to the agreement. The idea behind this was 
that if such official plebiscites were to take place, governments would not be 
able to rely on sufficient support to join the FTAA.
 The national coordinating bodies of the Campaign organized a series of 
popular consultation initiatives between September 2002 and March 2003. The 
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most successful of these experiences was conducted in Brazil between 1 and 7 
September 2002, where more than 10 million people in 3,894 municipalities 
from across the country voted in a popular plebiscite on the FTAA. The results 
of this consultation showed that 98 per cent of the people that participated were 
opposed to the signing of the FTAA, and only 1 per cent supported it (‘Dez 
milhões’ 2002).
 Another important initiative took place in Argentina, where between 20 and 
26 November 2003 the Autoconvocatoria No al ALCA network organized a 
popular consultation on the FTAA, foreign debt and militarization. On this occa-
sion, 2,252,358 people voted in 5,700 voting boxes placed in every province of 
the country (Berrón and Freire 2004: 301). The results of this consultation 
showed that 96 per cent of the people expressed their opposition to the FTAA. A 
second consultation was launched in July 2004 to pressure the government to 
hold an official referendum on the FTAA, although this did not succeed.
 The experience of Paraguay was also relatively successful. With the leading 
role held by the Social Pastoral section of the Episcopal Conference of the Cath-
olic Church, rural movements and organizations, and NGOs working mostly on 
human rights and the environment, a popular consultation was organized during 
2003 in 17 districts around the country. Surpassing organizers’ expectations, 
162,676 people participated in this consultation. The Paraguayan campaign 
managed to introduce the FTAA as an issue of discussion in the press and in 
national debate. This is considered to be one of the most important achievements 
of the movement against the FTAA (Berrón and Freire 2004: 304).
 In Mexico, a permanent consultation process was used from 12 October to 18 
March 2003, in which two million people participated. However, 900,000 voted 
in favour of the FTAA. A consultation was launched in Ecuador by the Perma-
nent Committee of Struggle against the FTAA on 9 October 2003, and the Uru-
guayan chapter of the HSA coordinated a consultation on 21 August 2003. Other 
initiatives were held with less significant repercussions in the US through an 
online consultation, a collection of signatures in Costa Rica, El Salvador and 
Honduras, and a public opinion survey in Peru and Canada.
 The initiatives of grassroots participation discussed in this section, in which 
the labour movement was actively engaged, contributed to politicizing the FTAA 
process and agenda from ‘outside’ the formal institutional process. Advocacy 
efforts to open up the tightly controlled decision- making space of the FTAA 
negotiations were buttressed by grassroots opposition and an information cam-
paign which successfully managed to give public visibility to this trade process. 
Likewise, it opened up the debate about the possible social and environmental 
implications of this trade agreement. In this respect, the contribution of the 
labour movement to the construction of grassroots spaces of participation is a 
means of building power ‘from below’. This can be seen as a counter forum, 
shifting strategy in which trade unions increase their influence in trade policy 
process by investing in non- formal spaces.
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Conclusion
The labour movement in the Americas combined participation in formal spaces 
of participation in the negotiations, as well as informal grassroots spaces trying 
to gain leverage in relation to the negotiation process. It directed its advocacy 
efforts at attempts to open up trade decision- making spaces, in order to increase 
the representation of labour demands as part of emerging governance structures. 
The extent to which increasing participation in such formal trade processes leads 
to greater democratization of decision making depends on the capacity of the 
labour movement to resist being coopted. Engagement in trade policy processes 
is only desirable if the movement has a firm enough standing to be able to inter-
pellate corporate power and also contribute to policy debates. Labour autonomy 
is also linked to having increased technical skills on trade issues, combined with 
strategic thinking to guide its interventions.
 Labour unity is central to mobilizing responses in multiple institutional spaces 
with a common agenda. In this respect, cohesion is key to ensuring leverage in 
trade processes and offsetting the tensions between unions and sectors that can 
easily exacerbate divisions in the movement. In this regard, the steps taken to 
unite the labour movement in the Americas with the LPA and TUCA are import-
ant landmarks in efforts to build a united regional labour movement.
 Nevertheless, convergence at the inter- union level is not sufficient to drive a 
deeper process of renewal of the labour movement. Autonomy of the labour move-
ment also rests on the legitimacy of trade unions to act as organizations that repre-
sent workers’ rights and demands. The rise of unemployed workers, illegal 
migration, tertiarization and non- unionized productive activities, among other fea-
tures of the labour market, press trade unions to adapt its traditional representation 
of ‘workers’ – industrial/urban workers. Some of the coalitions established 
between trade unions and various social movements to mobilize against the FTAA 
project suggest a closer involvement of trade unions with other forms of work.
 Opposition to the FTAA project created conditions for the viability of multi- 
sectoral coalitions as tactical responses for increasing leverage against this neo-
liberal trade initiative through mass mobilization and resistance. The challenge 
is to move forward in the political articulation of trade unions and other social 
forces beyond the requirements of changing conjunctures. The chances of 
expanding the social bases of representation of the labour movement rest on its 
increasing democratization in the light of greater plurality of workers and social 
demands. The construction of political alternatives to neoliberal integration 
schemes can only take place with the participation of a range of social forces 
that are critical of the exclusionary and environmentally destructive logic of 
modern industrial notions of ‘development’. In this respect, the renewal of the 
labour movement depends on its incorporation of struggles for land distribution 
and environmental sustainability led by peasant movements and environmental 
groups, the acknowledgement of existing dynamics of inclusion/exclusion based 
on gender and ethnic origin, the ancestral plight of the indigenous movement 
for the control of natural resources, and political representation and cultural 
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 survival, among others. The renewal of the labour movement cannot disregard 
such emerging forces.
 In so far as the labour movement increases its capacity to engage in trade 
policy processes, and mobilize as a united front with social bases of support 
beyond direct union affiliates, unions can make the most of the many sites of 
social and political articulation that have emerged in recent years on the ‘outside’ 
of formal political institutions. Combining strategies of mobilization in formal 
processes and in grassroots spaces like social summits, fora, people’s tribunals, 
campaigns and so on, the labour movement opens a new landscape of political 
opportunities to influence and contest trade policy. Just as powerful governments 
and TNCs adopt ‘forum- shifting’ tactics, trade unions are beginning to mobilize 
at the multiple levels of trade governance involved in trade policy decisions. 
Alliances with other social groups that may have better access to policy pro-
cesses become strategically important. Political cohesion and coordination 
between unions is needed, as well as strong links with skilled and resource- 
endowed NGOs and popular movements. They can all add to their specific form 
of influence, which includes: transferring resources and skills in trade matters, 
securing access to institutional spaces, sharing advocacy experience and con-
tacts, and mobilizing mass- based street demonstrations, public events and 
popular education initiatives. These practices create new opportunities for 
gaining leverage in political processes for the labour movement.
 The labour practices that were presented in this chapter as responses to the 
FTAA process are only points of departure in the much longer aim of reformu-
lating a type of labour movement capable of addressing the challenges of 
workers’ representation raised by an increasingly decentralized and concentrated 
productive system. The current global economic and financial crisis incorporates 
greater pressure on national economies to protect employment. In the past this 
has led to the rise of nationalistic and xenophobic tendencies among the labour 
movements. More than ever, the need to reinforce international solidarity is of 
central importance. This is necessary, not only to avoid the fragmentation of the 
labour movement, but most of all to continue with the construction of a global 
labour force capable of having leverage in the creation of future economic gov-
ernance arrangements that invariably affect the nature and conditions of work.
 The intensity and depth of the experience of neoliberal trade projects under-
taken in the Americas region provide a case study for many of the dynamics that 
drive neoliberal globalization. In particular, the labour practices adopted in this 
continent to resist (but also to facilitate) ‘free trade’ projects illuminate some of 
the challenges and avenues that the labour movement will have to take in order 
to realize its aspiration of seeing the workers of the world unite.
Notes
1 The ‘Global- Local’ Research Programme at the Institute of Development Studies 
(IDS), University of Sussex, provided financial support for this research. I would like 
to thank particularly John Gaventa and Rajesh Tandon.
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2 The first of these Labour Summits was held in Denver (1995), followed by Cartagena 
(1996), Belo Horizonte (1997) and the MERCOSUR presidential summit (1996).
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